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Abstract
There are multiple airworthiness (AW) certification paths for aircraft platforms
and their modifications. Specifically, military commercial derivative aircraft (MCDA)
have a unique opportunity to pursue either FAA certification, military certification or a
combination of both. Policy tells MCDA programs to pursue FAA certification to the
maximum extent possible, however, the policy lacks clarity regarding where that extent
ends. This concept of extent encompasses multiple factors and the choice of an AW basis
is a complex decision. Under ideal conditions the decision maker, the program manager,
has the experience and insight to support their decision, however, this is not always the
case.
This research unpacks the factors weighed by experienced personnel in an effort
to inform future AW decisions. A comparative case study analysis was conducted using
the same military specific modification on two MCDAs and one military specific aircraft.
Interview data from multiple stakeholders was gathered for each case. While, the data set
is small, it is representative, and generalizable to a common type of platform
modification.
A recurring challenge is a lack of experience in AW among Program Mangers.
The distilled insights from this research provides continuity and lessons learned. An AW
PM Guidance Sheet summarizes key decision factors and is a key deliverable of this
research. The objective of this Guidance Sheet is improved and informed decision
making for future certification decisions.
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While estimated cost and schedule requirements are two major factors considered
in the choice of a certification basis. However, we find that the different paths are
relatively equal in cost and schedule outcomes. Therefore, programs should not let a time
or cost constraint dictate their decision. The primary decision factor should be focused
on the technical level of integration of the modification necessary to meet FAA and
military AW standards.
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AIRWORTHINESS DECISION FACTORS IN THE US AIR FORCE
I. Introduction
1.1 Background
Airworthiness (AW) certification is a necessity in the aerospace world. It implements the proper safety measures for anything that will be in
the skies. AW applies to an aircraft itself or any new gadget or modification applied to an aircraft. Airworthiness is formally defined as, “the
property of an air system configuration to safely attain, sustain, and complete flight in accordance with approved usage limits” as stated in MILHDBK 516C: Airworthiness Criteria (AFLCMC/ENRS, 2014). The United States Air Force (USAF) AW certification falls under the umbrella of
two organizations: the Technical Airworthiness Authority (TAA) dictating the military AW processes, and the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) dictating the civil AW processes. The TAA is within the Air Force Lifecycle Management Center (AFLCMC) EN-EZ office located at
Wright Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB), Ohio. The FAA is an agency within the U.S. Department of Transportation, with offices all across the
country to be near aircraft manufacturers (Mission – Federal Aviation Administration, 2022).
Between these two AW certification authorities, there are a multitude of ways to obtain certification some of which involve the combination
of both parties’ processes. The reason for trying to utilize FAA AW certification as well as military AW certification paths, starts with the fact that
the USAF throughout its history has used many commercial aircraft and modified them to meet military requirements (Grimes, 2014). These aircraft
are called military commercial derivative aircraft (MCDA), because they originated under an FAA certification for a commercial purpose and then
modified for military use (FAA & Hempe, 2015).
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At present, the Air Force fleet consists of 81 different operational aircraft, in 8 mission categories (Table 1), (2021 USAF & USSF Almanac, 2021).
MCDAs exist in all of the categories except for Bombers and Fighter/Attack. MCDA examples would be the E-11A (Bombardier Global Jet), VC-25
Air Force One (Boeing 747) and the KC-46 (Boeing 767), which are private and commercial passenger/cargo jets respectively in the civil domain,
but for the military are ISR/BM/C3, Transport, and Tanker aircraft respectively. Bomber and Fighter/Attack are the only two aircraft types made up
entirely of military specific aircraft (MSA), meaning that they were built originally for a military purpose and have no civil aircraft equivalent. For
example, the A-10 Thunderbolt (Fairchild Republic), F-22 Raptor (Lockheed Martin),
Table 1: Aircraft Types & MCDA Breakout
A/C Type # of Types Total Aircraft # of MCDA Type # of MCDA AC
Bomber
3
158
Fighter/ Attack
8
2094
Spec Ops
6
154
ISR/BM/C3
26
491
17
104
Tanker
6
526
4
494
Transport
18
668
13
83
Helicopter
4
198
Trainer
10
1179
6
654
Total
81
5468
40
1335
% MCDA/Full AF Fleet
49%
24%

B-52 Stratofortress (Boeing) do not have a commercial aircraft equivalent. Due to such a unique spread of aircraft the same airworthiness
certification is not applied to each platform and the modifications that are applied to them. Of the 81 types of aircraft flying 39 are MCDAs, which is
over 49%. It is important to recognize just how many PMOs are having to work these complex AW decisions and that it is hardly a small portion of
the Air Force working with these types of aircraft.
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Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 62-6: USAF Airworthiness states that, “For all other civil aircraft acquired or modified by the Air Force, the
Air Force shall obtain and maintain Federal Aviation Administration type certification to the maximum extent practical” (SAF/AQ & Roper, 2019).
Although this policy is only a few years old this concept has been encouraged for generations. Aircraft initially purchased as commercial-off-the-shelf
(COTS), provided initial cost and schedule savings since the aircraft was already built (Marx et al, 1990).
FAA standards and test procedures only cover a portion of military modifications (ex. a routine modification to a Heads-Up Display (HUD) due to
Diminishing Manufacturing Sources (DMS)). This lack of coverage leaves certain functionalities of a system to the Air Force to certify through its
channels (FAA & Hempe, 2015). This line of where the FAA certification ends and military certification begins is known as the “AW seam.” This term
had not been formally defined in documentation until 1 Sep 2021 in AWB-360: Commercial Derivative Aircraft Airworthiness (AFLCMC/EZZ & JanningLask, 2021), but has been a phrase passed along word-of-mouth for many years. Airworthiness Bulletins (AWB’s) are guidance from the USAF
Airworthiness Office (AFLCMC/EZZ) and the Technical Airworthiness Authority (TAA) that look to explain AW steps and processes. While program
management offices (PMOs) must navigate this “AW seam”, there is a lack of guidance on how to best approach the decision for a programs’ AW
certification path. Therefore, this research focuses on understanding the decision factors that different programs took into account as they pursued their AW
certification. There are policies and AW Bulletins (AWB) that exist to aid in what to do once a path has been selected but not much research has been done
specifically targeting how a program should decide the AW certification path for modifications. The decision of the AW certification path is not a simple
binary decision of FAA certification versus military certification, but is a complex decision with multiple options of combining different levels of both
certification processes.
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1.2 Research Questions
This lack of continuity was motivated from the researcher’s past experience in an MCDA program management office (PMO) and the
difficulties faced in knowing the best approach for airworthiness certification. The research questions in this thesis are:
1. What factors are key in the choice of an AW certification path for aircraft modifications?
2. How do these decision factors influence each other in the final airworthiness path selection and its execution?
3. What can be done to improve airworthiness certification path decisions?
Hopefully by answering these questions program managers will be able to lead their programs to the clearest and most reliable certification paths for
their platform.
1.3 Methodology
To answer these questions, first, a deeper look into existing literature, policies and procedures was accomplished, and second a focus on
PMOs factors for AW certification path. A comparative case study analysis was performed examining different MCDA PMOs and their decision
factors that dictated the AW certification decision made. The data collected was through a series of semi-structured interviews with at least one
program manager (PM) and one engineer (EN) from each platform along with a representative from the TAA. This triangulation of perspectives will
identify any distinctions specifically tied to personnel views. Personnel from MSA platforms are also included in these interviews in order to see
how the MCDA mixed certification approach compared with a military only AW certification. The questions were categorized to bring in certain data
tied to personnel’s experience, the understanding of the program’s modification and programmatic measures, the airworthiness certification path and
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the decisions made along the way, as well as reflections of what they thought worked and lessons learned. Through coding responses, Similarities &
Difference tables and direct quotes were used to identify decision factors see what influences them.
1.4 Assumptions/Limitations
There are over 80 types of aircraft flying today, and more in development, and even more modifications that occur on these platforms. The
wide range of aircraft modifications (Figure 1) that are applied to our systems have the potential meet different levels of FAA certification across the
“AW seam.” The research focused on one type of modification, military global positioning system (Mil GPS), due to former experience with this
modification. This also allowed easier access to contacts and interviews. More importantly, the research team asserted that insights from the Mil
GPS modifications are extensible and representative to other modifications with similar roles (e.g., navigation and communication, Identify Friend or
Foe (IFF)).

Figure 1: Spectrum of Aircraft Modifications
B-12

1.5 Implications or Expected Contributions
This research intends to better inform decision making processes for future PMOs of what decision factors current programs had going into
their AW certification paths. The prior AW experience of the research team was limited going into this researcher and expected that to be the case
for program managers on other platforms. Therefore, a guidance specifically for PMs as the leaders of these programs was created in hopes to better
educate them before AW certification decisions are made.
1.6 Summary
Chapter II. Literature Review explains the policies behind airworthiness certification, a closer look at the AW “seam” and the different
certification paths it can take. Chapter III. Methodology shows the steps taken within the interview-based comparative case study conducted.
Chapter IV. Analysis and Results walks through the findings from applying the methodology. Lastly, Chapter V. Conclusion shows exactly how the
results have answered the research questions, recommendations for future research, and the significance of continuity and guidance delivered form
this research.
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II. Literature Review
2.1 Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to show further details of the existing policies and guidance, to define the AW seam, and show applicable
literature for the methodology.
2.2 Policies and Guidance
According to Cook & Haverkamp (2020), the FAA has a more proven track record, is more familiar on the international scale, and is
easily repeatable. In contrast, the military approach is based on risk acceptance levels and can lead to unique certification and requirements. A
common assumption that exists is that military AW process’s use of risk acceptance for aircraft modifications can be a cost and schedule saver as not
all compliances are necessarily met to fly operationally. This view of the FAA versus the TAA and the assumption of cost and schedule savings are
something the interviews discussed in the following chapters will consider.
The FAA has very detailed instruction for obtaining an aircraft’s type certificate in FAA Order 8110.4C – Type Certification (2017) over 200
pages, dictated by the encompassing Title 14 – Aeronautics and Space Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) specifically Part 21 – Certification
Procedures for Products and Articles (National Archives and Records Administration [NARA], 2021). These instructions are primarily for civilian
and commercial type aircraft, but do mention military aircraft and their ability to be certified as well. A type certificate (TC) is a design approval
issued by the FAA saying the aircraft has met applicable compliances or standards, meaning an aircraft with a TC has received AW certification
(FAA, 2017). When modifications occur a supplemental type certificate (STC) is issued indicating a major design change to the original TC, and the
aircraft would continue to have its AW certification (FAA, 2017). Figure 2 shows the typical certification process for a civil aircraft.
B-12

A design is created, a certification basis and plan are set then a series of inspections, and tests are implemented to show compliance with the criteria

Figure 2: FAA Typical AW Type Certification Process (FAA, 2017)
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set in the certification plan. When all compliances have been met, a type certificate is achieved.
The USAF’s equivalent of the FAA’s guidance for requirements and checklists is documented in the MIL-HDBK 516C – Airworthiness
Certification Criteria, as directed to use by Air Force Instruction (AFI) 62-601 – USAF Airworthiness, stemming from policy AFPD 62-6 – USAF
Airworthiness (ACQNow, 2021). MIL-HDBK 516C breaks down airworthiness criteria through conducting checklists that will meet different
specifications from a series of different categories represent by each chapter of the document. The criteria are tailorable as not all modifications will
need to meet every standard. For instance, chapter 5: Structures, lays out the checklist necessary for compliance as it relates to the load and mass
properties of the modification and the different tolerances it must meet, while chapter 15: Computer Systems and Software, focuses on the standards
of what pedigree the software and software architecture of the modification was developed at and if it is meeting the quality set by the checklist
standards (AFLCMC/ENRS, 2014). If installing new flaps made of a new material Chapter 5 would have more AW criteria involved than 15, where
as a cockpit HUD modification would have a lot more Chapter 15 criteria. Table 2 is a list of all the chapters of MIL-HDBK 516C.
Table 2: MIL-HDBK-516C Chapters (AFLCMC/ENRS, 2014)
MIL-HDBK-516C Chapters
1. Scope
11. Avionics
2. Applicable Documents
12. Electrical System
3. Definitions and Abbreviations
13. Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E^3)
4. Systems Engineering
14. System Safety
5. Structures
15. Computer Systems and Software
6. Flight Technology
16. Maintenance
7. Propulsion and Propulsion Installations 17. Armaments and Stores Integration
8. Air Vehicle Subsystems
18. Passenger Safety
9. Crew Systems
19. Materials
10. Diagnostics Systems
20. Air Transportability, Airdrop, Mission/Test
Equipment and Carfo/Payload Safety
21. Notes
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The TAA advised the research team to take the course AIR 116 – Introduction to AF Airworthiness Certification on the AF course site
ACQNow (2021). This was extremely helpful in the understanding of the military AW certification process. The basic process model for AW
certification through the military is seen in Figure 3. A modification airworthiness certification criteria (MACC) matrix is developed based on the
certification basis established through MIL-HDBK 516C, and is used as the grading rubric for the Compliance Reviews. Once tested for compliance,
a final risk assessment is conducted and if all compliances are met a military type certificate (MTC) to fly is issued, but if all compliances are not met
and some risk remains, depending on its severity, certain levels of leadership can accept the risk and fly on an operational military flight release
without certification. The FAA is similar in that it certifies if all compliances are met, but differs from the military process in that there is no option
for noncompliant certifications or risk approved operations.

Figure 3: Military Typical AW Certification Process (ACQNow, 2021)
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Another unique aspect to the military certification is whether or not the modification is reportable or nonreportable. As seen in Figure 4, all
the same steps occur but the authority no longer has to go through the third party TAA office but can stay within PMOs chain of command.
A TC with the FAA and an MTC through the military process seem similar but the requirements and standards differ enough that the cert
basis are not interchangeable and so MCDA aircraft often have aspects of both certification paths implemented in their AW certification. Ultimately

Figure 4: USAF Certification Process w/ Nonreportable Option (AFLCMC/EZZ,
& Fischer, 2020)
as a military aircraft an MCDA will hold an MTC but a certain level of TC from the FAA can fall within it as well. FAA Order 8110.101A is the
document that shows the different levels of FAA certification available to MCDA aircraft and what some steps are required to obtain those
certification levels (FAA & Hempe, 2015). The FAA Order also establishes the roles and responsibilities of the different parties involved in an

B-12

airworthiness certification for an MCDA. There are 4 levels of FAA approval that can be applied to MCDA aircraft and their modifications as
defined in Order 8110.101A (FAA & Hempe, 2015):
• Full approval – meaning equipment installation and operations without special restrictions or limitations.
• Approval with operational limitations – equipment and installation are approved but with certain limitations on operation from the FAA
standpoint; also known as limited approval.
• Safe Carriage – equipment has a partial approval that allows for installation (approval of aerodynamics, weight and balance, etc.) but does
not approve the functional aspects i.e., unplugged and no power.
• Provisions only – the equipment is not installed but only safety implications and limits are defined for the military to keep in mind when
they go for a military installation.
Beyond the certification/approval provided by the FAA, the remaining functionality must undergo some level of military airworthiness certification
process in order to be deemed safe for flight. The military certification with the TAA helps to dictate the remaining certification. This combination
of certifications is referred to as the AW "seam”.
2.3 AW “Seam”
The AW “seam” is a term to describe the mixing of certifications between FAA and military processes. While being a term used in this field,
it was only recently codified (September, 2021). Airworthiness bulletin (AWB)-360 is a product of the TAA and defines the AW “seam”. AWB-360
– Commercial Derivative Aircraft Airworthiness, defines the AW “seam” as “the junction between the FAA and USAF compliance assessments”
(AFLCMC/EZZ & Janning-Lask, 2021). Figure 5 is an informative chart laying out what the AW “seam” looks like at each of the 4 levels of
B-12

approval. AWB-360 will be helpful in understanding the disconnects that PMOs may have with the certification processes in the future. The
platforms interviewed in this research were all in execution a couple years before the release of this AWB, but the interviews will shed light on the
usefulness of this AWB as well as additional insight that would be helpful for future programs.
The AW “seam” is a balance of using both FAA and military certification processes. Cook & Haverkamp (2020) have introduced four
different approaches to interpreting requirements and understanding how they fit in an AW certification path for MCDAs: Superset approach – large

Figure 5: Levels of FAA Approval and AW Seam (AFLCMC/EZZ & Janning-Lask, 2021)
joint military and civil software development and verification process; Subset approach – finding common attributes at core competencies and
determine a joint compliance; Model-based approach – modeling the software certification process; and Assurance Case approach – the safety case
where utilizing backed evidence to explain why the software used is reliable based on similar previous functionality. The advantages and
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disadvantages of these approaches are listed in the Table 3. Their approaches look at the specific software aspects of the AW seam and how the
standard for civil software and mil grade software do not perfectly align, although these approaches still relate to the entirety of the AW “Seam”.

Table 3: Key Advantages and Disadvantages of Each Approach
(Cook & Haverkamp, 2020)

2.4 Methodology Application
Outside of Cook & Haverkamp (2020), no significant literature showed how to approach the decision factors and mindset of making an AW
certification path decision. With no prior literature to extend the research, the methodology quickly turned to the focus on collecting straight from
the platforms directly in the form of interviews. Knowing the difficulties making contact and scheduling a multitude of interviews the focus was
reduced to a few case studies involving a comparative analysis. The interview itself is just one step in the multistep sensemaking research method
(DeCuir-Gunby et al, 2010). Interviews bring to light multiple aspects of a problem, if asking the right questions. Asking the right questions, will
provide raw data that will tie to the theory investigated, that is also supported with some level of literature. But to make sense of these three aspects
code development needs to occur of the data needs to take place. Figure 6, from DeCuir-Gunby et al. (2010) shows the cyclic nature of coding in
interpreting data. This coding is not software code but a way of upfront identifying what sort of results that are to be pulled from responses in an
interview. The use of semi-structured interviews allows more freedom in response and additional layers of what could be recognized as important
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contribution to theory (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). In developing a codebook, it is important that the labels and phrasing are assigned to different
sections of data (Miles & Huberman, 1994). This will keep the data organized as it is compressed to answer specific research questions and draw
comparisons across multiple interviews as the coded phrases from different questions come to light. In these comparisons, data expansion through
new connections that were unexpected can come to light allowing for new theories and perspectives to be observed (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996).
Applying these coding tools can be organized in a way that can be set into decision matrices that compare particular coded interview responses headto-head (Clarkson & Eckert, 2001).
Semi-structured interviews questions with a coded sequencing were utilized, but the matrixing for comparison of the interviews was modified
into the form of Similarities & Differences tables for the methodology section in this research effort
2.5 Summary

Figure 6: Circular Process of Coding (DeCuiry-Gunby et al, 2011)
There are policies, documents and even short courses that explain either the FAA or TAA airworthiness certifications. The FAA Order
8110.101A (2015) provides four options for the AW “seam” and AWB-360 (2021) defined the AW “seam”, however the guidance is silent on how
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PMOs have actually implemented these seams and what the key decision factors were for their course of action. Due to this gap, the research team
has selected qualitative methods to characterize PMO decision factors in selecting their AW certification path. The specific methods are discussed in
Chapter III. Methodology.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to show the methods used to better understand the airworthiness decision factors of different PMOs for MCDA
modifications within the Air Force. The next section is an overview of the research methodology and overall approach. The third section establishing
the case study criteria. The fourth section shows how data was collected from interviews. Finally, the layout of how the data analysis was done
through taking interview responses and transitioning them into tangible outputs.
3.2 Overview of Research Methodology
The primary method for this thesis was a comparative analysis of different PMOs decision factors that led to their AW certification path using
semi-structured interviews. The unit of analysis was an individual aircraft modification that was a military requirement: Mil GPS. Decision factor
rationale for each aircraft platform modification was gathered from multiple sources. The interviews were of PMO and TAA personnel who have
worked on the aircraft modification and established an airworthiness certification process for their project. This data contributed to a case history for
each modification.
A series of open-response questions were used in interviews conducted with different engineers and program managers in aircraft PMOs to
learn about the airworthiness certification paths followed and the decision factors that were made along the way. Members under the Technical
Airworthiness Authority (TAA) in the AFLCMC/EZZ airworthiness office were sought for interviews as they have assessment duties and, in some
cases, approve the PMOs airworthiness pursuits. The interviews allowed for a matrix to be created that coded the important similarities and
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differences of the informants. The matrix led to the final stage which delivered a final guidance, or cheat sheet, for future program managers to use
when preparing their airworthiness certification paths for their own programs.
3.3 Case Study Criteria
There are over 5,400 aircraft within the Air Force today across 81 types or models of aircraft (Table 1). Some are being built solely with a
military purpose and others had an initial design for a commercial purpose that were then purchased for use in the military. 49% of the types of
aircraft are MCDA and over 1,300 aircraft are MCDA (Table 1), and so a significant portion of the Air Force mission and PMOs are supported with
MCDA. Military aircraft can be identified into four major categories of aircraft and any modifications requiring airworthiness certification pertaining
to them (Figure 7). These categories are based on the origin of the aircraft and then the type of modification requirement being implemented. The 4
categories are: commercial derivative aircraft (CDA) with a civil requirement, CDA with a military requirement, military specific aircraft (MSA)
with a civilian requirement, and MSA with a military requirement.

PMOs
their

Civil Requirement

Military Requirement

CDA / Civil Reqt

CDA / Mil Reqt

Commercial
Derivative Aircraft
(CDA)

The case selection for this research was scoped to
that were all working a common military modification for

Platform 1
Platform 2

aircraft. A military global positioning system (Mil GPS)
modification was implemented on each of the platforms. Mil

GPS
the
it is

Platform 3

Military Specific
Aircraft (MSA)

was selected as the constant in this research for four reasons:
MSA / Civil Reqt

MSA / Mil Reqt

research team had previous experience with the modification,
representative of many types of common aircraft

Figure 7: Aircraft Categories and Modifications
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modifications; provided a good chance for data collection; and it is a modification that exist at the AW “seam”. This control brings the focus from a
wide variety of modifications to a strict military modification that is also very similar to a civilian system in that it is a GPS which all civilian aircraft
have.
Interview informants for three different PMOs were secured as case studies for the research. Each PMO managed a different aircraft. Two
MCDA aircraft and 1 military specific aircraft (MSA) were selected (Figure 8).
The cases obtained allow for cross examining of similarities and differences from commercial aircraft to military in certification requirements
Civil Requirement

Military Requirement

CDA / Civil Reqt

CDA / Mil Reqt

Table 4: Case Study Platform Details
Commercial
Derivative Aircraft
(CDA)
Case Study
A/C Type

Platform 1 MCDA
Platform 2 MCDA
Military Specific
Platform
3 (MSA)
MSA
Aircraft

Operational
10-20 yrs
new
>20 yrs

Fleet Size
Small: < 10
Small: < 10
Large: > 100

MSA / Civil Reqt

Platform 1
Platform 2

Mission A/C Type
ISR/BM/C3
Transport
Platform 3
Fighter/Attack

Modification
Mil GPS
Mil GPS
Mil GPS

MSA / Mil Reqt

Figure 8: Aircraft Type and Modification with Case Studies
and decisions made. Further, duplication among MCDA allows for a comparison between similar systems. Both of the MCDA aircraft are small
fleet aircraft with a communication heavy mission, but are very different in overall portfolio. One MCDA falls under the ISR/BM/C3 aircraft
portfolio, while the other is a new platform within the Transport aircraft portfolio (Table 4).
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Informants from multiple roles were attained for each modification case. PMOs have personnel who have unique roles, notably in
management and engineering. These roles can influence the person’s perspectives and priorities. Therefore, the informants representing the PMO for
each platform consisted of at least one program manager and one engineer. This is to identify what similarities and differences may have come from
the mindsets of the two different roles. Their experience levels and knowledge will be measured.
Beyond the internal personnel (PM and EN) from the PMO, the AW process often involves the external agency of the TAA. Therefore, a
member of the TAA associated with the case studies were sought for interviews. This will add a third perspective on the airworthiness decisions

Figure 9: Interview Personnel Perspective Triangulation
made in each of the program (Figure 9). The TAA perspective is unique as its goals are strictly to address airworthiness of any system whereas the
PMs and ENs in the PMO are ensuring they are fielding technology according to certain cost, schedule and performance constraints.
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3.4 Data Collection
3.4.1 Interview Structure
To reiterate, interviews were conducted with informants from two different MCDA and one MSA. All three aircraft programs have engaged
in the AW process for the Mil GPS modification. The two MCDA programs have sought a hybrid FAA/military certification along the AW “seam”,
while the MSA program had a military only certification.
The interviews conducted with the PMs, ENs, and TAA representative consisted of 20 semi-structured questions that collected information
about the informant work level and experience with airworthiness, the details surrounding the program and its requirements and history, the
airworthiness certification path taken and why their program went the way they did, and lastly what information had they wish they had and were
there things they would have done differently etc. The semi-structured interview questions (Appendix A: Interview Script), allowed open-ended
responses where similarities and key differences in certain approaches and decision-making occurred across the PMs and ENs for their programs
respectively. The TAA representative was asked the same questions modified the more PMO-specific questions to be from the vantage point of
being a viewer of the program and not one within it.
3.4.2 Institutional Review Board
Interview and research protocols underwent Air Force Institute of Technology’s Institutional Review Board process. A package including the
interview script, matrix, and consent form, along with other AFIT specific documents were submitted. As part of data collection all names and
organizations of informants were redacted from all final transcripts. Recordings were also deleted upon final submission of this thesis. There will
only be one unedited copy of full transcripts to be kept within AFIT in case there is a continuation of study off of this thesis and therefore references
need to be carried over. Therefore, the interviews would incur low to no risk to the informants from any sort of physical or mental harm justifying the
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IRB to deem the interview an exception to the full IRB approval process. By making the interview results anonymous in the end it should help put
the informants in a more honest and vulnerable state when answering the questions.
3.4.3 Tools & Execution
Before conducting interviews, the researcher met with AFLCMC/EZZ, the USAF airworthiness office, to present this research topic.
AFLCMC/EZZ became the sponsor for the research. Their feedback helped with case identification providing some contacts to PMOs fit for the
research. The researcher’s own experience in aircraft PMOs established reliable sources for interviews. The first interactions with informants were
through email. Since all contacts were employees of the USAF it was easy to establish contact using the Global Address List (GAL). When reaching
out to members of the different PMOs, the Division Chiefs, Colonel or O-6 equivalents, (platform level program managers) were contacted as well to
make sure they were aware that their personnel (PMs and ENs) were participating in interviews for research and if that was acceptable to them.
Contacting the Division Chiefs, also, brought extra visibility and awareness to the concerns in this research and established additional potential
contacts for the future.
In the initial emails an Interview Consent Document (ICD) from the IRB package was sent to each of the potential informants. This gave the
informants a breakdown of what the research is, why it is being conducted, how interviewing them will contribute, and most importantly how they
will be protected. From there, meetings were set up in Outlook with the ICD and the Interview Script attached and a link for a video call. The
Interview Script created in Microsoft Word starts with an introduction of the research and a brief reminder to the interviewee that they will be
anonymous, before introducing the four categories of questions and then listing the questions themselves.
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The interviews were conducted using Microsoft Teams (MS Teams) to utilize its capabilities to record with as a video conference and create a
downloadable transcription of everything said to a single Word document with time stamps and identification of speaker. This allowed for cleaner
data collection and not having to rely on recollection as the researcher. The transcripts and recording were saved.
The Interview Matrix was created in Microsoft Excel. Appendix B: Interview Matrix – Raw Data (Anonymized) shows all the interview
questions are listed as their own column with each interviewee as their own row. To maintain anonymity each interviewee was designated a
code. Under each question a finding type was established to know what type of information was to be pulled from the responses for each
question. Once an interview was conducted the exact responses were copied from the transcript file to the corresponding cells in the
Interview Matrix. Then, key phrases were bolded within each question as they related to the finding type for that question and paraphrase
onto a second sheet of the same format Interview Matrix called, Key Code Phrases (Clarkson et al., 2001; DeCuir-Gunby et al., 2010). The
Key Code Phrases sheet seen in
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Appendix C: Key Code Phrases Matrix (Anonymized Data) of the Interview Matrix helped to define key takeaways from each of the
questions.
The “Key Code Phrases” sheet of the Interview Matrix would identify initial similarities and differences among personnel and their decision
factors as they pursued different airworthiness certification paths. A final checklist of necessary AW knowledge, key decision factors and other
advice was created for future PMs to aide them in future AW decisions. The process from “Key Code Phrases” Sheet to the final deliverable of the
PM Guidance is laid out in the next section.
Eight interviews were planned and executed over the course of two months in November and December 2021. One interview was with an EN
over MCDA modifications that did not include Mil GPS and therefore was dropped from the analysis of the research as it was an outlier to the setting
of the other seven interviews. Of the seven interviews that were used in the data, six interviews involved the three platforms discussed above with
one EN and one PM. The 7th and final interview used in the analysis was from one TAA member who was able to speak to the two MCDA aircraft
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airworthiness certifications. Figure 10 is an example of the coding of Platform 1’s informants answers to questions 8 and 9 being narrowed down
through key code phrases related to “Certification Path” and “Factors for Cert Path” respectively.

Figure 10: Raw Interview Data to Key Code Phrases Example
Areas that were compared and key code phrases found across the informants were founded in the 4 sections of the interview: About the
Interviewee, The Program, Airworthiness Certification, and Reflections on the project. Under About the Interviewee, individuals’ level of experience
in their fields and in aircraft systems / airworthiness, and role in the program were measured and compared. Under The Program, the specifics of
their programs to include cost, schedule, performance, mission setting, age and type of aircraft were measured and compared. Under Airworthiness
Certification, the actual certification paths are explained, the decision factors that went into them, the cost and benefits through the eyes of the
interviewee, major setbacks and risks incurred were and what final certification would look like, were measured and compared. Finally, under
Reflections, a layout of the most helpful knowledge (documents, communication, etc.) for the certification path, whether they thought it was the
correct path, and what information they wish they had known were measured and compared.
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To further layout the comparisons Similarity and Differences Tables (examples in Table 5) were created comparing each relation type:
MCDA v MCDA - Platform 1 v Platform 2, MCDA v MSA - Platform 1&2 v Platform 3, PMs – IP1 v IP2 v IP3, ENs – IE1 v IE2 v IE3, PMs v ENs
– IPs v IEs, and Platform 1&2 Personnel v TAA – IP1/IE1 & IP2/IE2 v IT1.

Table 5: Similarities & Differences Table Examples
MCDA v MCDA
Similarities

Similarities

Differences
Platform 1

Platform 2

Platform 1&2 Personnel v TAA
Differences
IP1/IE1 & IP2/IE2

IT1

Using quotes straight from the interviews, key code phrases, and evaluating the similarities and differences of the decision factors in
establishing their AW certification allowed the formulation of guidance and best practices for program managers to better prepare them for
airworthiness decisions on future aircraft modifications.
3.5 Summary
The methods used in this research was a comparative case study qualitative analysis through semi-structured interviews. The informants
included three types of personnel (EN, PM and TAA representative), to form triangular views on the airworthiness decision factors that led to certain
airworthiness certification paths. The 20-question interview recorded and transcribed on MS Teams, allowed a comparison of key areas of the
informants’ experience levels, the programs settings, the airworthiness certification paths and what was good and bad with in their decisions, and
lastly what items were most helpful and what they wish they had when reflected back on the program. The responses populated in an Interview
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Matrix was simplified to key phrases in a second “Key Code Phrase” matrix. Using direct quotes, and key code phrases placed into similarity and
difference tables allowed for insight into the decision factors seen by the programs. These methods then allowed for the creation of a one-page word
document to PMs of best practices and guidance on how to approach making their own airworthiness decisions on future programs.
The following chapter, IV. Analysis & Results, shows the details of what information was collected in the interviews along with any
unexpected results, key takeaways from this effort, and the final product document for future programs.
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IV. Analysis and Results
4.1 Chapter Overview
This Analysis and Results chapter shows the decision factors, execution of the airworthiness paths, and a comparison. Using direct quotes and
key code phrase comparisons through similarity and differences tables, the common factors found were used to implement a final guidance for future
PMs as a quick reference tool of how to approach airworthiness for their program. The following sections are summaries of the three platforms,
expected and unexpected findings, resulting decision factors, and finally the guidance for PMs.
4.2 Summaries of the Three Platforms
Below are three summaries of how the programs were executed based on the information presented in the interviews. Appendix B:
Interview Matrix – Raw Data (Anonymized) and
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Appendix C: Key Code Phrases Matrix (Anonymized Data) has the raw interview data and key
code phrases used to build these summaries. These summaries will help in understanding the
specific findings discussed in the following section and ultimately the categorized decision
factors.
4.2.1 Platform 1 – MCDA
Platform 1 is a small aircraft fleet (< 10) and has been in operations for over 10 years.
The Mil GPS program was carried out under an Urgent Operational Need (UON). The UON
designation sets a higher resource priority so that a system fielding can be expedited. In this
instance they had a two-year deadline to be flying operational with the Mil GPS capability. Their
prime contractor was not the Original Equipment Manager (OEM) of the aircraft. The OEM was
a subcontractor.
In Fall 2018, the PMO awarded a contract of $72M that would pursue an FAA safe
carriage STC with an independent review team (IRT) from the TAA that would do a risk
assessment on all aspects of functionality of the Mil GPS system, while the FAA would certify
the installation. The safe carriage approach falls along the AW “seam”. It was chosen primarily
on the assumption that less work from the FAA and more work through the TAA and military
would provide the quickest path to operations. The program started at a high risk (the highest in
airworthiness) deemed by the TAA. The installations and majority of flight tests were done by
the OEM but results of flights were evaluated by the TAA. All installations and flight testing
have since been complete and the program sits at a serious risk. At the serious risk level, they
await the Program Executive Officer (PEO) signature to fly the capability operationally as
intended, but is still waiting for signature as of December 2021. The PEO position typically the
one or two-star general in the PMOs chain of command and is the decision authority for serious
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AW risks, as well as other major milestone decisions on programs within his or her portfolio. A
separate Phase II effort is planned to pursue full FAA certification to potentially relieve the PEO
of acceptance of AW risk in the future. This additional effort was quoted at $20 million. With a
risk approval from the PEO the aircraft would fly under a Military Flight Release (MFR) based
on risk (paperwork saying you are eligible to use the modification in operations) versus holding
an official MTC
4.2.2 Platform 2 – MCDA
Platform 2 is a new program targeted to a small aircraft fleet (< 10) that is a replacement
platform and has yet to be fielded. The mil GPS modification is one of multiple projects being
implemented in the overarching $3+ billion program, for a new aircraft. There is familiarity with
the green aircraft (basic FAA design of an aircraft right off of the production line) used for this
platform, because it has been utilized for other existing MCDA programs in the USAF, but these
particular tail numbers have never been used or flown operational. The prime contractor is the
OEM of the aircraft and is a familiar defense contractor. The program started in the last decade.
The mil GPS effort is pursuing a limited FAA certification with a letter of functionality (LOF)
from the military for military-specific functionality, such as anti-jam and anti-spoof. The mil
GPS effort is about $50M. The mil GPS effort is installed and ready for flight test with approved
airworthiness certification plans but is waiting on other projects to reach the flight-testing stage.
Operations for the fleet are scheduled for 2025.
4.2.3 Platform 3 – MSA
Platform 3 is an attack/fighter aircraft that has been operational and well established for
multiple decades. Platform 3 is a large fleet (> 100). The mil GPS effort was a requirement that
came out of Air National Guard in 2014, which was then adopted by the Air Force fleet and
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pursued in 2019. Since it is a MSA it can only pursue the military airworthiness process. Within
that process an AW package was presented to the Director of Engineering (DOE) in the PMO
EN chain of command to see if the project would be reportable or nonreportable to the TAA.
The DOE is the highest-level engineer that works directly with the PEO of the same portfolio of
programs. The modification was deemed nonreportable to the TAA, because it was determined
to be a low-risk effort and a form fit function replacement modification. The DOE even
delegated the authority down to the Chief Engineer within the PMO. As of December 2021, the
capability has been certified under a Military Flight Release (MFR) amended to the MTC to be
used in operations and has successfully flown operationally.
4.3 Expected and Unexpected Findings
As each interview was completed, the understanding of each platform’s progression
would be enhanced by the perspective from PM to EN within each case. Then when cross case
analyses of the platforms were introduced, comparisons were made and tracked in the Key Code
Phrases Matrix. The matrix needed to be reduced to something more tangible and so the
Similarity and Differences tables were created to see from platform to platform, and person to
person comparisons of how the programs were executed and the factors that seem to play a role.
Some of the findings are repeated but are addressed from different perspectives.
4.3.1 MCDA v MCDA
Table 6 shows the comparison between the two MCDAs Platform 1 and 2. It was
a going-in position that both would be a MCDA pursuing the same military GPS
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modification. It was expected that their certification paths would not be exactly the same.
Table 6: MCDA v MCDA Similarities & Differences
MCDA v MCDA
Similarities

Differences
Platform 1

Platform 2

Mil GPS Mod with same hardware

Active Fleet stand alone mod

New Replacement Aircraft combined with multiple mods

MCDA with military requirement

Communication Relay (ISR/BM/C3)

VIP passenger transport (Transport)

Small Fleet Size ( <5)

CostPlusFixed Fee

Firm Fixed Price Contract

PM personnel no prior AW experience

Certification in progress

FAA Safe Carriage STC AW Cert w/ Risk Assessment
through TAA
2 year time constraint because of UON in 2018, still
waiting on Risk approval in 2022 wasn’t eligible for
approval until 2021 so 1+ year slip
Fielded but waiting on Risk Acceptance with PEO

Project Costs <$100M (ACAT III Equivalent)

Lacked funding for Full FAA effort

FAA Full AW Cert - Limited FAA STC w/ military letter of
functionality
2016 start with no required time constraint. Its effort does
not fall on Critical Path of the ACAT I effort. Waiting for
flight tests. Deliver 2025.
Pre Flight Test but carries no official AW risk due to FAA
process
As part of overall ACAT I program was well funded

Lithium battery Certification Issue

$72M for project (safe carriage path), proposed Full
~$50M for project (Full FAA AW cert - limited w/ LOF)
FAA cert would be additional $20M, Full TAA approach
estimated at $40M
Under Safe carriage no extra effort by FAA for lithium
Extra Contract Effort to certify lithium battery by FAA
battery but observed in risk assessment
Communication with FAA lacked prior to contract award Strong Communication well before effort was awarded

EN personnel 30 AW experience

Subjectivity Issues, such as Interpretation of policy
or risk criteria
Multiple meetings with FAA MCO and Contractors
Had to follow Mil Hdbk 516 for military portions
and MACC.

Extensive MACC

lesser MACC effort

Prime contractor is not the OEM

Prime Contractor is the OEM

Will only fly under MFR

Will ultimately fly under an MTC

For expected findings they had different approaches for airworthiness certification.
Platform 1 took a safe carriage STC approach and had the TAA have an IRT to do a risk
assessment on all functionality of the military GPS system, whereas Platform 2 pursued a limited
FAA approval for STC with a military LOF approved through the TAA on the specific aspects
that are military requirements such as anti-jam and anti-spoof. Platform 1 was also under a time
constraint requirement of 2 years whereas Platform 2 mil GPS effort was a new platform tied to
much larger ACAT 1 project and this effort did not dictate any critical path on timeline to
fielding. The idea of schedule is seen right away as a potential factor. Since there was still
military involvement in certification some level of MACC criteria was going to be done but
more for Platform 1 then for Platform 2. It was also expected that there would be multiple
meetings with stakeholders such as the FAA and TAA, but the timing of the meetings was
unexpected.
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The first unexpected finding was that meetings with the FAA and TAA had been well
established and reoccurring well before contract award in Platform 2, whereas with Platform 1
had only a few meetings prior to award which was already on a short timeline. This, combined
with the difference that Platform 1’s prime contractor was not the Original Equipment
Manufacturer (OEM), the builder of the aircraft, while Platform 2’s prime contractor was also
the OEM brings up the potential for disconnects as a factor within communication efforts prior to
award to include pre-request for proposal, acquisition strategy panel and the proposal stages.
It was expected that the two similar programs would have comparable costs. However,
Platform 1 with a safe carriage STC, meaning less FAA and more military certification is costing
more. This may not seem very significant, but further detail in section 4.4 Resulting Decision
Factors explains how this breaks a common assumption about military certification.
4.3.2 MCDA v MSA
Table 7 shows the comparison between the two MCDAs Platform 1 and 2 ant the
MSA Platform 3. All three platforms were pursuing the same military GPS modification. It was
Table 7: MCDA v MSA Similarities & Differences
MCDA v MSA
Similarities

Differences
Platform 1&2

Platform 3
MSP
No interaction with FAA except for airspace flight test
time
MilHdbk 516 towards military specific (Platform 2) and Entire cert process through Mil Hanbk 516C
hybrid - civil/mil, (Platform 1) requirements within FAA
certification.
Platform 1: Originally high/serious risk deemed
Deemed nonreportable meaning no TAA involvement in
reportable to TAA. Delegated authority within TAA for certification. Delegated authority is DOE in PMO chain of
risk assessment. Risk Acceptance at PEO.
command for assessment and acceptance.
Has to be an FAA STC roled into an MTC if Full FAA is Final product fly on either MFR ammended to existing
achieved. Flying on risk is MFR only.
MTC, or new MTC. Discetion of DOE preference.
Prime contractor
No prime contractor
small fleet (<10)
Large fleet (>250)
Funding & requirement from Air Force
Initial funding & requirement through ANG
Platform 1: ~$72M (3 aircraft); Platform 2: ~$50M (2 ~$60M = ~$20M development ~$40M full rate production
aircraft)
Certification in Process
Some aircraft are operational with capability
Communication & Passenger Transport Aircraft
Fighter/Attack Aircraft (weapons)
Considered full EMD effort
Considered Form Fit Function Replacement Mod

Mil GPS Mod with same hardware
MCDA
All systems integrate with Cockpit avioncis systems Constant Interaction w/ FAA for certification process
Project Costs <$100M (ACAT III Equivalent)

Some level of MilHdbk 516C & MACC

Platform 2 & 3 are Firm Fixed Price
Started about same time
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expected that the 2 MCDAs sought some level of FAA certification along the AW “seam”, while
the MSA sought a military only airworthiness certification.

One of the expected findings was that Platform 3 had no interaction with the FAA from a
certification standpoint. All platforms had to follow some level of certification criteria through
MIL-HDBK 516C and develop MACCs. Platform 3 had a large fleet and so ultimately the total
cost of the effort of about $60M being, which is similar to Platform 1 ($72M) and 2 ($50M),
went a lot further from a cost per aircraft. This would support the assumption that military
certification is cheaper than FAA. Platform 3 has also actually fielded whereas the other two
have not, which aligns with the military certification also being faster. With Platform 1 being an
MCDA with more military certification than Platform 2, but Platform 3 being cheapest would
suggest that maybe military certification is only cheaper when applied to MSA. Based on some
of the unexpected findings these assumptions are further challenged.
An unexpected finding is that Platform 3 was deemed nonreportable to the TAA so the
airworthiness process stayed in the PMO chain of command and did not have 3 rd party reviewers,
while Platform 1 received a high enough risk for TAA involvement. This suggests that time
savings could have been more that it was an internal military certification versus a full TAA
military certification. Platform 3 also had no prime contractor and much of the airworthiness
work calculations, data collection and planning were done by the PMO and its engineers. Since
they are part of the PMO the work they are doing is not calculated into the total contract cost.
This work done by the Platform 3 EN team is typically done by the contractors, like for the two
MCDA. Therefore, Platform 3’s cost may also be more comparable to that of the FAA hybrid
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certifications.

Platform 3 also was initially a requirement from Air National Guard and was

applied as a form fit function replacement versus the MCDAs having an Air Force requirement
which has dictated colors of money and had an official development portion of the contract.
This is a combination of disconnects between policies and interpretation of requirements.
4.3.3 – PMs, ENs, PMs v ENs
Table 8 shows the comparison between each of the three PMs interviewed. Table 9
shows the comparison between each of the three ENs interviewed. Table 10 shows the
comparison between the PMs and the ENs. This gave a basis of the experience and mindset of
how specific personnel type looked at their certification approach and if there were any overlaps
between them.

Table 9: PMs Similarities & Differences Table
PMs
Similarities
1st Aircraft SPO (< 3 yrs in aircraft systems)
Wish for better understanding of AW processes
Need strong communication with stakeholders,
decision makers (ie FAA, MCO, TAA, DOE)

Differences
IP2
Felt path was relatively easy / Didn’t think TAA was really
involved
small increments of progress, constant changes of what Did not think there was much adjusting from plan except w/
was agreed upon
lithium battery
Time constraint lead to certification path/Upfront
AF policy dictates full use of FAA certification especially
assumptions made the Seam of safe carriage more doable for passenger aircraft, so that’s waaht was pursued
IP1
Observed a lot of subjectivity with TAA

Confused understanding of final flight certificate
Part of all meetings and decisions/Upfront assumptions
Table
8: ENs Similarities &
Differences Table
made the Seam of safe carriage more doable
Was not finished at the time of working on the
project
Similarities
All thought they pursued
the right path
20+ years of Aircraft systems experience
Considered Mil GPS a noncomplex modification
Strong role in developing AW plans

IE1&2: Believe it impossible for Full FAA
certification with no military involvement

IP3
Thought it had been done through TAA
Thought there were some unneccesary tests but
relatively easy
Mil aircraft easy install

Not really involved and let engineering make the decisions

Operational Conflicts for scheduling

No major schedule conflicts (yet to flight test)

Flight test scheduling difficulties

ENs
Differences
IE1
IE2
IE3
Government Support Contractor
Government Civilian
Both worked Commercial sector and for military on MCDA and MSP
Only worked in Fighter/attack aircraft (MSPs)
Safe carriage w/ mil funcitonality approved would be
Limited FAA certification: Full FAA approval w/ military Pushed for nonreportable modification keeping
faster fielding with risk approval, but would have
statement of functionality/ To try to use risk as means for certification at DOE level for military certification. No
preferred Limitied approval similar path to Platform 2 quicker certification leadership will deny saying if FAA
TAA involvement.
wont accept why should I
Military equipment was not built to FAA standards and specs causing some difficulties in certification.
Military cert so standards and specs mostly

Military only certification would not be cheaper
Most of calculations and deliverables done through contractor and FAA
because PMOs lack manning for Military only
certification efforts on MCDAs
Strong communication with Stakeholders is key and Installed on all aircraft waiting on risk approval
Everything on track but waiting for flight test
that it be early and throughout.
Common issues with defining requirements versus This was the wrong path
The right path
safety critical functions and what needed to be a
certification criteria
2 major plan adjustments and countless compliance
always making adjustments but minor, except lithium
adjustments
battery certification needed separate effort
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Much of the calculations came to ENs in PMO to do.

Successfully operating capability in field
The only path

no major changes throuhgout process
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Table 10: PMs v ENs Similarities & Differences Table
PMs v ENs
Similarities
Platform 2 personnel were on same page of their
paths taken
Strong communication with stakeholders is
important early and often

Differences
IPs
First Aircraft systems experience

IE's
20+ years of aircraft experience each

Focused on schedule and contract details

Focus on meeting MACC criterion and meeting
compliances
Almost no understanding of certification path/ IP1 most All strong understanding of paths and difficulties
effort into learning though constrained by time
Have not seen a finished product of the aw certification Have seen AW certification process start to finish
process prior to start of effort

Most of the similarities between the PMs were expected findings. They all wanted a
better understanding of the airworthiness processes. This is what prompted the need for a PM
guidance sheet. They also all believed in the importance of stakeholder communication. Some
expected differences were that IP1 would face more scheduling conflicts since dealing with such
a small operational fleet, while IP2 only had to worry about being ready in time for the full
aircraft flight tests, and the large fleet from IP3 provided more test bird opportunities although
operational. Schedule seems to be a stronger factor for IP1.
The majority of the PM comparison brought forth unexpected findings. The first was that
this was their first aircraft project and time dealing with airworthiness certification. Having less
experience than the ENs was expected, however, it was unexpected that in all three cases the
PMs had no prior work with airworthiness. They all said they wanted to know more but IP1
seemed to be the only one who really tried to learn the process and participate in stakeholder
meetings while IP2 and IP3 left certification in the hands of the ENs. IP2 was unaware of TAA
involvement in their limited FAA certification process although they help evaluate compliance of
the letter of functionality for the military specific aspects that the FAA cannot approve.
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The ENs were all expected to have some experience and they each had 20+ years specific
in aircraft systems. Both IE1 and IE2 with combinations of commercial sector, other MCDA
platform, as well as MSA platform experience. IE3’s experience was all within fighter/attack
MSA platforms. All stressed the importance of communication with the stakeholders. They all
found that it was hard to define certain items as critical safety items versus a requirement, and
further how they could meet the compliances for these requirements. This was especially more
difficult on the MCDA side as IE1 and IE2 had to make military equipment match standards that
tied to an FAA standard.
Both IE1 and IE2 did not think it would be possible for a full FAA certification without
any military approvals of certain aspects, which explains by both pushed for a hybrid approach
somewhere along the AW “seam”. But what was unexpected is that they both said it would not
be possible for a full military certification approach to take place either. For the MCDA so much
of the AW work falls on the contractor and the FAA while in the MSA the IE3 talks about how a
lot of the AW work had to be done within the PMO, which brings up the concept of personnel. It
was also found that IE1 would have preferred a limited FAA approach mirroring closer to
Platform 2’s approach. There may be a correlation with the fact that IE1 was a government
support contractor versus a government civilian in regards to the power of IE1’s opinion. It was
also interesting that IE3 did not say the nonreportable AW certification was the right path but the
only path.
How do the PMs and ENs stack up together? As expected, they all thought
communication was key and more of it up front is key. The PMs had more focus on their
schedule and funding especially IP1 and IP3 versus the engineers who were more focused on the
technical requirements of the MACC and or FAA process.
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Unexpectedly, IP2 and IE2 were the only informants to say they were on the right path.
Within Platform 1, IP1 said the safe carriage approach was the right path, because of the cost and
schedule pressures and that was the path ultimately taken, but spoke negatively about the path
having a lot of subjectivity and disconnects among stakeholders along the way. IE1, regardless
of cost and schedule pressures, said safe carriage was the wrong approach. For Platform 3, IP3
said their path was the right path while IE3 said it was the only path. IE3’s perspective comes
from the understanding that MSA follow the military only airworthiness process and that’s it.
There is the option of reporting or not reporting to the TAA, but from IE3’s perspective that
wasn’t really changing the path. The only other path that could be available is to get a prime
contractor and hand over some of the calculation work to their personnel, but would ultimately
still be meeting all the same criteria in the MACC. Since IP3 also admitted to not really being
involved in the AW process it seems this was more of a blind agreement since the engineers
were accomplishing project.
4.3.4 – Platform 1&2 Personnel v TAA
The last comparison is between the MCDA personnel and the TAA representative (Table
11). Here we see how perspectives from the PMO were similar and different from the military
airworthiness office perspective. There was only one TAA representative interviewed, IT1, to
represent both MCDA platforms. Since Platform 3 was nonreportable there was no TAA
representation for that platform’s AW certification path.
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Table 11: Platform 1&2 Personnel v TAA Similarities & Differences
Platform 1&2 Personnel v TAA
Similarities
Advice: Strong Communication with all
Stakeholders early and often
Understood that since MCDA a pursuit of FAA
certification was the starting point

An MTC or an MFR will be obtained encompassing
the STCs
Lithium battery concerns for safety critical function
risk

Differences
IP1/IE1 & IP2/IE2
PMO decide the Airworthiness certification path

IT1
Aide to MCDA platforms in AW decision making

Platform 1 (IP1&IE1) thought TAA dictated safe
Platform 1 should have attempted Limited Approval from
carriage approach with IRT for risk assessment w/ future start
pursuit of Full FAA certification
PMs <3yrs aircraft systems, ENs >30 yrs aircraft
systems
Platform 1 thought UON time constraint made this not
doable; Platform 2 (IP1&IE2) pursued FAA to max
extent possible
Have to think about other programmatic concepts along
with airworthiness and flight safety

12 yrs aircraft systems, 3 yrs with TAA focus on MCDA

Platform 1 has cert basis for safe carriage and had to
complete MACC criteria to show compliances and
mitigated risk approval for cert basis; Platform 2 EN
agrees to multiple small adjustments, while PM saying
not from the PMO perspective

Platform 1 has no certification basis from TAA
perspective; Platform 2 has multiple AW plan revisions but
is normal necessity

Use FAA to max extent possible

Only focused on airworthiness criteria and safety

It was expected that the IT1 would have a good amount of experience in aircraft systems
particular with MCDA aircraft. IT1 had been with TAA for three years so was fairly new to the
TAA role when the MCDAs were going in. IT1 agreed with the PMO about the importance of
strong communication upfront in with the stakeholders. The role of the IT1 is guidance to the
PMO while the PMO settles on the actual path of the Airworthiness certification path. IT1
focuses on the system integration and how that aligns with the FAA certification process and
military airworthiness process to leave the smallest gap in the AW “seam” providing the highest
level of airworthiness. The PMOs have to take into consideration other programmatic
requirements along with the focus on the most gap-free airworthiness certification path. All
parties tracked the certification complications caused by the lithium battery and all thought best
to drop the battery from the existing certification paths. It was understood that after the Platform
1’s safe carriage STC and risk acceptance occurred they would only fly with an MFR versus an
MTC since there was risk being accepted whereas Platform 2 would fly with an actual MTC
which means you have no registered AW risk when flying.
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It was expected the paths chosen would be viewed differently, but it was unexpected the
lack of understanding of each other’s viewpoints. IP1 and IE1 took the safe carriage approach
and an IRT from the TAA to do risk assessments along different testing stages. IT1 did not
believe this was the right approach for Platform 1 to take, but agreed to the IRT. From IT1’s
perspective the TAA team advised against a safe carriage approach saying they would not be
able to fully certify functionality on the military side due to lack of data and doesn’t recognize
the existing FAA certification as a cert basis to build off of for their process. This is where
understanding the integration of the systems becomes vital. But what is unexpected is that the
PMO for Platform 1, as will be seen in quotes in section 4.4 Resulting Decision Factors, make it
seem that the TAA and other outside stakeholders were forcing the PMO’s hand to the safe
carriage STC with risk assessment as the only option. Therefore, the PMO saw the TAA as an
approver of the AW certification path, instead of instead of an advisory role to it. On the other
hand, the IT1 and Platform 2 personnel seem to be on the same page in every step of the
program. Platform 2 being part of a much bigger project and not constrained by operations
seemed to have better communication amongst the stakeholders.
4.4 Resulting Decision Factors
The first factor observed was Policy. This came straight from the existing AF policy
directive, AFPD 62-6 stating “the Air Force shall obtain and maintain Federal Aviation
Administration type certification to the maximum extent practical” (SAF/AQ & Roper, 2019). The

MSA did not have to abide by this policy and so their only real option was a military certification
path. For both MCDA platforms in this research, this policy was at the forefront of their decision
making. But to what extent were they able to use the FAA, that came from additional decision
factors. There were six other factors that influenced AW decisions found in the data set: Cost,
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Schedule, Performance, Personnel, Level of Integration, and Disconnects. These six could all be
observed in multiple occasions through the Similarities & Differences tables from the
subsections above. In this section all seven decision factors are identified as well in specific
quotes that clearly show how they were considered, the quotes along with the Similarities &
Differences tables also showed whether these are viable factors to consider.
The philosophy dictated in Policy is for MCDA to pursue FAA certification to the max
extent possible. Table 12 makes it clear that this is what the programs believe as IP2 states, as
well as what is advised by the TAA with IT1, explaining the benefit of continuing certification
along the original standards of the FAA since the original aircraft held FAA certification. IE3
states that since Platform 3 is a MSA it does not follow this policy.

Table 12: Decision Factors - Policy Quotes
Decision Factors

Policy

Quotes
The reason for pushing for that certification level [limited FAA approval] is basically, that's what policy dictates this... This
is primarily a commercial derivative passenger carrying airplanes so, that's what the Air Force DoD policy [states]. IP2
You know it's our policy to do FAA to the maximum extent practical and I think you know some of the rationale behind
that is that. You know the the base aircraft was certified [with a] test set of of rules or airworthiness standards. You
know the FAA airworthiness standards and, two it's important for safety to ensure that, as much as possible, you ensure
that same the same set of standards are used to assess all modifications because there's interdependencies between
each of the different requirements. - IT1
It was a military only… So we never go through the FAA in a military platform - IE3

There is an existing assumption that military certification is usually cheaper and faster
because it can accept risk. This assumption may have played a role as the outcomes of different
decision factors, particularly for Platform 1. The next three decision factors are the three
common programmatic measures: cost, schedule and performance.
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In Table 13, IP1 for Platform 1 talks to the Cost of the safe carriage approach being
~$72M but if pursuing the full FAA certification an extra $20M would be applied, but to go for a
full military certification was around $40M which is clearly more expensive than if doing the full
FAA certification. So, from a cost perspective the safe carriage seemed most reasonable. For
Platform 2 cost was not much of a factor for this modification as the estimate a very high level
ball park estimate. This is due to it being part of a much bigger program scope. Lastly from the
MSA perspective totaled ~$60M for a much larger fleet so in this instance the assumption would
seem to hold true but it’s because the base aircraft has always been military certified. IT1’s
quote under policy, although is in reference to FAA standards being maintained, would have that
same affect with original military aircraft to maintain their standard. We see Platform 2’s high
level estimate for limited FAA certification being lower than Platform 1’s safe carriage estimate,
because limited follows the existing FAA standard to a higher level.
Table 13: Decision Factors - Cost Quotes
Decision Factors

Cost

Quotes
The effort [safe-carriage STC w/ TAA IRT team] was approximately $72 million, both RDT&E and production funds.
The follow on [Phase II - Full FAA Certification] Government costs estimate is approximately $20 million. Also, if we saw
a full TAA certification and forewent the FAA certification. Uh, the kind of ballpark figure was postdated it about $40
million for the TAA to do there. - IP1
So the grand total [for limited FAA approval STC] was somewhere in neighborhood, about 47, you know 49 million, but
again, that is a very high level. A ballpark figure without a lot of fidelity and at that would just kind of our best guess. -IE2
I'm gonna say right about that 35-$40 million threshold is about where we were at with that program... There was for that
development stage, I believe we Cut about, I want to say somewhere about that fifteen $20 million worth in. In charges to
that, the. National Guard Air National Guard. Build the program as being a form fit function replacement and a
commercial off the shelf. - IP3
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Schedule also, seemed to play the strongest role as a decision factor in Platform 1 (Table
14). When this requirement came out Platform 1 was pressed for time to not only complete the
effort, due to the 2-yr timeline of the UON, but to also get their contract awarded. This rushed
the discussions that went into airworthiness certification and may have prompted the wrong
decision. Platform 2 recognized that if TAA had to recertify all the aspects of the airplane,
which is ultimately what would need to occur for a military airworthiness path that more time
would be wasted. Taking these quotes and comparing to what was seen in the similarities and
differences tables Platform 1 busted the 2-yr schedule, but will soon fly operationally with risk,
Platform 2, based on how smooth it has gone, if it was not tied to a bigger scoped project would
be close to certification and Platform 3 just started flying operationally. All three platforms
started within a couple years of each other and in the grand scheme of Air Force modifications
the results of their timelines negate schedule as a reasonable decision factor.
Table 14: Decision Factors - Schedule Quotes
Decision Factors

Schedule

Quotes
We initiated this as a, uh, urgent operational need, and so the time frame was supposed to be a two year time frame. - IE1
Are assumptions going into the effort was that you know we would do all the testing as if we were gaining full FAA
certification. However, we didn't have the time due to a UON or the urgent operational need status. Uh, so we were
seeking, ultimately full testing, as if we were gaining full FAA certification in hopes that the TA would take that testing and
be the final approval... it was more the documentation piece through the FAA that would have dragged out the period of
performance. So we sought the safe carriage with then ultimately the TAA signed up to do an independent review team to
help assign airworthiness risks. - IP1
..don't have to recertify the airplane for all through the TAA to all the things that have already been FAA certified. - IP2

The last programmatic measure is Performance (Table 15). The ENs from both MCDA
platforms talked about the capability of Mil GPS being similar to the commercial GPS works so
the technicalities of the installation were not overly complex. The aspects outside of the FAA
were the anti-jam and anti-spoof criteria. The complexity of the installation and what aspects of
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the capabilities FAA certification can cover are the two primary aspects of how performance is a
factor. IE1 wanted to pursue a limited FAA certification because of the results of this factor, but
it seems cost and schedule trumped the performance factor, and reduced the certification to safe
carriage.
Table 15: Decision Factors - Performance Quotes
Decision Factors

Performance

Quotes
The modification was not too extensive of a modification. It basically added two antennas to the crown of the aircraft and 2
military GPS units. Uh, that were providing signal to the aircraft cockpit...military developed system had specific military
purposes... FAA looks at functions and it does not have certification rules for military functions such as carrying bombs or
jamming and and things like that. And in our case the jamming, the anti jam anti spoof kind of things were not functions
normally dealt with by the FAA. - IE1
[Mil GPS is] an alternative positioning source. So we haven't gotten rid of the commercial eggies, commercial GPS is used
in the aircraft…this is really a civil aircraft function as a military aircraft. -IE2

Levels of Integration was something highly stressed by IT1 (Table 16). The points made
are similar to those of performance but focused more on the interdependencies of when you
connect the mil GPS system what other systems is it interfacing with and are those interfaces
something that will be recognizable to the FAA standards for certification. Notice that IP3 for
says the functionality of the aircraft was not being modified but when seeing IE2s’s concern
about military equipment not being produced with the FAA in mind, those interfaces the mil
GPS box will have with a commercial cockpit could look much different than how it interfaces
with a military cockpit. This is the most direct decision factor as it relates to the definition of
airworthiness and obtaining a safe aircraft to fly.
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Table 16: Decision Factors - Level of Integration Quotes
Decision Factors

Level of Integration

Quotes
The modification was not too extensive of a modification. It basically added two antennas to the crown of the aircraft and 2
military GPS units. Uh, that were providing signal to the aircraft cockpit. - IE1
So the overall functionality of the aircraft was not being modified. Uh, and so the risk level and the certifications were
fairly easy. -IP3
They [military equipment designers] don't go with the idea of trying to concern themselves with the FAA process. - IE2
… two it's important for safety to ensure that, as much as possible, you ensure that same the same set of standards are
used to assess all modifications because there's interdependencies between each of the different requirements… So as
we certify [the] integration of that GPS system into the aircraft. You know it's going to have tentacles essentially back into
the aircraft avionics and we won't have data for that, and so you know ultimately the lack of data you know results in
uncertainty. - IT1
The FAA doesn't have criteria to address anti jam or SASM, so they rely on us to to utilize our military criteria for that.
And we assess it and issue them a statement of functionality to support their [program's] compliance findings. - IT1

The Personnel factor was interesting and unexpected (Table 17). Outside of policy
dictating FAA certification and looking at the levels of integration, IE2 simply presented that
their PMO is not properly manned for a full military certification, as a lot of the work that the
contractors and FAA do would then come to the government. The MCDA programs both also
had a prime contractor unlike the MSA, Platform 3. IE3 talks about how the engineering team
has to do a lot of calculations and handling of test documentation, that the MCDAs are not doing.
Table 17: Decision Factors - Personnel
Decision Factors
Personnel

Quotes
We don't have the personnel to do what would be necessary in my mind to do it [military only certification]… it becomes
an issue of of the way the Air Force structure the program office. - IE2
our personnel and we have to do the calculations to go about doing it and we have to have all the documentation in place
to make sure just that is done and we've done proper testing. -IE3

Finally, Disconnects, which often come from miscommunication, is the final decision
factor. This is more of an indirect decision factor, because one cannot really know in the
moment that they are basing a decision on a disconnect. These interviews conducted were able
to expose some of these disconnects. In Table 18, IE1 indicates that the PMO was told by the
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TAA that the safe carriage with IRT team risk assessment was the only way they could do it,
meanwhile IT1 thought limited FAA certification would have been the right path for Platform 1.
There was a clear disconnect due to a lack of communication that occurred. IE3 essentially
states the opposite of the assumption that military certification is fast and cheap. IE3 also states
how the Air Force is always pushing for faster and cheaper and combats that saying you can’t be
faster and cheaper and do certification right. IE2 also combats the assumption of military
certification being faster, saying that based on who is approving the risk you may be held to the
same standard as FAA, which ties in to IT1’s view on the assumption. In general, the FAA and
TAA certifications are looking for the same type of tests and levels of rigor for similar
requirements. IT1 does say that risk can be used if compliance isn’t met but that should not be
what a program strives for. Theys should strive to be in compliance, to be safe, to be airworthy.

Table 18: Decision Factors - Disconnects Quotes
Decision Factors

Disconnects

Quotes
Now we're not going to let you do it that way. You need to do it this way and so we revamped our plan and and we did it.
We went forward with the only path that the [TAA] said, you know we could follow. - IE1
My perspective is that they, both, Uh, we should have soughtt full or limited FAA approval for all aspects of that
modification. - IT1
It's [military AW process] not something that happens very quickly and and because it's such a long process and a costly
process to acquire all the documentation. Uhm, you it is very difficult to field anything in expedited manner. The Air
Force is pushing us to do things faster, better, cheaper, you know, and it's like you can't have both ways. -IE3
The FAA is not gonna accept it. What makes you think I'm gonna accept it? [In regards mil AW Decision Authority] - IE2
I've often seen that military certification being identified as much cheaper than FAA certification, because there is the
option to not show full compliance and and they get that risk accepted and move on right? But in the FAA world you have
to show full compliance, which means you have to do all the analysis, the test that the FAA is going to require...You know
mil cert doesn't mean no cert right? ... generally speaking, FA and military certification, they're gonna, ultimately, drive the
same type and level of work - IT1

The decision factors observed Policy, Cost, Schedule, Performance, Levels of
Integration, and Disconnects, do not hold equal value from person to person or platform to
platform but in comparing all the points of view, the one that should hold the most weight is the
level of integration, and to best understand this knowledge of your system as well as knowledge
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of the airworthiness processes themselves so when communications begin there will be less
disconnects.
4.5 Guidance for Program Managers
The program managers hold the responsibility for their programs and so when an
airworthiness decision is made it ultimately comes back to him or her. That is why when it was
observed that all three PMs had no prior airworthiness knowledge this deliverable became an
essential piece of contribution to MCDA decision factors research. The ENs had a strong
knowledge of the airworthiness process but disconnects still occurred and so the PMs need to be
more knowledgeable as well.
In

<INTENTIONAL BLANK SHEET>

B-12

24 March 2022
Appendix D: PM Guidance Sheet, a full example of the guidance created for PMs can be found.
The guidance has 4 main topics: Know Your Platform/Modification, Understand Airworthiness,
Decision Factors, and Assumption Fallacy.
The first topic, Know Your Platform/Modification, lays out high level your platform and
mission and right away starts to reference items in the next topic.
The second topic of the guidance is to state what knowledge must be read and learned to
understand airworthiness. From the literature it is clear that a PM must read and understand the
AFPD 62-6, have access to the list of AW bulletins from the TAA offering guidance MCDA
certifications, and should have a copy of FAA order 8110.101A to know the connection between
the FAA and TAA certification and the roles of the FAA and MCO. Every PM before making
any AW decision should also take AIR 116 – Introduction to AF Airworthiness Certification.
This basic knowledge will allow for PMs to have much more intelligent conversations with their
EN counterparts as well as the FAA and TAA and all stakeholders on the subject. Lastly on the
back or page 2 of the guidance is a copy of Figure 5 from AWB-360 showing the levels of FAA
approval and the AW seam of where military certification is needed. Once all the knowledge is
absorbed this figure creates a good mindset for how a PM’s program fits into the AW
certification puzzle.
Next, this guidance lays out the common decision factors in the order of most importance
as a PM looks to build their AW certification path.
1. Level of Integration – Where does the new system touch and how does it affect the
existing system
2. Disconnects – Know the platform and AW processes and communicate with
stakeholders well before Contract Award or Acquisition Strategy occurs.
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3. Performance – The capability of the system, the mission of the aircraft
4. Policy – What is the furthest FAA can certify on the system
5. Personnel – Is your office structured for a certain certification level (most MCDAs
would not be able to handle the workload of a military certification)
6. Cost – Similar work would have to be executed for military cert or Full FAA. Refrain
from work that would overlap causing double payment.
7. Schedule – No path is significantly faster than the other. Shortcuts such as risk
approvals lead to more disconnects ending in negligible time savings.
Cost and Schedule are at the bottom of the list because these two decision factors were ranked
much higher for Platform 1 than Platform 2 in execution, which led to the most disconnects as
the program progressed while also not meeting their time constraint.
Finally, the known assumptions about military certification being cheaper and faster due
to the ability to accept risk, is listed on the sheet but as a warning to not get caught in its fallacy.
4.6 Summary
Through a series of seven interviews with PMs and ENs from three platforms and one
member of the TAA an analysis was conducted to observe what major decision factors took
place for their AW certification path. There were seven major decision factors observed through
the interview comparisons: Level of Integration, Disconnects, Performance, Policy, Personnel,
Cost, and Schedule. The decision factors are listed by importance based on the analysis. The
interview comparisons in the Similarities & Differences Table along with quotes suggests that
Platform 1 would have been better off potentially following the same certification as Platform 2,
which is significant because it showed that programmatic constraints like cost and schedule were
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high in priority when coming to that certification path. The lack of aircraft experience and AW
knowledge amongst all three PMs, is what led to the Guidance for PMs in
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Appendix D: PM Guidance Sheet. This guidance along with an emphasis of early and often
communication with stakeholders will better prepare PMs and their teams in the future as they
navigate their way to the best AW certification path.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Summary of Research
This research looked to bring clarity to MCDA platforms as they pursue the airworthiness
certification paths for their programs. Policy dictates that MCDAs pursue FAA certification to
the max extent possible. The phrase “Max extent possible” leaves room for subjectivity. This
research provides clarity into see what decision factors went into the programs AW certification
path, how these decision factors influence one another and finally where there could be
improvement to airworthiness certification. An analysis of comparative case studies through
interviews of two different MCDA platforms and one MSA platform was conducted to help find
answers to these questions. Below are the three research questions and how they were answered.
5.1.1 Research Question 1
What factors are key in the choice of an AW certification path for aircraft modifications?
-- The research showed 7 major decision factors that played into how they chose to pursue AW
certification. Those decision factors were: Level of Integration, Disconnects, Performance,
Policy, Personnel, Cost, and Schedule. This order was developed by examining the platforms
based on what worked and what didn’t work, along the AW certification path.
The platforms did not display all of these factors equally. Platform 1 had a stronger focus
on Cost and Schedule versus the other factors (Level of Integration and Policy). Platform 1 ran
into more issues than Platform 2; ultimately leading to negligible timeline and cost savings in
comparison to Platform 2. The primary focus should be the Level of Integration of the design
itself and how it best integrates with the existing system; knowing the touch points for the max
level FAA is able to certify.
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To avoid Disconnects, communication and knowledge sharing among the stakeholders
must occur early and often. A focus of this communication must be the AW certification touch
points. The third factor, Performance, ties into the first two factors (integration and
disconnects), but considers the question of, ‘do these capabilities reflect solely military purpose
or are there commercial elements?’ Mil GPS, at its core, is a GPS; it has commercial and
military requirements and is a good candidate for FAA certification. As a counter example, a
new missile system has no commercial equivalent requirements. Policy, the is ranked after the
first three technical factors, it provides a starting point.
The bottom tier of the lists are things that are difficult to control; in some instances they
are constraints that guide decisions (operating within constraints/“it is what it is”). Personnel
recognizes the capabilities of the manning within the PMO. Based on this research MCDA
PMOs are not sufficiently manned for the workload of military certification, whereas Platform 3,
the MSA, had the capability for in house analysis and certification. In contrast, the contractor
and FAA possess much of those capabilities for MCDA systems. The final two factors are Cost
and Schedule, although still decision, they should not take a high priority. Why these two are
ranked so low is better answered under the second research question.
5.1.2 Research Question 2
How do these decision factors influence each other in the final airworthiness certification
path and its execution? -- A common assumption is that military certification is cheaper and
shorter, because of its ability for risk acceptance if compliance cannot be met. This assumption
creates a disconnect to the policy of pursuing FAA certification, since the Air Force is constantly
pushing for faster and cheaper options. This assumption of military certification would
encourage PMOs to break policy and focus on Cost and Schedule. This was the case in Platform
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1. The programmatic decision factors of Cost and Schedule were taken at higher value than the
technical decision factors such as Level of Integration, causing more Disconnects as their rushed
timeline took away from the more in-depth communication that needed to take place. Platform 2
focusing more on the level of integration and clearer communication to avoid disconnects have
had a much smoother execution. Platform 3 was also very smooth as a full military certification
but because their basis as an MSA allowed for clean integration. The cost and schedule savings
hoping to be gained ended up being negligible for Platform 1 in comparison to Platform 2 and 3.
The technical understanding of the integration ties closest to what airworthiness certification is
supposed to do and that is to provide an aircraft that is safe to fly with the technology capabilities
on board. To understand that integration not only do the engineers need to understand that
(which all studied did) but the PMs need to understand it as well as they are ultimately
responsible for the project.
5.1.3 Research Question 3
What can be done to improve AW certification path decisions? -- The two key takeaways
from the research that can directly impact how a program selects their AW certification path is
the need for better flow of communication and to address the lack of airworthiness knowledge of
the program managers.
There were major disconnects for Platform 1 feeling that they were forced into the safecarriage approach with risk assessment from the TAA where the TAA believed they should have
done a limited FAA approval approach with statement of functionality for the military
components like Platform 2. The prime contractor not being the OEM and integrator of the GPS
system also seemed to be a contributor of miscommunication between the FAA and Platform 1.
Therefore, more extensive conversations between the primary stakeholders surrounding
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airworthiness decisions need to take place prior to Acquisition Strategies and Contract Award.
Designated meetings between the TAA, FAA/MCO, and OEM of the aircraft and makers of the
modification with the PMO’s engineers and program managers need to occur prior to award. If a
time constraint is being pressured, push back on it, because when sacrificing the airworthiness
quality ends up not saving any time as we saw in the data.
The program managers end up holding the weight of whatever path is chosen and so that
is why the PMs need to have prior AW knowledge before making a decision. In all three
platforms this was the PMs first aircraft system and first time doing an AW certification.
Therefore, to equip PMs with the right knowledge a guidance sheet in
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Appendix D: PM Guidance Sheet was created. This guidance will educate PMs of the
existing AW processes, show them the importance of knowing their platform and modification,
the AW seam between the FAA and TAA, guide them through the common decision factors that
go into an AW certification decision, as well as warn against the certain fallacies that exist and
lessons learned from prior platforms.
5.2 Study Limitations
This research focused on a small subset of all the MCDA in the Air Force. It was scoped
specifically to a Mil GPS modification and three platforms that underwent that modification all
around the same time. This was due to the familiarity with the modification and availability to
contacts. This scope is representative other communication and navigation modification on
MCDA. Many other PMOs working unrepresented modifications on MCDA can still use the
thought processes here as it applies to a mindset for navigating the AW “seam”. These
constraints narrowed the focus to specifically where to use a limited FAA approval vs safe
carriage FAA approval or to go full military certification. There are other levels of FAA
certification that could have been pursued. An increase in platforms would also add to the
validity of the data findings.
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research
If given more time a broader spectrum of MCDAs could be included in the comparative
analysis, with different modifications. If more programs are able to participate in the interviews
a repository of continuity among multiple platforms categorized by modification types and then
certification type based on the AW seam. This could be something then all aircraft program
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management offices could have access to in order to find continuity and lessons learned from
other programs.
Another approach would be to pursue more quantitative data analysis into the actual costs
and schedule relationship. The estimates received in interviews were not exact. A quantitative
analysis among programs to determine exact dollar amounts and length of specific AW tasks
could provide fidelity to the whether the assumption of military certification is cheaper is false.
Also, this would be insightful to the differences within the different FAA AW seam
certifications. No literature was found tracking this quantitative data which is part of what led to
a qualitative case study data collection through interviews in this research.
This further research will help develop a more objective understanding of the
airworthiness certification process and add validity to the decision factors already found in this
research.
5.4 Significance of Research
Even though the scope of the research was small, the findings are significant. For all
three platforms including the member of the TAA, nothing was stressed more than the
importance of communication early in the project with all stakeholders to the airworthiness
process. To be an educated stakeholder in that meeting, a PM should not enter those meetings
blind and so the PM guidance is crucial to bring their knowledge of airworthiness and the
processes to a level that can intelligently talk through the #1 decision factor Level of Integration.
By better understanding the Level of Integration they can more properly assess the programmatic
decision factors, and not fall victim to the fallacy of cost and schedule savings associated with
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military certification. This research hopes to help program managers and their team make a
more sound and objective airworthiness certification path decision.
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Appendix A: Interview Script
Good Morning/Afternoon Sir/Ma’am.
Thank you for taking the time to do this interview with me. My research is examining which
factors are important to the selection of an airworthiness certification basis. Many program
offices have pursued FAA or TAA airworthiness certification or some combination of both.
I am collecting information from multiple program offices, including management and
engineering, as well as the Technical Airworthiness Authority. I want to better understand the
choices made and processes followed to better aid future programs in their decision making.
I will be recording this interview to allow for a smoother discussion and better data capture.
Your personal information, duty title, and specific program will not be released outside of the
research team nor used in the final paper or results; they will only help me organize the data. All
recordings will be deleted once my thesis is complete. All retained data will be anonymous.
There will be 20 questions in the interview:
To begin I would like to start with background on yourself and your relation to the program.
Second, we will go into what the program is, its purpose and the modification at hand.
Third, I will ask questions directly tied to the Airworthiness process and decisions made for the
certification approach.
Finally, a few questions reflecting on the decisions made and where to go from here.

1.
2.
3.
4.

About the Interviewee
What is your name, position or title, and the program office you work in?
How long have you worked in AC systems?
What modifications and platforms have you worked on? What is the most recent? When
was it?
What is your role in the modification?

The Program
5. What is the modification we are talking about today? (Size, Functionality, Time, ACAT
level, Dollar Amount, etc)
6. Was the original design of this aircraft for the military, or is it a Commercial Derivative
Aircraft?
7. How long has the Air Force been utilizing the aircraft?
Airworthiness Certification
8. What level of Airworthiness certification did you seek to accomplish through the FAA?
How much did you seek to accomplish through the TAA?
9. Why did you strive for that certification level?
10. What were the benefits or drivers of this path?
A-1
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11. What were the costs of this path?
12. Did you achieve the Airworthiness certification from the FAA and TAA that you
wanted? Were the benefits sought achieved?
13. What were the major setbacks encountered or biggest moments of tension in the
certification path?
14. Did you make multiple adjustments to the initial AW plan or Criteria Basis through the
process? Did you meet all standards or able to show compliance in every area?
15. What risks do you currently carry?
16. Are you flying today on a Military Type Certificate (MTC), Military Flight Release
(MFR), or Supplemental Type Certificate (STC)?
Reflections
17. What documents and communications did you find most helpful in establishing the AW
certification?
18. Was the path your program took the right path and why?
19. What is something you wish you had or knew up front when going for the AW
certification? Any future recommendations?
20. Who or what other programs would be of good value for me to pursue in an interview for
more data collection?
Thank you so much for your time. Once I have established the first round of interviews and
certain trends in the data, I may look to come back with some follow-ups. Would you be open to
reconvene after the New Year for a second interview?
Thank you, have a great day!
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AW Certification Interview Matrix
Derek Dennis 1/3/2021

Date
20211110

20211110

Q8
Q9
What level of Airworthiness certification
did you seek to accomplish through the Why did you strive for that certification
FAA? How much did you seek to
level?
accomplish through the TAA?
Code Name Finding -> Certification Path
Factors for Cert Path
IE1
The the program office had an initial plan, Well. [TAA] was the final authority and so
a proposed plan to get a safe carriage STC we had to basically do it. Their way up
certification of the FAA and then military because we were seeking their approval of
certification for the functionality of the the year where or where they understand,
military GPS system because they are
they said. Now we're not going to let you
military functions that are very difficult do it that way. You need to do it this way
for the FAA to certify. That was our
and so we revamped our plan and and we
ingoing airworthiness plan. Submitted to did it. We went forward with the only path
the TAA office at Wright, Patterson, and that the [TAA] said, you know we could
They they kind of basically did not accept follow.
that plan and proposed instead for us to
utilize a independent review team or
independent airworthiness assessment in
the short term. Whilst we sought full FAA
certification of the the mill GPS system
and so that. The second way is the way
that we moved forward with this program.

IP1

Q10
What were the benefits or drivers of this
path?

Airworthiness Certification
Q13

Q11

Q12

What were the costs of this path?

Did you achieve the Airworthiness certification
What were the major setbacks encountered or biggest
from the FAA and TAA that you wanted? Were
moments of tension in the certification path?
the benefits sought achieved?

Q14

Q15

Did you make multiple adjustments to the initial AW
plan or Criteria Basis through the process? Did you meet What risks do you currently carry?
all standards or able to show compliance in every area?

Q16
Are you flying today on a Military Type Certificate
(MTC), Military Flight Release (MFR), or
Supplemental Type Certificate (STC)?

Benefits
Costs
Success rate
Setbacks / Difficulties
# of adjustments
Risk types
Flying Cert
The benefits were for an urgent
The costs of that are pretty large
The answer to that is no. We we have not
The biggest set back on for the FAA. The full FA STC path is Yes, we did. Like we said, we proposed a different path The, uh, the program has four serious level risks, We are flying the mill GPS system under the safe
operational need program and
because, uh, when you, particularly in the received FAA certification of the mill GPS system funding availability and Viability of actually obtaining FAA and or guided into the the airworthiness path. You
UM? And and so that I have not been accepted yet, carriage STC, meaning it's just being safely
independent review team. Assessment risk case of our modification, we we're
or choose the top level goal and there's cost in certification of those malfunctions, the Biggest setbacks on know, for the partial FAA with AARTHY and then seeking and we are continuing to seek to get those risks
carried and not being utilized, not operating as a
assessment and approval. It could have
taking military developed system and cost. Mostly constant funding issues that you the in the military certification side were the independent full FAA path. And so we revised to that. The
coordinated and accepted. And we hope in the next navigation system for the ____ and. We are still
been theoretically the fastest way to get putting it onto a commercial certified know haven't really enabled us to fully go down review teams. Uhm, elevation of of risk we the program office independent review team process does not entail a couple of months as other priorities are quieting seeking risk acceptance in a military flight
the system approved for operations in airplane and and that military developed that path, but we haven't attained that and we and our contractors even even the FAA, the BOMBARDIERE certification per say. I mean a certification basis, so it down, we will have the time and energy to push that release for operations of the mill GPS system for
theater whilst working. The much longer system had specific military purposes did not obtain the Military certification that we contractors assessed the risk at much lower than the the
doesn't define strictly define a certification basis, and through the system and and and at least get it
navigation in the aircraft and. Come as we said,
process of a full FAA STC of the capability. that would work extremely hard and or wanted, yet either 'cause we do not have
military independent review team from Wright Patterson Air so it's a little Gray. Or in that department. Though our before general she meant to for him to make a
we need to get that risk accepted before we can
So that's the benefits of the.you know the expensive and time consuming for the military approval to operate mill GPS for
Force Base. We came in with a medium level risk for
program did do a full. A military MIL Handbook 516 decision on whether he it is he will accept that. Risk gain the military flight release. Uh, that it would
plan that we were told to follow the the FAA to to certify and. And that's so those navigation of our airplanes and the Independent operations. And but the airworthiness authorities independent MACC certification basis, and compliance findings and so that the you know ___ can utilize them. Their not, uh? BB8 we will not be able to put that
other plan is it also or the other part of that are the drawbacks of that. Where the review team process that we utilized came in review team at Wright Patterson, came in with a serious level and we we had, you know, a good. I think was 35 non most GPS capabilities which are currently installed system underneath the military type certificate
is it also keeps all the certification of the FAA, There's not, you know, like FAA
with such a high level of risk that that risk has risk, and so that risk has still not been accepted. Because the compliance is found. And we assess those. Still add that and just not operating... Yeah there are. A number until we attain the full FAA certification that was
aircraft in the original certification
looks at functions and it does not have not been accepted by the Air Force Uh, and
higher level rest of higher difficulty it is to gain acceptance. medium level risk where the independent review team of lower level risks, non compliance risk. But the part of the airworthiness plan.Uh, we agreed to
authorities certification basis as an F. So it's certification rules for military functions [has] to go all the way up to the PEO level, which
took a much more macro. Look at everything and. I I this the the higher level risk roll those lower ones with the [TAA].
an FAA certified airplane and the mill GPS such as carrying bombs or jamming and is General 'S'. For us to operate that system. and
think causing it to be a much more conservative
into them. So yeah, but basically you just you look
system would be fully FAA certified. If we and things like that. And in our case the and that's a very long and arduous process. And
assessment and hot, much higher level of risk... We at the highest level risks... There is no higher rest
could obtain that, and so that's those are the jamming, they anti jam anti spoof we haven't got there yet, so so we haven't
met the standards we we met both the FAA standards and never has been one that it was discussed as
the two. You know reasons that that that kind of things were. Not functions
retained either level of certification that the the
for the safe carriage STC. You know that portion that being a possibility, but they there was never an
that path was which was given to us. ...
normally dealt with by the FAA, so.
program is seeking yet...Exactly, yeah and yeah,
we attained and we did. Do a full compliance finding a assessed high. Nothing. I'd have to go go back on
That is a general Air Force, a philosophy Difficult and expensive, inexpensive for I, I think we're we're kind of, Yep. What we're
for the military certification side of the House. We
that, I'm I'm not not not 100%. When we provided
for commercial derivative aircraft, for any them to certify and we. We actually
seeing both of the downsides as opposed to the
weren't compliant with everything. We did a fault. We all our mitigations and ask for a risk assessment
aircraft to Keep their certification, uh of haven't come, Got there yet we the
benefits of the of this chosen path.
did the full process though. Uh, and so we you know for operations of the system, it came in at the
modifications done under the same
contract for that has not been LED
you you C compliance and everything and and if you serious level. So it might have been. It might
authority that the basic aircraft is is was because it came in a much more
don't then you define your non compliances and you actually be in a high level before we did all our flight
certified and On a big picture, it definitely expensive than the funds we had
assess your risk in the military process and and that is testing and all our integration work and all that and
makes sense because there are a lot of available. And then we still don't have
what we did. There was just a elevation of risk from the then. But but the assessed with all the work we've
aspects of the military certification
the appropriate funding to attain or try to
IRT side that made it a higher level risk.
done was for the serious level.
processes versus FAA certification process attain that the full FAA certification of
that they just don't meet. They're they're. the military GPS system. I mean, it's my
So for the, UM, the effort that was
Uh, ultimately we didn't have the time for Benefits. So I'm not sure there was a
So first phase one, I believe we were up We did a complete the FAA safe carriages STC All of it. Uhm again, I guess I would go back to the TAA and Uh, but there were multiple adjustments, more so
I actually can't remember all. Of the risks up. I
Technically, we're not flying. Well, I guess we're
awarded in on contract, we sought a safe the full FAA certification due to the
benefit because it was not an easy process to. To, uh, approximately $78 million a with the help of the TAA. So not necessarily
they're more subjective approach to how they sign off on. based on once the TAA had their review time, we. We would have to go back and double check up. On flying with the supplemental type certificate for
carriage STC through the FAA. OK, and requirement being deemed the urgent
the [TAA] is, in my opinion, a very
month for the safe carriage STC with. what we wanted and initially against that was our Uhm, the approval. There's many different functionals within made many adjustments based on their assessments what is still being carried in what was deemed to be Safe Carriage only, so the capability is not
with utilizing that we thought for, then the operational need, so we didn't have the
subjective process. Uh, and felt like the Uh, IRT approval TAA IRT approval. The Plan B. The UM, which we were able to to seek? the TA understandably, but they just view things quite
of where we were and what they needed to see in
able to move forward. But ultimately, overall it was utilized right now. How, however, once the PEO
operational use to be approved through duration to do the full testing. The testing in every time we had brought up our our plan follow on Government costs estimate is UM, if we were able to turn the capability on, significantly different than the FAA. So going down that FAA order to get a achievable airworthiness risk
an airworthy serious. Thank high risk.4. Yeah, for signs off on the airworthiness, we will be flying
the TA.
and of itself was approximately 12 to 18 are risks for assessment or you know our approximately $20 million. However, the which is in the process of being worked through path where all modifications to date with the Bacon fleet have assessment. We had to add scope to the contract,
the PEO to sign, but as far as what actually was
on an MTC, or both. Both MF Rs in MTC's.
months. That would have added to the our testing artifacts there. It was their
proposal initially sought was at $54
the wickets, ultimately. Uhm, due to the
been all FAA. OK, I think that's probably the biggest part of ultimately to buy down a lot of that airworthiness risk constituted in those, I can't remember off the top of Between the fleet and the nuances of the fleet,
timeline that we just didn't have. In order interpretation of how they felt we met or million to finish out full FAA
airworthiness assessment, there is a package
tension, and trying to align both entities to kind of meet that that they felt that was acceptable for them to
my head right now.
we will have a variation of actually all three of
to feel their requirement. So in effort of
didn't meet certain criteria each time going certification. Also, if we saw a full TAA being staffed with the C3IN PEO for A signature common goal and ultimately get the capability to the field in approve. One of the biggest ones was the F Met the
those.
reaching that UON. Uh, we didn't have the back to the TAA. Uh, things that were
certification and forewent the FAA
to be able to accept that airworthiness risk and the fastest time possible. Uhm, major setbacks. We had a lot failure modes and effects testing. FAA doesn't look at
documentation time. I guess I should say, agreed to previously seemed to shift
certification. Uh, the kind of ballpark
be able to turn the capability on, so hopefully by of scheduling conflicts. Biggest was we lost an aircraft in the necessarily a lot of the Information within that kind of
not necessarily the testing time, it was more slightly and kind of had maybe more time figure was postdated it about $40 million the new Year we will at least be able to turn the. middle of the effort. Going into the first installation. Uh,
scope from the military side of the House. So we had
the documentation piece through the FAA to think about things. So then there was a for the TAA to do there. A final approval Turn the capability on for an avionics suite
aircraft that actually went down was supposed to be the first to amend the contract or ECP the contract to add that
that would have dragged out the period of different kind of dynamic that would set also and that would go back from start to capability.
install.Uhm, if I remember correctly and it just threw up kind of scope in so that the contractor could then prove
performance. So we sought the safe carriage even the month after, as opposed to
finish and kind of wood. Uh, we undo the
the whole schedule off because the contractor had been
where. Uhm, what we were missing from from the
with then ultimately the TAA signed up to progressively, you know, having an approval FAA testing if you will. I'm not sure.
prepared for a certain aircraft and that's not initially that went eyes of the TAA. Uh, I would say from a financial
do an independent review team to help and then moving forward from there. We (What about non financial costs?) Let's
in first.Uh, the schedule was also tide to a multitude of other standpoint it was probably close to just under. Uh, I just
assign airworthiness risks. In order for us to seem to kind of go back and forth. More so say schedule certainly took a hit up we.
things to take the most advantage of the aircraft downtime, under $10 million in added scope that was derived
utilize the capability in the field.
than continuing that forward momentum. Spent a lot of time going back and forth
which coincidentally two of the four initially needed a major from a TAA perspective. That yeah, wasn't initially
Again, the differences between how the and not being able to proceed with
inspection completed, so we had to work the schedule around planned for and our airworthiness plan for certification
FAA certifies things and the TA certifies being able to use the operational
that, which then tied into also.Testing from the FAA
criteria. As far as [standards], I guess from a safe
things really was not as easy. I think as the capability. If you will come here, we are
perspective and the perspective and just finding.Uhm, the best. carriage standpoint. Yes, we were able to achieve that
team initially anticipated based on upfront in November of 21 when the when the
Uh, we use of time essentially for both in snow and testing, and and ultimately able to achieve A airworthiness
discussions with, you know leadership in the contract was awarded in September of.
there was a period set in there that we were grounded. Uhm, designation from the TAA so that we could move
TAAs office. Uh, which then kind of resulted 18 and still unable to use the avionic use
on multiple occasions actually even once the aircraft
forward and having the [PEO] sign off on that risk as
in much more of a zigzag. A pattern of how especially now a bacon program. Office
unfortunately went down. There were other instances across opposed to having to go to SAF/AQ up with the way
we obtained any of that as far as the FAA has jumped up. I think we just compare.
the fleet that ended up grounding us. Additionally, I think for a that it was deemed. And I always get these ones
went, I thought that they. Seemed pretty They just completed their third. Uh,
total of almost four and a half to five months, or the entire confused. It was deemed as a serious and a high risk,
UM. Consistent with their process from the based moves in the past year a little over
effort. But again, I guess for the purposes of this interview, the not a serious risk. Uh, so that it stayed within at least
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AW Certification Interview Matrix
Derek Dennis
1/3/2021

Date
20211110

Code Name Finding ->
IE1

20211110

IP1

Reflections
Q19

Q17

Q18

What documents and communications did you
find most helpful in establishing the AW
certification?

What is something you wish you had or knew up
Was the path your program took the right path and
front when going for the AW certification? Any
why?
future recommendations?

Known knowledge
Yep, yeah, the air, the air worthiness plan. Was
a critical tool. You know we didn't get the the
the path that we had proposed. Uh, accepted
and so we had to revise that plan. And and that
that's a critical part of it, as well as the. If A is
what they call a project specific certification
plan, which is essentially a net worth in a
certain plan. Uhm, for that specific modification
or installation and and both of those are very
critical. And and we're great tools. Who the?
Mil Handbook 516. Mack certification basic
basis matrix is is also a a key tool and document
to trying to push things through that. That
military starts side of the house.

Correct decision
Yeah, and in my opinion it was not the right path.
And and we are still, you know, not able to fly the
system because we didn't choose the the right path.
The and it was not the right path because. And FAA
certification of military functioning system, it's
just not viable and it's not feasible it it's it's. It's
desirable from a high level philosophical
philosophy, but. Uhm for military functions Uh,
specifically military developed systems with
military functions trying to seek FAA certification
is not realistic in that in that some.Yeah, that that
was the the biggest problem...A military
certification with a mill. A Mac I think is. The only
viable method, and it would still end up it still may
end up with some you know non compliance is at
risk, but the those risks would be. Much more well
analyzed and thought out and understood. Uhm
van, the overarching IRT process that was used.
They they Uh, you know? Effectively they are. They
almost didn't understand that the. The Bombardiere
business jet uses GPS for longitudinal position only.
And it has all or if that's the only thing that it it it
would. It would be the sole source for all the other
position data has multiple other sources that are
constantly.Checked against each other and so
vertical, you know, ground above ground and all
those things have multiple sensors going on and and
though the. And in the military utilization of GPS, is
is much more. Depended on it, and so the the.The
I think the countless meetings that we had,
No. Uh, I think it was the right path because again
both with the MCO and TAA. Trying to dive
it was a UON. We needed to field the capability as
into what was deemed acceptable, how we
soon as we could. Then at the time, with the
would go through the whole process in that,
information that was provided for the team to be
you know we had that Seam approach that
able to conquer this task, and I think that Seam
didn't necessarily work out in our favor, but
approach was the appropriate way. Again, based
we were still able to obtain. Are close to
on upfront dialogue with TAA leadership, they all or
obtaining all the certifications necessary for
I should say the individual had agreed that if put in
the fleet. And I guess just not necessarily the
that same scenario would have kind of conquered
documentation. Uh, from my perspective, but
the the task as we had. Unfortunately, when it
more of the communications across the board came down to brass tacks, that wasn't necessarily
and getting everybody all on the same page,
the way that. Happened, but the team was able to
all in the same call to try to talk through the
still move forward and find some sort of delineation
multiple different functions areas that were
between the two approving authorities. TAA and
concerning to whether it be the MCO the TAA FAA to be able to field the capability. So yeah, I
and kind of having that common ground to be
guess given that the information that we had at the
able to talk through a lot of the conversations time we were able to move forward didn't [meet]
to be able to get everybody on the same page
the timeline. But I think that ultimately will give the.
to get to the end goal of field in that capability. The the pilots that capability that they need to be
able to. Complete their missions.

Lack of Knowledge
If we had done a little more research on the FAA's
ability to certify military functions and E and the.
The FAA's.Uh, continuing stance on that, and you
know, they're they're. They're even getting more
strict with it now where our aircraft has an FAA
asked for the ARC 210 in the cockpit, you know
that that radio we have in the cockpit and that was
the last FAA STC issued for R210 cockpit since then.
They said we're not doing those that that radio
because that radio. Oh, really shouldn't be certified
under the FAA because it has 2 broad abandoned
you and unless you modify the radio to not allow it
to use its full band of frequencies you're creating
you, you have non compliance is and so it it does
not comply with FAA rules because. Uh, and in less
you you know put, you know, do basically software
limitations in the system. You know you you add,
ban, ban chopping, or band limitations because.
The the radio itself you can dial any frequency you
want and you can stomp on glideslope frequency
or some important. Uh, navigation for status
frequencies in.So yeah, if we had known a little bit
more about that that history in that, that general
trend within the FAA, I think we could have made
up a stronger case to maintain the original path
that we had recommended and and and seeking
FA just safe carriage by the FAA and functional.
Certification by the Air Force...Yes, yeah yeah as
a.My recommendation on how.Military systems
All of it. I guess we were going off of information
that we had thinking that we were down the right
path at the TA would ultimately kind of sign off
on all of the testing and all of the work that we
had planned to do in the strategy leading up to
getting the effort awarded. So I guess. Having
better insight or I don't really know how to even
say that either, but like ultimately. Have accurate
information going into the effort. I think the team
would have put maybe taken a different approach
had we, you know, had information that differed
from what we were given initially. So yeah, I guess
again I think the whole subjectivity of TAA. Again,
in my opinion, subjective. Uh, I think, Probably be
personally would have liked to known how
nonstandard their processes are on how they
come up with derived airworthiness requirements
and how they feel it falls into a certain category
vice. Uh, maybe some sort of metric that kind of
puts it in there. Granted, it's off of a metric, but it's
all kind of up to the fields in again, in my opinion of
where they think it falls as opposed to some sort of
quantitative metric that says no kidding. It's in
this category, not based on, well, you didn't do all
the nuts and bolts, but you did 98% so, but it's still
not good enough for us. We're gonna move you
somewhere else and far as the category scheme.
So I think combination of the subjectivity and then
having better information going into the effort and
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Q20
Who or what other programs would be of good
value for me to pursue in an interview for more
data collection?
Contacts for Me
Certainly there are. A number of other airplane
other platforms also pursuing mill GPS systems and
like one of them they tend is using the same
military GPS system. And that's but that's you
know, military system on a military aircraft. But
then you also have the the _____ is. Is trying to
incorporate the same mill GPS and that's more of
an apples to apples with our program because it's
a commercial derivative aircraft that is
incorporating a military system into it and the ____
has is is. Yeah, if you haven't approached him I I
think you should because it it has more military
function in systems incorporated on it than the
____ like the ____ has self defense. In other you
know anti jam kind of things like that that it has to
have because it's it's a VIP transfer...The biggest
example of that is the the IFF system that APX 119
IFF system that we incorporated.Handles both civil
and military modes and and so, uh, civil...Yeah, the
Honeywell guys would would be able to even if
even if they can't give you too much, they can give
you their marketing spielo. Yeah, we've got this guy
on all these platforms and then you can find them
to find somebody in that platform.

I know that the aerial networks division is having a
lot of struggles with the FAA right now based on
UMT phase or the temporary frequency
authorizations. I don't know if that would be an
area to kind of look into. And it's actually that it
would comes down to is that the Air Force doesn't
do everything that. Kind of falls in line with their
process, especially in the most layman terms, so
they're not willing to kind of play at the moment
and not authorizing any of those frequency
allocations. Uh, I don't know Stephen Icso. Maybe
a good person. I know he also has the bacon
experience as a reservist, but also has all all of
HNAG pretty much portfolio in kind of dealing with
the nuances there from or at least knowledgeable
on what's happening with the FAA, and at least
from a network perspective. And getting all the R.
Uh, sorry. End of day, all the frequency allocations
sorted out for different Air Force platforms to be
able to test and or utilize. For a plethora of, but at
least from the network perspective, H and AG may
be able to, uh. Trying to think of other programs. I
know the AWACS grew up. They were just going
through, but I think they're got cancelled so that
wouldn't be a good one. I'm not 100% sure I can
think about that one more two and get back to you
with anybody else or other programs if that's
acceptable? ... Asian J and I was having a similar
scenario with Vijay G. As far as gas oven dealing
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Q1

Q2

About the Interviewee
Q3

What is your name, position or title,
and the program office you work in?

How long have you worked in AC
systems?

Position Type
Yes, my name is ________. I am, uh
and avionics engineer for the Air Force
government employee. I'm. Presently,
the lead flight, quite deck avionics
engineer for the _____ be on the Air
Force side. Uh, and I work in the
program offices AFL AFL CMC slash
_____ guess?

Experience
So I've only been working for the
government directly for about 12
years or so. I've actually worked in
industry for about 24 years before
I came to the government. So I've
worked in the airlines I've worked
at that as a contractor, work
special OPS. Uh, years ago, back in
the 80s. Worked well actually. I
guess at this point I I would say I'll
get someone to neighborhood of
about 30 years of experience in
avionics. I've got about 37 years as
an engineer overall. Most of that
was in avionics.

What modifications and platforms
have you worked on? What is the
most recent? When was it?

The Program
Q4

Q5

What is your role in the modification?

What is the modification we are talking
Was the original design of this aircraft for
How long has the Air Force been utilizing the
about today? (Size, Time functionality, ACAT the military, or is it a Commercial
aircraft?
level, Dollar Amount, etc)
Derivative Aircraft?

Experience
I worked on the. Multiple platforms
UM? Probably somewhere
neighborhood 18 different, 18 or
20 different aircraft. So I've I've
worked in the in the commercial
side of the fence I've worked on
Douglas DC-8 DC 10s. Uhm, MD
87's a Boeing 7273747576777. I've
worked the King Air 200 of work,
the Airbus A300 Before's and I've
worked with the. The military of
dumb stuff I've worked with. The
MH 53 day helicopter. The inmates
60 G helicopters that's a payable
on Paybox special OPS. T38
upgrades J Pats aircraft C32 a C40B
and C-27 J the light Attack support
aircraft. Which I believe is a uh. I
forget I forget the Desi. It's eight
almost 829. I can't remember what
the. Actual name was anymore,
but. Uh, and also F16 simulator
trainers and. The horse in the Air
Force. Now right now I'm working
on ______. Uh, _____ is now
designated_____. The new _____

Position
But the mil GPS my my my vacation I'm
responsible again like it's just somebody on the
lead. Flight deck engineer and I had a pretty
heavy hand in the determining factors of how
we're going to move forward as far as the
design for the. _______. How we're going to
apply military GPS because at the time they
were doing it. They were looking at just putting
a box and as it's cheaper, cheaper by itself and
then they were just. But they were saying they
put like a a small three ATI display in the flight
deck instrument panel. Uh, we chose to make it
in the war. Uh, we had they just system for the
flight crew, so we've actually done a lot more
to that. It's a very. It's a fairly. It's a. It's a fairly
decent integration for this aircraft, so my
responsibility is everything pretty much start
to finish from the design aspect. Working with
Boeing, working with the manufacturer
Honeywell. Been involved with with all the
design reviews and things like that and, uh. Also
involved with this certification aspect of it
working on both with the FAA and at every time
they originally were, you know when we were
trying to push the idea of going down to the
FAA certification route, Boeing was pushing
back and wanted to mill certification so the
initial thought was ever do milk certification.
Will then they change their mind and decide to
__________ and the avionics IPT lead Ive worked in ____ program office In my time at AFLCMC, prior to that I think my major role in the the this
for the ____ replacement program. So since April of 2019. I have worked I worked in simulators for the most modification is is working on both the the flight
I work in AFLCMC/____
in ____for about twenty months. part supporting C-5 and KC-10. Ive deck. And the mission communication system
As a major aircraft program, I've worked on the anfar ERP program avionics. Making sure that we have a, uh, a
only worked on ____
for the C-5. and worked on KC-10, solid design that the contractor is is working
of course, that was primarily
their their timelines now need to get to
training systems.
production, but eventually two certification.
Uh, hopefully mostly F FAA certification. Uh,
so that we can continue. Yeah, we can field this
thing on. Somewhat on time. Uh, and I won't
get into the schedule details.

B-8

Type of mod
We integrated this system with the aircraft
such that it interfaces with the flight
management computers, which is the,
which in this case is the green aircraft
equipment. And what we're doing is we're
allowing them to switch between the
military GPS. In this case, it's a. It's an
embedded GPS INS. It's a Honeywell H-764.
It does have a a GPS card in it. It's an INS
with GPS and the GPS card is a force 524
echo trimble card which has the capability
of S Pass which we are not using. We're not
using the S fast capability. We are using the
mil GPS aspect of it, yes, but the S passes
really civil function which the. Air Force
Airworthiness Office does not want us to be
doing so we're interfacing with the flight
management computer and we're also
feeding information from the flight
management computer to other places
within the aircraft so. , you know, looking at
a block diagram here, they kind of give a
basic description we've got In our system we
have we're using. The CRPA antenna, but
seven elements CRPA, intent of within AEW
electronic unit for the for the antenna for
each of the GPS is we're feeding information
from the GPS to mission communication
system, which is the back end of the aircraft
Basically, modifying two 747 800
aircraft._____ transports. So it's it's a small
fleet size only and only two aircraft, but the
modification is. There's a significant. It's
about a, uh, a cat, one D $3.9 billion effort.
It's actually been been ongoing for a number
of years, and it's probably not going to now
deliver until about 2025. So, Uh, about nine
years at total. I believe in in a making from
the in inception to a final delivery...Ah, just a
mill GPS portion is is not not that much. it's
tough to say. With that, with that dollar
amount is we really don't have that. Broken
out because it is a firm fixed price contract.
We don't have the level of insight into
various efforts that you might have on some
other other contracts. Let's just put it that
way. Its hard to say, if I had to I guess I
would say less than uh, $10 Million. For the
effort by I'm like I said I really have no no
way of knowing since we don't have a work
breakdown structure and pricing that's
broken out on that level of detail. ("And so
the functionality. How would you describe
it?") For the mill GPS portion. It's, it's
basically, uh, an alternative. Positioning
source. So we haven't gotten rid of the. Our
commercial eggies, commercial GPS is used
in the aircraft. The military versions.where

Q6

Q7

AC type
Well, so the aircraft that we're using as a
as a Boeing 747 Dash 8 I. That's in a
reality that wasn't going to be the case. It
was gonna be a. We were actually getting
trying to get something off the
production line and I guess what
happened was is that. ThatBoeing had a
couple of fairly new at that. I'm fairly
new 747s that the Russians I've had. I
guess the Russians for the airlines had
and they defaulted. So we ended up
picking up those two airplanes. Suppose
we 'cause we gotta get DA lot of it, which
I I you know I don't know, you're not
you're talking to the wrong person where
I think we got it right. Good deal out of it
but that's that's that was the that was
what they thought was anyway so they
so that's what we got. We got 747 dash 8
I's so it's a purely commercial aircraft.
And we're transforming it into a US Air
Force commercial built derivative
aircraft.

Time of use
This aircraft has never been used. This
aircraft is brand new. Uh, it set out in the
desert out at the out in California. Uh, and I
was after a few times I've seen it up close
and personal, but on the aircraft several
times and this is before we send it down to
San Antonio for modification but but that's
that it's been around. I mean, like I said. I
think I wanna say, oh, geez, I can't
remember the year. I can't remember the
time frames anymore. So let's say roughly
2016 or so, or something like that. I had to
go. I had to go check records to find out
when we actually purchased those aircraft,
but. They've been in our possession for a
few years, but you know, like I said, they
they sat out there. They're being upkept by
Boeing, and then they were sent out to San
Antonio where they're being modified as
we speak right now. ("They havent flown
any op hrs?") No, absolutely not.

I would say if you looked at question 6,
see you original design obviously was a.
This was a commercial airplane. So it it is
a commercial derivative Air Force
aircraft.

This particular version of the aircraft I I
don't think has been fielded before within
the Air Force, 'cause it's a 747-8. But in
general we have both Air Force has been
using 747s in various roles. Probably for
about 30 years. The first is, you know, Air
Force One and naoc and and a couple of
other other systems throughout the Air
Force. To date, I can't say that we've been
using any 747-8s, in any other under role,
but 747 is in general for for quite awhile.
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Q8
What level of Airworthiness certification
did you seek to accomplish through the
FAA? How much did you seek to
accomplish through the TAA?
Certification Path
The path that this program office took
was First and foremost, we take the the
FQDN AFI in the in the in the direction
we're given from the Air Force. Pretty
serious, especially on a passenger
carrying aircraft, which is where your
what this is. To get as much FAA
certification to the maximum extent
practicable and that's what we're trying to
do on everything. Now I also will tell you
that Programmatics gets in the way. So
what happens is there's times when we
want to get other things FAA certified, and
because of the fact that you want fixed
firm fixed price contract, what happens is
that they're they're they're. There tends
to be some horse trading going on. So,
and there's things like that that occurred,
and so there's certain things we couldn't
get that we wanted to get from FAA
perspective. And then in in, in, in in reality,
we started looking at it. It's it's not a real
bad thing, but. The thing that we got the
trade off that we got was. We got them to
buy into the idea of going forward and
getting FAA certification of full FAA
certification with the mill GPS. And when
I say full on talking about it from the way
the FAA describes it, we can talk about it
Now we're seeking maximum
certification through the FAA. On the on
the on. The EGIs in particular. But I gotta
check my notes here real quick, but I'm,
I'm believe right now. Uh, we're just going
to certify them as provisions only under
the FAA. At least that's the plan at this
point. We're gonna do some additional
testing because of the because of the
batteries. Uh, to see if possibly they can
be certified. Uh, with the batteries in in
place and let me just check something
there real quick. I I'm sorry the the I
misspoke so right now our our
certification approach is to certify the
the EGIs with mil GPS. But basically
removes the lithium batteries from the
STC. Type design. The bottom line is that
the EGIs can can have the batteries
inserted at at a different time, but for uh
will have to do a little bit of a work around
on on the. Spin up cycle of the EGIs to
allow them to to operate without the
lithium batteries. But that and then go
through the FAA process that way, so we
will certify it within mill GPS. Uh, in the
aircraft, just without the without the
lithium batteries installed at the time of
certification is that makes sense. ("And so

Q9

Q10

Why did you strive for that certification
level?

What were the benefits or drivers of this
path?

Factors for Cert Path
Again for the FAA. For for number reasons,
one first of all, that's the that's the edict
that's pretty much handed down to us from
the commercial derivative perspective. It
because we're passenger aircraft. It lends
itself very well to what we're doing. In it,
because the FAA was able to to at least
they're telling us they were able, they're
able to do these. Did the GPS spot
certification and not just the GPS, but the
interfacing that we have with all the
different elements within the GPS like the
Egypt with transponder and everything
else. Because they could cover all that. Did
we decide hey, that's a better path to go
down and and and what that comes down
to? Also is. Is manpower in the program
office as well? If you take a good look at
program office in the past? You know they
have. They've basically have cut down the
the staffing. In my opinion, if you're going
to do a true certification effort on this type
for this particular system, you're going to
have more people involved. You got that
more engineers involved on the on the Air
Force side and you're gonna have to have
more control over what's going on with the
design melt elements within Boeing, and
that's part of the problem with a fixed price
The reason for pushing for that certification
level is. Basically, that's what policy dictates
this. Yeah, no, that's what policy dictates
that you know this is a. This is primarily a
commercial derivative passenger carrying
airplanes so. That's that's what the. This Air
Force DoD policy. Ultimately.

Benefits
Well, like I said, I think I think it it helps us
from the standpoint there and we don't
have the personnel to do what would be
necessary in my mind to do it. Proper
certification from the program office
standpoint. it becomes an issue of of the
way the Air Force structure the program
office anymore and so. Uh, you've got the
personnel you got time, cost and schedule.
If it works to the benefit it can, it can help
you in those areas. Again, like I said, we're
we're at it's it's. It remains to be seen
because we're not far enough down that
path in my mind to be able to say whether
or not there's not gonna be a hiccup or a
problem. So far things look OK, but that
doesn't mean anything. If this were not the
endpoint yet.

Uh, if you really go to to to question 10,
what's the benefit or the benefit of doing
that? You know, sticking with that policy is
we don't have to recertify the airplane for
all through the TA to all the things that
have already been FAA certified so. And
and I obviously that's a significant. Portion
of the airplane. And looking at the the
system that we're looking at, you know
essentially the whole flight deck. It is a.
FAA certified flight deck. We're we're
making some changes to it that have to be
reviewed and and possibly certified
differently, but if we had to go back and
and recertify the whole flight deck Ah, a
new. This would be a much more involved
process and and are, you know it would
drive no significant impact too. Flight test.
Ah, I I can't. I really can't imagine trying to
go down a a total military certification
process. Uh, on this system. The MCS the
the mission communication system. That's
really not, you know, part of what we're
talking about. That's that's another furball.
But for for the purposes of the for purposes
of the. Mil GPS Certifying everything
under the under the FAA as much as
possible is is. I think the most realistic
thing to do. We will have to do some

Airworthiness Certification
Q13

Q11

Q12

What were the costs of this path?

Did you achieve the Airworthiness certification
from the FAA and TAA that you wanted? Were
the benefits sought achieved?

Costs
Well, you've already seen you've already
seen the. But as the numbers I kind of
rattled off to you about the the way the
system is integrated. We could have took
this. We could take the easy path I
guess, and just to meet the requirement
though in a GPS receiver on the aircraft
with a little three ATI display and it made
it be a Federated system. Again, it goes
back to. In our minds, we wanted to
make and it's system that was useful to
the flight crews. And it's something that
they could use for, you know, the
purpose of their conops. As a worldwide
aircraft like you know, being able to fly
anywhere in the world anytime. But far
as their costs are in the big, to me the big
cost is really the money. If there's a
drawback to what we're doing, it's the
money because of. If you're doing this, if
you were doing, I think that modification
efforts on the Air Force side versus what
I've seen on the commercial side is is
almost like night and day. Because if I
do this, if I did a a an effort on the on
the on the on the on the commercial
side. I believe that you're probably
looking at a cost that's way, way much
lower than what you end up paying for
I don't have the the the actual costs of
this effort like I talked about before. We
don't have a. Hey, uh, under a firm fixed
price contract. We don't have a
dedicated work breakdown structure
and and various costs for. Sub efforts
within the work breakdown structure
where we might be able to pull this out.
("What about like nonfinancial costs")
Like I said, ______ can probably talk to
you more about working with the TAA.
We've talked a little bit about the FAA. I
think our biggest challenges has been
the the lithium batteries. We didn't
have to deal with that issue. Then uh,
let should almost be a slam dunk.
Getting a certified with the with the
alternative input from the the mill GPS.
The the lithium batteries have created a
little bit of issue, so we're doing
additional testing. Are on our own
outside of the contractor. to examine
the viability of of retaining the lithium
batteries in a system so this is where we
got to look at. Kind of two paths. Well, I
told you earlier about taking the batteries
out and certifying it without the batteries
in place is basically the the Boeing
certification path. From a government

Success rate
At this point in time, what we can say is that the
plans have been approved and accepted by the
FAA, and that we have gotten our airworthiness
cert plan through the Air Force. That's as good
as I can tell you, because everything is in
process... Well, that's hard to say right now
because the schedule keeps slipping to the
right. Uh, so I'm not even to be honest with you.
I'm not even sure what this ________. He's as
we're speaking. They're changing the schedule.
So I think originally originally we were supposed
to have the plane out. Dash 2020 24 into 2024. I
think it was. I think now they're talking about
18 months or better out from that. And so, uh?
("That's because you're it's all this like you're
doing so many other things to the aircraft is.") Oh
yeah, yeah, it it. It's it's certainly isn't because of
this this this modification, it's it's. It's a bunch of
other stuff. Uh, we got we got a whole host of
issues going on. But I think originally you know
we were looking to have this sort. You know, let's
put this with the FAA. Gives you five years. OK,
they give you 5 years before they they can
actually pull the rug out from underneath you.
When it comes to certification now you could get
an extension I guess on it. And of course you're
gonna have to probably do a lot of of of proven
to them. Things are still. Where they're
supposed to be. But there's there's a. There's a
Well. Yeah, and that's still a work in progress
unfortunately. So Boeing has yet to submit all
their certification. All their certification
paperwork. Uh, for the avionics systems to the
FAA. I have to check on the check on the EGI
itself. And then see how that's being certified.
Come because of the the the the lithium
batteries. There are about 16 certification plans
that are being held up. Overall, the aircraft, by
and large is is being certified. So through the FAA
process so. Rough number is there's about 70
certification plans in total. Pardon me. The vast
majority of those. Are are already through the
FAA process and and have been accepted. Uh, I
have. I'll have to check with _______ and get
back to you on, particularly on the EGI and where
that stands. And that's probably the other
engineer, you ought to, talked here.
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What were the major setbacks encountered or biggest
moments of tension in the certification path?
Setbacks / Difficulties
Uh, for this well for this particular for this particular
modification, nothing yet. I'm always keeping my eyes open.
There's always been a few hiccups come along, but we've
been able to get things moving resolved. Whatever up to this
point, so hope, hope, and pray to God. It stays that way. But
there's another things, for example with like the class to EFB.
We ran into situations right now where I'm facing right now.
White paper as we speak to go to the FAA to go argue some
points on that particular thing because they're they're putting
us in a situation where they're wanting us to put this system
into DAL level D that everybody else in the industry is using a
down level E, and nobody makes equipment for DAL level D
hardly. So, and it's not going to work for our conops, so they're
putting us in an undo situation and undue stress situation
where I can't get equipment to do my job. But yet you're
telling me I gotta get it certified that level, so we're gonna
have a little chat about this, because because the
interpretation of the policy holder is driving us to do these
things, which everybody else in industry scratching their
head saying. I think he's nuts. So we've got to figure out how
to get this resolved. So that is a major hiccup, because if we
don't do, if we cannot get this. If we cannot get this taken care
of, we're going to go down the path of those certifications.
We've got to do that right now. We believe it or not, because
the fact that we're looking at FMC position data up through
that to the to the basically through the to the EFB. The ENV
guys are going to look at this and they're gonna, they're they
they the potential for trying to turn this into something. We're
going to wind up doing a safety critical thread analysis on on
So I I think the the batteries are probably the the biggest set
back. Yeah so far but. Hi there, it's not driving us off the
timeline. At least not the current timeline. And we put a plan in
place to to deal with it. Woods with alternatives… Uh, we
talked kind of about the the major set back and it really hasn't
been all that major. I think we've been able to to to work
through the process with the FAA.

Q14

Q15

Q16

Did you make multiple adjustments to the initial AW
plan or Criteria Basis through the process? Did you meet What risks do you currently carry?
all standards or able to show compliance in every area?

Are you flying today on a Military Type Certificate
(MTC), Military Flight Release (MFR), or
Supplemental Type Certificate (STC)?

# of adjustments
Yeah, so there's there's always that going on. There's
there's no matter how you slice it, the there are
elements of of. With Boeing develops the sort by now.
Keep in mind when we talk about FAA cert plans here
Sure. Boeing develops a cert plans. Typically we don't
get a lot of insight now. We did on some things. We
got to see some of the preliminaries, things that they
were doing and and that was good because I asked a
lot of questions and I was looking for some stuff,
making sure they were doing certain things. Matter of
fact, I myself personally went directly to the FAA,
MCO and I and I and I went when it came to the GPS.
Especially I wrote about I wrote a I don't know three or
four five page paper and I said look, I'm a derp and they
know it 'cause we they know me for years. I said look if
I was doing this myself. This is exactly what I expect to
be done. OK for all the interfacing for the Egypt words.
A transponder, all these other things. Here's what I
expect you going up from the navigation perspective,
here's why. Expect you going from ADSB perspective.
Here's here's exactly what I expect. We're going out
and I'm telling. I'm asking you guys this, because you
guys have the insight to a cert plan. I don't. I'm just
trying to let you know As the Air Force as a program
office, I'm asking you to let me know if these people
are not doing what we asked them to do, because if
you're not, I'm going back to Boeing and we're gonna
have a chat because there's there's certain
expectations and I'm having when this gets done, you
But how we made major adjustments to the
airworthiness plan? Not from from our perspective.
the objective is is still. To Certified under the FAA to
the the maximum extent possible. The current cert
plan is is now bend basically through the process and
and is published. Could there be some changes to it in
the future? I think if there could be They will largely be.
Uh, to increase the FAA certification or decrease the
amount of FAA certification down the road. Uh, and
take things back from the from the mill certification
process. That is what I'm understanding, anyway... So
Can we show compliance in every area? No. Obviously
there are. There are some systems in in this this
aircraft that are are because of the nature of the
systems or just outside FAA's purview. But as far as
this system goes, I I think we will be able to show
compliance. In most areas and following this D LT278
testing. Uh, we should be able to show compliance in all
areas for the EGI. ("So to follow on that..Is is that
something that you're saying you're going like
compliance testing that is? Like the FAA just checkboxes,
even though they're they don't have specific tests for
that and models.") No, we we we still have, we still
have the full gamut of AIMS testing. To go through
this as part of this effort, so, Uh, you know from that
from that perspective. Uh, It's not going to be just a
check box from the FAA per standpoint. Aims testing is
is a. I'm I'm not gonna say a separate effort, but it's it's
a. So we're we're working through those kind of. Tests

Flying Cert
Well, the goal is his together as a full of MTC,
that's what we're shooting for it, so that's what
that's what I'm sticking with. ("So it will be an
MTC? Overall, but you're still receiving it STC
within that.) Right, right, yes yes. So so so the
way it works basically is is that. You, I think the
way they started this aircraft was it started out. I
want to say this started out with attack another
where it came out as a green aircraft totally FAA
certified. So we start out there as attack. We
move on to what we're doing. It's now MACC
modifying the aircraft so. We are, you know,
the ultimate goal from the Air Force perspective
is always getting a military military type
certification. Whether you're getting STC's or
not, it doesn't matter because in the end it is
under the jurisdiction. This whole thing is really
under the diction of the military, and the
military has ownership of this. So when it's all
said and done, it's a military type certification.
The STC efforts just get rolled up into that and
that's taken into account when you when you
lay out the baseline for your MACC. You're
talking about with applicable, what's not and
what's not applicable AETC to the Mac is because
it was based on 14 CFR part 25 or whatever from
standard word is that it's covered through the
FAA certification. So from our standpoint. Uh, we
just take the STC's, they just become an element
Yeah, Jected Vista flying in STC. Uh, uh, as far as
as far as mill GPS goes. My my understanding or
someone flying on an STC. So Yeah, could that be
subject to change. I think it would probably not
be driven by Mil GPS if if that's where we end up.
So right now. We've been targeting all these
things to to be under under an STC. Three or
four first flight. Even the other areas where we're
having problems with the lithium batteries.

Risk types
Well, the risk on that is of course, if if they can't get
it fixed certification. We got a major problem.I
don't even know if we can get it. I don't even
know if we get military certification. Because we
would have to go back and and had to deal
probably to deal with the contracts on what?
Because you're going to have to go back and get the
data necessary and we're gonna have to go back
and re establish ourselves with the Hanscom GPM's
and TPM's they get 'cause we register going down
that path. And once we once we determine where
it could do the we're gonna get certification that
that was basically nixed no longer no longer matter.
Fact, everything from our perspective at this point
in time is being FAA certified that would be related
to. Anything from the Hanscom perspective so.
Everything is is is being FAA certified in so. We
basically don't lead to apply anything from that
perspective, and we've talked. We've had
discussions with them and they know where we're
at right now, so there's so there's EN. They're all
familiar with, you know where we're at so.

We're not carrying any risk in our our current risk
of you for. For Mil GPS, you know, should we be?
Honestly, I don't think so. At this point, we're not
showing any significant risks there. Just trying to
see if I could find it. Update briefing on. On where
we are. So so right now where? Where were Boeing
is tracking or? It looks like by January of 22. We
should be pretty much. Through that process. ("And
so did you have to have any sort of risk assessment
done by the ETA on GPS. Or was it all with that?")
yeah, to my. To my knowledge this is all through
the through the FAA. Size so. Uh, functional tests
and the end to end system development. Right now
low GPS is is was completed pretty much in August
of this year. Their Boeing is looking at the. At their
system spec verification. But that's the part that. so
they're still working on and expected me completing
around January of next year. On spec verification,
with the with the existing load GPS... Flight tests
wont start until somewhere around 23. Aircraft
worn power on is is right now looking at June 22.
Uh and 1st Flight won't be until around November
of 22. Uh, and then. Our our primary testing flight
deck type testing is is in block. 20 which is actually
on the second aircraft. And that won't be until
sometime in 23 according to the current schedules
sometime around June, July will start Block 20
testing. So second, aircraft power on is not until.
Late in 22 with first flight and around June of 22. So
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Code Name Finding ->
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20211130 IP2

Reflections
Q19

Q17

Q18

What documents and communications did you
find most helpful in establishing the AW
certification?

What is something you wish you had or knew up
Was the path your program took the right path and
front when going for the AW certification? Any
why?
future recommendations?

Who or what other programs would be of good
value for me to pursue in an interview for more
data collection?

Known knowledge
So I would say that what was very very helpful
for me personally was I had set up a series of
meetings. Early on in the program were like I
said, I'd pull people from the FAA. The Air
Force Airworthiness Office, Hanscom. Boeing
of course. And program office and trying to
think who will. Who will I brought into the
broad in a number of elements and we and I
and I I devised a plan of what the discussion
should be about, because I've done you like it.
Started doing this for a long time, so there's
certain things I forgot to pack. The presidents
airlift 'cause they're the users they were
involved in this conversation as well. To try to
make sure that. We we get the most complete,
thorough look at how to put the system on the
aircraft and how to get it certified. In other
words, I was looking at this. I was looking. I was
keeping an open mind. I was looking at it from
standpoint. How would I go down the path of
getting FAA certification? How would I go
down the path of getting mill certification and
and and try to? Uh, come up with. All the
inputs that I gotta get based on all the
information that we know about. In trying to
make it a, you know a a smart decision so that
'cause this was all really in in the process of
how do we get to the point of coming up with
a strategy? How do we wanna go forward with
That's that's probably a question that's that's
better asked of ____, I don't know if you have
an interview scheduled with him, but he can
probably help you more in that then. They're
not then I can. As far as how we got to the
certification. Ah, I'm only tangentially involved
in that.

Correct decision
I believe it's the right path. It wasn't the right path.
I wouldn't be sticking with it. This this path is is
beneficial to the program Office for number
reasons. Like I said before, if you to do the job right,
in my opinion, we'd have to get. We'd have to staff
up with a number of people, and I'm not just
talking hot buys, I'm talking people know what
the crap they're doing with these types of
systems. Yeah, and the interfacing and things like
get for us to be able to move forward in a proper
manner so. And the problem that I'm seeing right
now in the air forces we seem to be kind of short
staffed in a lot of areas, seeing eyes, one of them
and and so that would be a difficult thing for us to
do. From from the standpoint of my my like I said
my biggest negative in my the biggest negative thing
to me personally is effectively went firm fixed
price contract because it even though I have a
good relationship with Boeing even though we
talked to each other, there is a lot of details in
there that I'm not getting and I don't know what's
going on and if it was, if if if that was not present
for. So I mean, that's something that. Perspective.
Uh, is it happen? Is it's? It's an application thing, so I
mean, I've I've, I've got quite a bit, but not again.
The type of engineer I am. I wanna know every
aspect, every detail to make sure everything is being
covered properly. 'cause I don't want surprises at
the end of this mess. And that's one of the things
I I think it's I think it's the right path. There's as far
as where we're going number one because that's
you know what the guidance requires. But more
importantly. They would be redundant to. To to
try to serve recertify the whole the whole system
under under the FAA even, or I'm just under
under under the military certification aspect
because. Even though we have to do some
additional work to do too. Get the mill GPS certified
under an FAA process. Ah, if we went the other
way. Anything that that system touches. There
within the avionics architecture or the OR the
aircraft. Could then be.Question. By the military
side and and we would have to go back and and
recertify. I don't know, uh? The the flight
management system other than the electrical
power system. Other systems within within the
airplane that already that already have a
certification. On them, ah, if we open it up to the to
the mill side. So I think for that reason and not
having to do. Duplicative and and additional work.
Or to get to a certification. Is this is the right thing
to do for the for the aircraft?

Contacts for Me
Ill give you 3 names: OK, one guy one get it and
give you the PM or a VIPTPM. His name is ______.
[_______, _____ PM, ]. Another another individual
I think would be very beneficial from a technical
perspective, and he's my boss and he and I.We
working together for years on this program is Mark
Phillips. And he's he's avionics lead [EN] for the
entire aircraft he's got. He's got the whole aircraft.
I'm just. I'm just the flight deck lead that reports to
him.the last person I would mention would be
Raimon is his name is Raymond Rd Regas we we
just calling Ray Array Modrej Regas Rodriguez is a
He is our lead airworthiness person on the
program. And he and I were posed together for a
number of years on this program, so he knows.
Very much very. He's got a very very good hand on
what's going on from the Edward is perspective.
Overall, for the entire aircraft as well as you know
what I'm dealing with. And he also worked at the
ENY office for a number of years as an airborne
this person so. He can give you the insight from
from sitting in on that side of the fence. Uh, as well
as you know, working with us in the program
office. ("And then how about from the perspective
of maybe a different program office?") Well then I
would suggest you gonna talk to uh. OK, so I know
I know two commercial group group people or
groups like that. Or kind of fresh on the mind. KC
46 the course is one of them. I don't know the
That's a good question. I don't know if KC 10s gone
down this road at all. Or not. I'd have to go back
in. Come back and ask. From how they C5 would
be helpful and I would, I kind of presumed that
you've talked to some of the other. Our
commercial derivative aircraft. Have you talked
to C32s or 37s at all? ("No, I haven't so far done").
I think I have the the name of the commercial
derivative engineer in the commercial derivative
aircraft out at tinker. Let me see if I can pull that
up for you. ("I spoke with ________".) Yeah that
sounds right. Yeah that's the same name I have...
We're we're pretty much even on the testing
portion.Uh, for for the system are our guys have
that at all. Pretty much in place right now. Well,
right now I'm I'm not seeing any huge, huge risk
right now. They're they're. They're talking about
being able to test in California or some Maryland.
Ah, Texas Washington, and it looks like a Montana.
So right now I'd I'd say we're we're looking pretty
good in. and that part Just to see if there's
anything else that. They have been here for that or
any kind of risks. No, it's honestly I'm. Uh, I think
where we are in the integration process and and
being able to. Then they get the test is. Is looking
pretty good or or suppliers and then a good job of.
of keeping us ahead of the game. Overall, we've
had really great avionics program management. I
I, I think that's a safe statement. From Boeing,

Lack of Knowledge
Boy, what which there's there's times I wish you'd
asked me that question well caught on it man,
'cause there's there's some there's a white paper I
want to put it out on this because there's things
that we've learned that this needs to be
everybody needs to be aware of and KC-46
taught us some stuff too. Uh, Teams, what did
things that's going on right now is is we're. We're
part of the learning process and statement of
functionality so. So I guess. When you're doing
certifications, I think we need we need to have a
good understanding up front. What elements will
be will will be ethics or apartment? We have been
certified right up front because that will make a
big indicate that will tell you right away and
hopefully what kind of data you should be
seeking after. But there's that, but there's this
other little problem. It's a nagging problem, and
this is probably all face. Every time, is that? When
you go down a path, let's say you've established
the path you're moving down that path and all of a
sudden they run into a hiccup. Wait deep into the
to the bowels of the situation and all of a sudden
you guys switch gears. Or let's say that you were
doing the mill certification and all of a sudden so
they they have to come back to it because they've
changed something in design and now it opens
up the map again and all of a sudden. Other
people that were involved in the Mack to begin
I guess personally I I wish I knew a little bit more
about how. Now the FAA. Deals with the whole
certification process. And we've had pretty good. I
think communication with the MCO, the military
Certification Office of the FAA. Those guys have
been really supportive. maybe a little bit more
clear understanding about roles and responsibilities
and it it's not. It's not just in in this system 'cause
so I think we were pretty solid where we are right
now with it. Within those GPS. So I'm I'm looking at
just the whole all the other systems. Uh, across the
prosody aircraft. How we interface with the FAA?
And and work the certification process with them
is. And this is new to me and I'm I'm learning it.
Ah, and just how how that needs to work and A
and, you know, with the various roles and
responsibilities are. This is important. We're
running into some some situations where certain
individuals. Within the FAR. So I say stonewalling
some of the things that, uh, that we're that we're
trying to do not in the system so much, but on
but on others and. Yeah, the the politics inside
the. Processes. So it would be helpful to to know
you know where they are. Would I I should say I'm
not expressing this way. It would be helpful to
know how to to work the the. Huh, regulatory
structure within the FAA? Maybe that's the best
way of putting it. For instance, we have a. We
have one individual who is a a policy holder.
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Q1

Q2

About the Interviewee
Q3

What is your name, position or title,
and the program office you work in?

How long have you worked in AC
systems?

Position Type
OK, my name is __________. I'm the
A10 avionics section chief for the A10
SPO. Yes, uh two how long have you
been working in aircraft systems? It's
not just tense, but.

Experience
OK yeah, I've been working since
2000 for about 21 years on aircraft
systems. Prior to that I was a TPS
developer for avionics Sr using
Lru's. So basically developing
software that tests the avionics
off of multiple different platform
aircraft. But we the way at the SPO
we only include aircraft systems as
a system as as a whole experience
when you're actually working
within a SPO. Or avionics. Business
or about that let me shut this up
OK. And so, so that's so it's just the
21 years.

What modifications and platforms
have you worked on? What is the
most recent? When was it?

The Program
Q4

Q5

What is your role in the modification?

What is the modification we are talking
Was the original design of this aircraft for
How long has the Air Force been utilizing the
about today? (Size, Time functionality, ACAT the military, or is it a Commercial
aircraft?
level, Dollar Amount, etc)
Derivative Aircraft?

Experience
Position
OK, so I've been on the program
Yeah, so uh, as the section chief, my job is to
that back on the A-10 program for review, approve, mentor my team through
the last three year. It's almost
the modification processes, whether it be a T2
three years now, pushing on three temporary mod that we implement to validate
years I've we've worked a ton of
the technology AT1 where there's an urgent
modifications. We did a a second need out into the field that would need to be
guess, we call it or, but it's a
deployed quickly, or a permanent modification
Ethernet, a second Ethernet switch where we're deploying and fielding that mod
that we put on the aircraft we are across across all of our aircraft. And in
currently working on, and if C
addition, airworthiness certification. Ah,
Circuit Card assembly that that is where I'm reviewing and and helping them
an integrated flight and fire control get through the CERT basis write ups that we
computer. Sir crowd assembly that need as where as well as the error in this
we're changing. It's a form fit
certification through the Director of
function replacement out of the
engineering and and OP. If needed the cert
commodities group, but we're
basis. My job is really to determine if changes
implementing it to improve
are reportable or not reportable. Well, uh, we
diminishing parts abilities. We're
brief it. To RROSE team art where we call
doing the same thing on RR Central Systems engineering area as well as our Chief
computer. We call it kick you 2.8
engineer, which then migrates to our Director
and and that's also for DMS issues. of Engineering and we'll talk more about that.
We are doing a major modification But I'm involved in that whole process as we go
for 3D audio. We're putting a 3D
through in order to attain obtain an error word
audio system to improve situational in this certification and or airborne disapproval.
awareness. Uh, we within the Coms So that's kind of my role. ("home real quick.
that are coming into the pilot we
What is JRP like? What does that acronym
are working on a high resolution
stand for?") It's a, it's a anti jamming GPS
display where we're replacing the system. It's assassin based system. Uhm,
ATI and putting a major diss. Some, there's different types of systems that the Air
So my name is Yep, so my name is
I was there for approximately 2
So modifications platforms that I've So I was the program manager over a
____________. My position title was years. So that was my only
worked on and there was the A10 modification. Uh, to digital beam steering and
acquisition program manager. I
experience in aircraft systems.
platform. Of course then GBSC
upgrade the GPS NAV navigation unit on the
worked in the A-10. In a program
Prior to that I had worked. Yeah on would be the next biggest platform attack.
office in the avionics section. I left.
GSD, which is a. Nick
I was involved in the process of
There are approximately a year ago, so Intercontinental ballistic nuclear
standing up that program. We had
actually a little more October 2020 is missile program in their program
not been declared at that point in
when I left and then
offices and prior to that I worked time A in the FYDP that we were a
for a test range.
green lighted type program. I'm
trying to think the technical terms,
but that's a running outside of my
head at the moment. Uh, so I
worked on that initial acquisition,
getting it ready for. Or uh,
milestone A and then moving on
milestone beef. So and then that
was prior to the, UM, working for A10. Uh, so that throughout the 2017
time frame is when I was working
for them for a few years and then
prior to that I worked for the Utah
Test and training range, which. Uh, I
oversaw a lot of different types of
test components and things like
that. Uh, related to a lot of
different programs across the DoD,
working with other test ranges,
such as the net are vanilla test and
training range. Change, uh the test
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Type of mod
Yeah, so the way we we pretty much did it. A
guard, uh, it let me rephrase it. This
particular mod was funded by the guard
under and degree of funds. It was about
$20 million contract. What I would say a
medium A Capt 2 program. The purpose of it
was to support GPS anti jamming initiatives
that were being out there. It requires a
select availability, anti spoofing module or
sasm GPS. Receiver with Beamsteering
digital antenna electronics. That's the daed
interface, and then we combine that with
our controlled reception pattern antenna or
our CRPA antenna. So it's the the taking our
current Iggy. Installing this, this new GPS
receiver in it and then putting a CRPA
antenna in in in. You, uh, interface with the
DAY in order to make the whole system now
function and provide us this jamming
resistant GPS capability. ( "OK, so you
already had an EGI installed. You're just
switching up the GPS card that was in it.")
Correct and and the ofp software within it
to work with the new GPS receiver. And
DAE 'cause it Iggy interfaces with the DAE
ibda interfaces with the CRPA antenna. So
and so that that connection we needed to
have some upgraded. Oh FPS in the EGI to be
able to look at that, because that was a new
No, uh, so the program was named the Anti
Jam EGI. A big E stands for embedded
guidance and TfL unit. It's kind of. They bury
acronyms in acronyms. I'll leave it at that.
Uh, so for question #5, what is the
modification we were talking about today? It
was at Anti Jam EGI. The size of the program
we're going to purchase somewhere around.
281 air operational aircraft, and then there
were some extra. I think we're right into the
low 300 standard, 10 units or so, but we
were doing that as a retrofit. Updating the
current EGI by adding some new
components, Society of it, and then adding
a. Uh, and the EGI was made by Honeywell,
the. Uh, we were adding a digital beam
steering unit that was made by Lockheed
Martin. That particular unit controlled a
CRPA which is a controlled reception
pattern array antenna. Basically it's an
antenna that has seven different antennas
built into one unit and then. We, uh, digital
beam steering unit controls the way that
that antenna looks to move itself around.
Interference created by jamming or other
interferences. So that's kind of the
functionality, uh, account level on that
particular program. It was funded through
the. Uh, Air National Guard, as well as the.

Q6

Q7

AC type
Time of use
It was a military only. It was actually
Yep, 19 about 1976 is when it game online.
designed and and sourced by the Army
and then the Air Force stole it from a man
and that I mean you could tell by the the
the 30 millimeter gun we have in the
center to be a tank killer. That was really
what they were going for. The Air Force
then in about 1976 March of 76 I believe
it was took over and and and crafted
from him and and has been managing it
since then.

Yeah, military aircraft. It never had any
commercial type purpose.

Uh, if my memory serves me correctly. Uh
IOC for the aircraft was around 1971 or so
early 70s. Uh, so it's been in use now for
about 50 years. And continuing forward.
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Q8
What level of Airworthiness certification
did you seek to accomplish through the
FAA? How much did you seek to
accomplish through the TAA?
Date
Code Name Finding -> Certification Path
20211213 IE3
So we never go through the FAA in a
military platform. We always go go
through our director of engineering and
to our Technical airworthiness authority
when it is reportable and and so we
always go through the eat what we call
the EN process as as we go through so the
TAA is where it's at for us. We work with
in the Air Force EN processes that are
outlined in 62601 as well as MIL
Handbook 516C.

20211124 IP3

So the overall functionality of the aircraft
was not being modified. Uh, and so the
risk level and the certifications were
fairly. Easy, I didn't really have a direct
part handling those out with the
engineering shop and the A10 because it's
been on the slaughtering house for more
times. Have can count over the last
decade or so. Has been a hasn't done a
major modification to the aircraft that
required any of these type of
certifications in a very very long time. Uh,
in the avionics section, having said that, so
most of it was TAA and then there was
the. FAA component that we have to
certify the navigation system itself for
airworthiness, so the actual piggy and that
process had not been done. In, uh, at my
departure from the program office, that
was something that they were still. The
Yeah, the FAA really has no basis in it
because it's a military aircraft. The only
folks that we really had to deal with. Yes,
uh, Were the folks at Hanscom and I'm
trying to remember the office name
those folks have to certify the actual GPS
that it could navigate the way that it
said, and so they signed off. Uh, when all
of the metrics they had this huge matrix

Q9

Q10

Why did you strive for that certification
level?

What were the benefits or drivers of this
path?

Factors for Cert Path
Well, it's it's well one. It's mandate
mandated right for us to go through it.
Uhm, it you know? You all modification
changes based on the AFI require it. The
determination is based on the impacts of
the airframe of critical functions within
within the aircraft. They're either reportable
or non reportable and delegated, and it's
delegated to our chief engineer. If it is non
reportable. So basically what we have to do
is get in there, discuss with in our own team
and look at our airworthiness criteria.
There's, uh, some people caught. Used to be
called a MACC. Now we have a cert basis
and and airworthiness certification.
Basically there check lists of hundreds of
questions that we go through just to check
ourselves to determine what we think is the
impact of this mod on the on the airframe
and at what level do we need to report it?
And we go through that entire checklist and
then we determine, Oh yes, this is, you know
non reportable. We try to sell that to our
OSS. Any team as well as our chief engineer.
Once we get concurrent. In all agreement
there, then we moved on forward over to
the Director of Engineering and we try to
sell it to him. Here. He actually makes the
decision whether that it is truly reportable
As far as why we went that route. Pretty
much that was decided by the chief
engineer and engineering team. Uh, they
basically decided that this was and I'm trying
to remember the names of the mods. Did
they do? And the names that they give those.
But they basically decided that it was this
type of mod and because of that it would
have to go up to. Uh, I'm trying to
remember the name of the person that
signed off. Uh, at Air Force Sustainment
Center. But they it was basically the the
chief engineers boss. Uh, at the best I can
say at. Warner Robins model Rusty 'cause
I'm not used to dealing with these these
folks anymore and it's been a moment, but
at any rate they he was the signature or
authority on the mod and making sure that
we were we were doing everything in
compliance. Uh, and so the idea was behind
the mod. Basically he give us the approval to
do the first couple of aircraft for test and
then once we prove in those particular
aircraft for test, uh, we'd already done a lot
of lab work. Uh, and testing of the
components to make sure that they met
specifications that were required by the
program. Uh, and then it would come over
and uh. We would test those and then I

Benefits
Yeah it it it sure and ensures the system is
safe to fly. No cyber escapes exist. It's
installed in core and in accordance with
our system engineering processes. Uh, uh,
the modifications since the modification
changes the way we navigate the system,
and I'm talking specifically the JRG program
and we received data from the satellites,
we needed to ensure that no critical safety
issues were affected during that process,
and that MACC Airworthiness process
allows us to go through those mechanisms
and and basically double check ourselves.

Airworthiness Certification
Q13

Q11

Q12

What were the costs of this path?

Did you achieve the Airworthiness certification
from the FAA and TAA that you wanted? Were
the benefits sought achieved?

Costs
Sure, you know to me after every
modification that we do about, I believe
AETC about 1/4 of our costs are linked
to airworthiness and the
documentation that we have to
generate to validate compliance. I
mean, we have to look at things like the
EMIM set EMC, both EMI from a SRU
LRU perspective. But then also the EMI
from the platform perspective. What is
this particular modification going to do?
To our weapons system and other other
systems that are on our weapon system,
what is what is other web? Uh,
modifications that currently exist on the
platform gonna do to this modification.
We have to look at, you know, for a hero
and hemp testing, what is it going to
affect our ordinance? Is it going to affect
our, you know, radiance on our
personnel and we have to do the
calculations to go about doing it and we
have to have all the documentation in
place to make sure just that is done and
we've done proper testing. To ensure
that it's safe to fly all of the lru's need to
go through qualification testing from the
vendor and we have to analyze that
QUAL those QUAL testings to help make
The the drivers. For the path were the
The costs of that path. Uh, compared to
typical, uh? Engineering community. They other paths, it was just mainly time.
were the ones who advised on that my job There were a lot of briefings that we had
is the program manager was mainly to
to submit to 1st our Chief engineer
check the process and make sure that
getting his buy in and prepping that, and
they were making the process. Meaning then once we got beyond that because of
the timelines that they needed to on the the type of modification it had to go up
program and. And ensuring that we were to. Uh, and then next, uh, the
getting through that to make our test
Sustainment Center's chief engineer, and
events and things like that once we got to so we had to get on his calendar, be
that stage. To keep the program on
prepared for briefing him so that and
schedule.
then on top of that, we also had to brief
the. The program. The system program
manager, the SPM, over everything, so
we also had to brief first so there were a
lot of briefings involved and trying to get
timing with all those people were
probably the most difficult. Uh,
challenges and hurdles. Uh, and then also
making sure that we had everything
back from the contractor. A-10 is very
unique in the fact that there is no prime
contractor like there is in other
program. Office is a lot of times. For
example, if I was on F35 or F16. Uh, any
of those types? I have a dedicated prime
contractor workforce that I can get a run
to and say for those particular. Birds
Lockheed Martin. I go tell Lockheed

Success rate
Yes, we were able to do it. We were able to fly
it. It's been a now a proven technology both in
contested areas as well as across state lines and
and so it. It's a. It's a great modification. We part
of that question is where we where, where do we
see benefits and that is now. We can actually go
into a contested. Warfighting area with a lot
more confidence that our GPS system is going
to be accurate because a lot of our weapons are
based on accurate GPS data and our lot of our
flight controls and paths which are doing are
are based on that. So we're much more
confident going into a wartime threat area
threaded area then we ever were before before
of this mod was installed.

Uh, last I had heard and this is about six months
ago since I've reached out to any of those folks,
they were still working through those
processes. They had finished all of the testing.
Uh, but they were on track to to get that. And
they they were expecting to to receive those
benefits. Uh, some of the contracting processes
and things like that and. And Depot availability or
hampering the program as far as timeliness of
being able to achieve. Uh, as you're probably
well aware with the GPS realm, especially beam
steering. Uh anti jamming type things. There were
a number of programs that. Were G wants and
had been funded as such and so they receive
priority over A-10 so. The the life of being the
little guy on there that showed impulse, so to
speak.
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What were the major setbacks encountered or biggest
moments of tension in the certification path?
Setbacks / Difficulties
There was, I think, two major misunderstandings, one with
was with my program manager of the program who almost
had a hidden agenda up to go to M code. I think he was
talking with the ACC folks. ACC folks wanted to go to M code
Garden Reserve or pushing this as an based system. The the
program manager. Took it upon themselves to challenge
engineering on whether this was a COTS product or not, and
whether it could. It could be installed on the COTS product
and bottom line. We were able to go go through and prove
that yes, it was falls within the the COTS environment and
normal integration that it was a TRL level 7 or higher capable
component and could be funded properly under angry of
funds. And the program was able to continue, unfortunately
that. The issue that we had with our program manager
pushed us back about 8 months in ability to field and and
and. Prior to that some of the things he was working on
behind the scenes without engineering knowing probably
pushed us back a year maybe a year and a half ago. Getting
this modification out there Unfort and it was unfortunate that
was the that was the biggest problem we had once. Once that
was resolved, we've been able to go through. And and and get
through pretty quickly. The other is the determining within
our own engineering team what is considered a critical safety
item in what is not considered a critical safety item. That's
one of the big challenges. I think there is a lot of. Uh, either
misinterpretation or lack of understanding of of what is a CSI
and what is the requirement. So we had some internal fights
on it. We finally came to the agreement that it this was not a
critical safety item that we had other systems that were the
I think in that particular program. Some of the major setbacks
and problems that we faced were actually in the test realm.
Being able to get test time. Came up with the FAA for a GPS
champ system. Uh, the they had a NAV fest where they
purposely do jamming and things like that, uh, I believe its
yearly and it's at White Sands missile range and getting that
block it. I'm getting the. Getting flights and things like that.
Trying to make that event. Uh, and having you know, only a
couple of shots without its own. Individual program that would
go out to test and have to use the range and set all those types
of parameters up. Getting that FAA time to do the type of
testing we needed was very difficult, so that was that was
some of the biggest setbacks that we faced. Uh, especially
when we ran into some technical problems because nobody
had ever integrated at the EGI, the UM. This Lockheed
Martin anti jamming being steering device together. There
were some major technical problems that delayed us and so.
Ah, there we had some significant setbacks, and the FAA was
not the. It's difficult in and of themselves to to get that kind of
time. Uh, and then trying to get arranged to do it. ("The FAA
you were having to prove navigation while being jammed?")
Uh, so that wasn't for the FAA. That was a program
requirement. Uh, we needed to prove the operational. Uh, you
know applicability of this system. Are we able to actually?
Navigate in a jammed environment, and so the FAA controls all
the airspace, even if it's military or space. And when you're
operating in type of jammed system and so out at White Sands
missile range, or Wismer, they actually have jammers that they
will operate, but that has to all be coordinated through the

Q14

Q15

Q16

Did you make multiple adjustments to the initial AW
plan or Criteria Basis through the process? Did you meet What risks do you currently carry?
all standards or able to show compliance in every area?

Are you flying today on a Military Type Certificate
(MTC), Military Flight Release (MFR), or
Supplemental Type Certificate (STC)?

# of adjustments
yeah, I think yeah, yeah you you strive to meet
compliance on everyone. But as you go through your
internal reviews, both internally to the avionics team as
well as the OSS knee team and the chief engineer and
Director of Engineering, and you're going through that
process. Yes, you do make you make adjustments as
you go through to ensure that the data that you have
is accurate and being represented accurately to the to
the upper chain upper management. ("And then once
you've like, started to do tests and stuff in the lab, and
do you still have to go back and make more changes
or?") It depends. It depends on the cost of the
programming. Most of our programs we have a
contractor that is the integrator. In this particular case
it was. Lockheed Martin was the integrator and
Honeywell, the supporting them as a subcontractor to
the EGI. There are things when you get in there that we
would like to get fixed that are at a scope of the
contract and so you have to look at those at each time.
And say alright, does this meet your overall
requirements of the contract and. If it doesn't, is it
something that is gonna kill your airworthiness
compliance? If it is something that they say is a high
risk and you you just don't want to carry that risk
onto the aircraft, then you go strive to make a a
contract change in order to get that capability or that
requirement added to the program. Uhm and and then
after that, if if not and you say hey, that's not
something that is a show stopper for this, maybe we'll
So we hadn't finished when I left the program. Going
completely through that airworthiness process we had.
Basically, we're in that process, uh, and? We because
we had such a limited scope, the ability to meet the
criteria was fairly easy, but sometimes the criteria
drove a lot of extra unnecessary tests. Uh, and when
you're on a jet that becomes very expensive quickly.

Flying Cert
We're currently on an MFR know at MTC. Sorry
we will be getting the MFR once we start the
getting ready for the production. Contracted
fielding onto the aircraft. So_____ it would be
the opposite. So we should be yeah for Jigar D,
But if it's a JRD only, we'd be final on MFR and
then later. It's dependent on what the DOE.
Uhm, his call on whether or not we. Just fly on
AMFR, continue to fly on MFR, or does he want
us to have an MTC for this modification? I think
we only have about. Four or five temps that have
ever been issued for the A10. I'll typically. DoD
would just issue in MFRs and which would be
basically just, uh, modificata mate and
amendment to our baseline MTC. That's what I
understand. _____the youth. Correct me if I'm
wrong. Yep no, I think you're right. Thanks____.
Appreciate it. ("But if you're noat carrying any
risk why would it still stay as an MFR and not just
be an MTC?") Well, so I mean with the transition
to another DOE, his requirements have changed
as drastically. A MTC how I was explained it to
buy the latest DOE. Is any modification to the
aircraft? Previously it was you'll issue and MTC
only if it's a major a major modification to the
810 baseline MTC. ("So I guess that can be
dependent based on your leadership then?")
Yeah ____, correct me if I'm wrong. Is is there
another in that's MFR, there's MTC and then is
I would have to look into that question because I
don't remember. What type of certificate? And I
remember that we had a discussion about that.
They they did the modification package and then
that was what went up through. I've got 1067
stuck in my head that I don't think that that's
correct, so I'm pretty sure 1067 something else...
I'm trying to think of the modification. There's an
A&B and that's why I know that it's wrong. I'm
like the name of that. Well, we're still number of
things that are, you know, hiding from yesteryear
in there. ("My assumption would be an MFR since
the program isnt done yet because that's usually
what they give you a bum like when you're still
testing or like if you're operating on risk") Right.
("And then military type certificate is 1. Use
checked all the boxes and then you're not really
holding any risk when you're flying operationally
anymore"). It sounds correct, but it's been so long
that. I'm trying to remember the different types
of modification types. Does that was part of that
process that they? Then we went through. But
that was we went through that process. Oh
goodness. 2 1/2 years ago or more? I think so.
It's been a long time since that that process
kicked off. So it's it's been a minute.

Risk types
And this one, and correct me if I'm wrong. Uh ____,
or or ____ but I don't think on JRG we're carrying
any risks.

Ah, that I'm unfamiliar with as far as what risks do
they currently carry? Uh, uh, the the whole program
risk in the reason the program existed was to deal
with the risk of. Uh, jamming in a denied GPS
environment and I would say that the program as
a whole successfully mitigated that risk. But as far
as what risks we currently carry on unaware? ("Did
they ever end up getting a test flight?") They did go
out to White Sands and and we're able to do stuff.
We had done plenty of test flights with the
onboard. Uh, once the EGI is self was certified by
the uh. DAG had to be the Lockheed Martin box.
Had to be. The circle had already been, but they had
to be certified as airworthy. It's, uh, by device
manufacturers hunting well Maki and so once we
had those and then approved modification. A
program through the chief engineer and his boss.
Then at that point time we were doing quite a bit of
testing. First on the ground and then once we. Got
fairly mature enough because we're using that as
our hardware in the loop lab because of the lack of
the 309 speed ability to do that. Then we were able
to actually take and put it in the air. The nice thing
is that as far as risk mitigation, if there was a
problem it was like will shut down the system and
and flip the breaker and we're done, you know?
Uh, so as far as, uh, a safety concern, there was
very little that they were worried about because
most of the components had already been flying.
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Date
Code Name Finding ->
20211213 IE3

20211124 IP3

Reflections
Q19

Q17

Q18

What documents and communications did you
find most helpful in establishing the AW
certification?

What is something you wish you had or knew up
Was the path your program took the right path and
front when going for the AW certification? Any
why?
future recommendations?

Who or what other programs would be of good
value for me to pursue in an interview for more
data collection?

Known knowledge
So for us, the UM MIL handbook, 15 C MIL
Handbook 4461, four 64 and MIL standard, I
should say four 61464 and 882 from system
safety perspective are the big the best
guidance that we have that give us some
concrete answers or clarifications to the
questions we have. We utilize the 516 and in
looking at the Mac. Assert basis airworthiness
certification checklists to actually help direct us
the best we can. Again, they're a good stepping
stone and guidance, but there's a lot of
misinterpretation. End or a different
interpretation, depending on who you talk with
as you go through the chain. And but that's the
best that we have. And so we utilized those plus
personal experience and guidance from our
Chief engineer.

Correct decision
Well, it's I wouldn't necessarily say it's the right
path. It's the only path. I mean, we don't have a
choice. This is the path that the Air Force has said
is the best way to go about doing it, and we follow
our processes.

Contacts for Me
The F16, I mean they are our sister platform that is
out there. We actually inherit most of our
modifications after they implement them with the
with the exception of this particular one, but they
would definitely be good to do it. They're a little
different perspective on it because they have an
integrator prime integrator on their platform.
Lockheed Martin that is always with them. But it
but and and one of the things I'd like to say on here
too is I get frustrated with this. The whole process
when F16 integrates something and is able to get
through. My director of engineering and without
having to do maybe a major cyber cyber security
analysis. And then when we implement the same
modification onto our platform now all of a
sudden I have this in dense, discuss, intense
discussions. That I have to have with everybody
throughout the chain, and to include the DOE on
what my cyber vulnerabilities are. Or you know
what my impact to my aircraft is is like it was just
implemented. The F16. It's flying on the F16 and
now I've just adapted it and now I've got to go
through this additional stuff. You think that there
would be a means by which we could streamline
implementation of things from platform to
platform to make it easier as the second and third
and 4th person go through the process. I'm
inheriting a lot of the documentation and stuff
from those other platforms. Instead we tend to
Uhm, related to what I talked about? Uh, Albert.
Uh, uh, his name is Leah She Sung View or I can't
really say that very well, but I did send you his
contact information. Uh, he's a good contact over
there little hard to understand first, but. Uh, after
they moved him to sit next to me. So that I can
keep it better tab on what he was doing. They, uh,
you know I got a little bit more accustomed to
what you're saying, great guy and I'm trying to
remember the name of the guy that
did.Certification. Let's see if I can find it really
quick. I can see his his face in my head, but I can't
seem to think of it off the top of my. Head here.
("Do you remember who your Chief Engineer
was?") Yeah so Oh, a good engineer just to talk to
in general. His name is ________. Cool, uh he he's
worked for F22 and some other programs and then
he came to A-10. So it was the chief engineer's
name was seeing if I can find him Christian. Their
information when you've when you're used to. So
I. When I used to deal with him every day, it was
easy. And now I have a full different group of
people that I work with, and so it's a very different
experience. You can look up their their supervisors
names and all of that kind of stuff. When you
went, you actually find their contact card in
Outlook, so that's what I'm doing really quickly. For
insulation, oh Michael Hackett That is the chief
engineers name. Already told you _____ oh,

A man that was more of a question for the
engineers. The engineers were really the ones
that stablished the path. Uh, but they had a
matrix that for airworthiness that they had to
do, and I remember this massive matrix and it
it covered everything and then we had to
tailor that matrix. Uh, once that matrix was a
tailored, then it had to be agreed upon by
because of the type. Uh, modification had to be
agreed upon by the local. Uh, the program
chief engineer, then it also had to go up to the
next chief engineer. Uh, for Air Force
Sustainment center uh. They call it life Cycle
Sustainment Center, but anyways, so yeah, that
was the, uh, the process involved. ("So did the
TA have to say anything with the matrix?") I
think they were the 88 in that case, or had that
authority And I was not as involved. That was
really something that the .The chief
engineer.Uh, and his staff shepherd. We had a
guy. Uh, there was another engineer that wasn't
the engineer on the program, but he. His job
was pretty much everything cyber and TAA
related, so everything got submitted over to him
and he worked at the hardest part was getting it
through the process and now was a long and
lengthy process with a lot of turn time for
reviews. So that was that was kind of the the
hard part.

Lack of Knowledge
Uh, better clear definition of what is reportable
and not reportable as well as what is a critical
safety item in what is not a critical safety item. I
think there is just a lot of misunderstanding in
those two areas that lead you down paths of
maybe obtaining additional. Uhm qualification
Aurora documentation to prove that your system
is not going to be detrimental in any way, shape
or form. ("Any future recommendations?") Yeah, I
mean you know the whole process. I understand
why the Air Force has done it and but it is a long
process. It's not. It's not something that happens
very quickly and and because it's such a long
process and a costly process to acquire all the
documentation. Uhm, you it is very difficult to
field anything in expedited manner. But on the
other side they are forces pushing us to do things
faster, better, cheaper, you know, and it's like
you can't have both ways. You either want us to
do acquisition in an expedited. Means and maybe
you would have less documentation. You would
need it to fulfill that or you want us to go through
and slow the process down, which this does, and
ensure that every everything is checked so that
the pilots that are flying these new modifications
are are safe. So you can't have both worlds now
with the new digital engineering processes that
we're talking about, maybe there should be some
the relook. Airworthiness as a whole and maybe
And I would say that it was the the correct path.
I think it would have been helpful to know. I think it
The UM. We had the right people doing the right
would have been helpful to know. Uh, I had come
jobs, considering the low risk that really helped
from GSD. As I said previously and as a result of
us, but. Uh, getting the system certified for. For
coming from a non aircraft world the way that we
GPS navigation, that was probably the most
certify things versus the airworthiness process
difficult part of the. Uh, modification process, and was very different. As a program manager, you are
that was a requirement of the modification
struggling too. To juggle a number of factors, so it
processes that met those requirements up to a
was literally a little bit of trial by fire. Here and in
certain level, and that was another matrix that was. other program offices that are seeking
Extremely difficult.
airworthiness certification, they wouldn't even had
to deal with what I was doing because I was really
doing not only the job program manager for the
SPO, but I was also program manager of
integration, which would normally be a prime
contractor. Normally, the prime contractor would
generate all of these documents and and and do all
this. Work, but that wasn't the way it was in in 10
minutes from what I understand, we are the
complete one off in the Air Force. Everybody else
on a major aircraft has a prime, so all of that. All
of those pieces fell to me, and when you don't
have somebody that's been in a job very long.
Uh, there's no one to go to to go. How do you do
this? It say, hey? This is what you've got to do. Go
figure it out so a little bit more understanding of
how to get through that process, but also all the
different processes that we were going to have to
get through. Uh, I understood, of course, at that
point time, the acquisition system. You know, I've
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Q1

Q2

About the Interviewee
Q3

What is your name, position or title,
and the program office you work in?

How long have you worked in AC
systems?

Position Type
Yep, so my name is _____. I'm the
technical expert for commercial
derivative aircraft within the Air Force
Airworthiness Office, so I supported
the efforts for the ___ and _____
efforts that came through our office.

Experience
So I've worked in aircraft systems
for about 12 years. I've been in the
airworthiness office for the last
three years and the position of
commercial derivative tech expert
and then prior to that I I did risk
management for for the
Airworthiness Office before
coming to there were in this office.
I was a lead engineer in Big Safari
for several different aircraft
programs to include commercial
derivative aircraft. Was various,
you know, organic Air Force
developed aircraft.

The Program
Q4

Q5

Q6

Q7

What modifications and platforms
have you worked on? What is the What is your role in the modification?
most recent? When was it?

What is the modification we are talking
Was the original design of this aircraft for
How long has the Air Force been utilizing the
about today? (Size, Time functionality, ACAT the military, or is it a Commercial
aircraft?
level, Dollar Amount, etc)
Derivative Aircraft?

Experience
Yeah, so I mean, I guess from the.
Airworthiness office in general. You
know it's all, UM, commercial
derivative aircraft that that come
through the office and are
assessed by the TA. So I would
include the ____ in _____. I'm also
the the delegated technical
airworthiness authority for
several. Uh, other CDA programs?
Specifically some FMS programs
that are acquiring CDA, so includes,
you know, triple some recent
projects are 777 modifications to
that, some Airbus 321 and 319.
Some other part 23 certified
aircraft. So like some King Air 350's
PC12 C208 and then in the program
office I was lead engineer for a
commercial derivative. Testbed
aircraft that we had which was a
Dornier 328, as well as other I
guess, classified CDA aircraft. So
then for as far as military side I was
a lead engineer for MQ one and
MQ 9 tests aircraft that we
managed...So some of the
modifications so recently. Well,
some modifications included

Type of mod
It it it? Yes, so I think I think this this I mean.
Obviously it's the mill GPS system. I would
say the programmes probably I would defer
to them for this specific, you know details.
To comment on there.

Position
So my role is to advise the programs. Uh, hum
through the the airworthiness process, ensuring
that they develop or assisting them in
developing their airworthiness strategy.
Essentially guiding helping guide them through.
The the airworthiness process from the TAA
office perspective it's urine they comply with in
Air Force policy as well as. Uh, you know,
helping them develop their different
airworthiness products so their plans, their
certification basis and their compliance
reports.

B-21

AC type
Yeah, so both. Both aircraft were
originally commercial. Uh, you know,
FAA certified aircraft. From our
perspective, we treat them as a military
CDA aircraft. You know, because they're
they're essentially the the basis for the
aircraft was certified by the FAA.

Time of use
I guess I would have to defer to the. I would
defer to the programs on that I. I I don't
recall the exact date that they were placed
in service obviously _____. It is still in in
development.
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Q8
Q9
Q10
Q11
What level of Airworthiness certification
did you seek to accomplish through the Why did you strive for that certification What were the benefits or drivers of this
What were the costs of this path?
FAA? How much did you seek to
level?
path?
accomplish through the TAA?
Date
Code Name Finding -> Certification Path
Factors for Cert Path
Benefits
Costs
20211215 IT1
("From your perspective, I guess what So yeah, so you know, we you know it's our So so the the limited. Uhm FAA
Yeah, so I think as far as cost I think. But
levels of airworthiness certification?
policy to do FA to the maximum extent certification. I mean the the benefits is of in general I I think I think generally
Should the program offices seek through practical and I think you know some of the that is really, you know that that's
speaking, FA and military certification,
the FAA and how much should they have rationale behind that is that. Uh, you know ensuring that you know all. You know, they're gonna. Ultimately, drive the
come to you guy?")So speaking directly to the the base aircraft was certified. Test set aspects of that modifications design are same type and level of work right? We
each of the programs. Uh, modification of of rules or airworthiness standards. You included in the FAA type certification. You both have our standards that that you
the the mill GPS. My perspective is that know the FAA worthiness standards and. know there are other. Uh, locals reduce. I have to meet right? And and the general
they. Both. Uh, we should have. Sot full Two and it's important for safety to ensure guess you could say reduce levels of
type of work that you're gonna have to
or full or limited FAA approval for the for that. As much as possible, you ensure that approval so you know safe carriage or do to show compliance. It is is generally
all aspects of of that modification I know same the same set of standards are used to provisions, only that that could have been the same. I you know, I think I think the
_____. you know they're they're current assess all modifications because there's sought, but in in that case you know the cost. Yeah, I often we would C diff Alex
plan is to pursue a limited FAA approval interdependencies between each of the FAA wouldn't have been addressing the when I was in the programs we would
and and I think that's it's appropriate different requirements. Uh, and the set of integration and operations of those
often see a big cost difference. Uhm, in
and it complies with Air Force policy. Uh, FAA requirements and a set of military
systems with all the aircraft systems, and mill versus FAA certification because the
I I think _____. They they currently. Uh, requirements are different and they both so you know that that's, uh, that's since the contractors essentially viewed Mill Cert
you know, did not pursue that path have their own interdependencies, and so GPS systems that critical system, right? And as no service, right? So the FA in their
initially. Uh, I I think yeah it would have when you start mixing them, there's a it ties into the aircraft avionics. You know system you either meet their
been. Uh, most appropriate to, from my potential to have you know gaps
that that's a case where you would. If we requirements or you don't, or you don't
perspective, two seek FAA limited
essentially in coverage, and then an overall did it secret FA limited approval, you get a type certification in the Air Force
approval for that mail. GPS on the ___. reduced level of safety so. You know,
would have a a mixing of far requirements we have. You know we have our
But you know, I know they had an interim anytime you have things that you know are and Muhammad 516 requirements. Uh, requirements and if you don't meet it
approach in in doing a risk based
highly integrated into the green aircraft which you know could create potential there's always the option to get
assessment, which we've which we've system or you know are critical systems, it's gaps. Another issue is when you do have accessor risk and get that risk accepted.
done for them, so I I guess for this one are important to ensure that you know you integrated systems. That you know,
By the appropriate authority, and if that
you are you. Are you familiar with our maintain that consistency with the
specially some sit well. In this case you you know PMPO or SA signs off on the
Airworthiness Bulletin 360 and the FAA ordinance standards to ensure that you know you have integrated system. We risk. Uh, they get their airworthiness
order 81, ten, 101? ("Uh and add ONS. So know that same level of safety that they're don't have access to all of the. The data approval, so there's always that. I guess
what was the original plan? I guess from their original aircraft was originally
for the the FAA certified portion of the what we call risk relief valve that that
your perspective on the _____ and then certified. Too often. You know it may make aircraft. So as we certify Arpista integration can be used. And so that's you know,

Q12

Airworthiness Certification
Q13

Q14

Q15

Did you achieve the Airworthiness certification
What were the major setbacks encountered or biggest
from the FAA and TAA that you wanted? Were
moments of tension in the certification path?
the benefits sought achieved?

Did you make multiple adjustments to the initial AW
plan or Criteria Basis through the process? Did you meet What risks do you currently carry?
all standards or able to show compliance in every area?

Success rate
Setbacks / Difficulties
You know, in the ____ case that they they have So I guess some. From the ____ perspective I I think. Uh, you
a an approval for this system? You know, with a know, I think they did a lot of good work in. Establishing
a serious level risk. It's not the you know, they there. Essentially, the airworthiness seem for the mill GPS
still have more work to do to get full FAA
and defining. Uh, you know the scope of that statement of
certification and mitigate that risk, and then for functionality that would support the limited approval. Uh,
for _____ you know they're still going through yeah, I think. Yeah, I I know there was a lot of you know work
their. Their cert basis was recently approved put into that, but I I think that's all that was all goodness as it
and they're still, you know in development and you know, Sedgley sets what the you know requirements are
you know, having haven't got sent the first flight from our perspective tissue. That statement of functionality.
yet.`
So you know, setting those you know those expectations and
requirements up front you know will. Uh, yeah I think serve
them well, you know going forward when it comes to the
compliance review phase. Uh, you know, I think, uh, yeah, I I
think for the ____. I think you know a lot of the the
challenges came from from you know essentially at trying to
apply. Hey, you know R. Military. Uh, you know or or assess
the system from the through the lens of our military where
this requirements, you know, assessing a system you know.
System integration on TI aircraft that was essentially intended
to be FAA certified, right? So I think I think those are some of
the you know, probably a lot of the challenges came from
that. It's just the lack of data and the fact that you know the
methods to show compliance on the. You know, on a CD A
you know if it were being face or to fight or different than
you know what. Uh, uh, you know would be required for a
mill certification and I I think I I'm sure I'm not sure if you're
there at the time. You know there's a lot of discussion on,
you know, safety critical functions and threat analysis and
stuff. And that's a big difference that we have with the FAA,

# of adjustments
So I I think in in general. Yeah, I I, I think, uh. I'm trying
to recall there there in this show airworthiness plan. So
I know, you know. I I know ____ they we've had
multiple revisions of their plan. Uh to to
accommodate and sensually. We're fine. Different
aspects of the certification effort. And and you know it
is. It is expected that you know you develop an
airworthiness plan early in the process, or you know
the program is life cycle and that that plan is refined.
You know, in maintaining current throughout the entire
program, so I I think making adjustments to the the
plan is is essential to ensuring a successful, you know
certification effort right to. To account for different,
you know it, you know either refinements or you
know changes or new things that you that you learn
right...Yeah, oh right OK so. So I guess for _____. They
have not been gone through their compliance review
yet and then for ____ they did a nonstandard
assessment, so they they really don't have a
certification basis. Established and so yeah, it it was
really a risk assessment of instead of that system. ("So
where there's still compliance is that we're having to be
met within the risk assessment.I know they're still like
made a Mac and like we're falling that criteria.") From
from our perspective. There is no certification basis,
so you know it's really a a risk assessment. Of the
design based on the data that is available so. I guess
in some aspects I think that. You know they probably
would have shown compliance, but I would say in
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Q16
Are you flying today on a Military Type Certificate
(MTC), Military Flight Release (MFR), or
Supplemental Type Certificate (STC)?

Risk types
Flying Cert
Did you say risks carried on on either aircraft? So Yeah, so in result they will all be flying under
____ doesn't have any risks, at least airworthiness either an MTC, UM, a military type certificate or
risk that they're carrying, right? 'cause they're still military flight release. So all all Air Force owned
in development. I know the ___ has risks. Uh, aircraft will. You are required to have an Air
yeah, for for see fit. I believe risks associated with Force airworthiness approval and MFR or an
safety critical functions risk associated with the MTC. if you pursue, you know for CDA. If you get
lithium battery I I would have to defer to the FAA type certification, you know we will leverage
program where or pull up the V assessment that that type certificate as well as supplemental
we did. Right, yeah, they're the right here where this type certificate as you know as a basis for
assessment would establish all the risks that are issuing R approvals but will always issue. Uhm,
applicable. ("OK, and and so because they're going in Air Force approval. On top of everything. ("So
through a risk assessment.Like to ensure flight I the limited FAA With a statement of functionality,
guess.That is why those risks are being held. Even that's an STC that then gets pulled under your
though like _____ is also having that looking
MTC for the entire aircraft") Correct, Yep, Yep.
battery.Situation I guess not to use the same
And you know, as part of that. You know for a CD
word.") I guess the way our system or process as part of issuing that MTC or MFR. You know we
works is that risks are assessed. You know, during will leverage that STC, but we also ensure that
a compliance or in their worthiness assessment, the clan, therefore this usage, is consistent
right? So the program may be carrying, you know, with. Uh, you know that configuration usage in
tracking different risks that need to be mitigated, an environment that was assessed under the
but those aren't risks that need to be accepted STC, so we're not, you know. Come. And are we
until you go to flight because you know our our going to we we always like? Are we going to be
process or policy doesn't require risks. Be formally using it different? Did we change any of the
accepted until you expose you know people or configuration or we're putting it in a different
assets to to that risk right where the environment environment? And if there are those those
so. Yeah, so you know ____ you know while they deltas, then those are gaps that that we either
may, they may be tracking I. I assume they're
need assess on the military side or drive back
tracking, you know various risks, you know. Those into the the FAA STC. ("So this is going to be.I'm
risks aren't. You know, really, you know, approved completely made up example, but say the. A guy
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AW Certification Interview Matrix
Derek Dennis
1/3/2021

Date
Code Name Finding ->
20211215 IT1

Reflections
Q19

Q17

Q18

What documents and communications did you
find most helpful in establishing the AW
certification?

What is something you wish you had or knew up
Was the path your program took the right path and
front when going for the AW certification? Any
why?
future recommendations?

Who or what other programs would be of good
value for me to pursue in an interview for more
data collection?

Known knowledge
So in general, you know the initially that
airworthiness plan is a key product that we
used to establish the entire airworthiness
effort. So you know having that you know our
requirement is that that's approved before
contract award. Uh, and updated throughout
the program. Uh, yeah. So I think that you
know, I understand there's, you know a lot of
different types of programs submit that may
not not all be practice always practical, but you
know having that error in this plan established
and approved early on since that really he goes
the the driver to defining what the overall
certification approach would be either male
sort right or FA or some combination of the
two. So and and you know that will inform you
know like the contractors plan for certification,
you know. So having that approved early on is
key. To establishing certification, another thing
is ensuring you know after that plan set
stablished you know anything that's on the
military side of the seem you know where
stablishing that serve basis certification basis
early on right and ideally before SGR so that
you're feeding those. You know, this TA
approved airworthiness requirements into
your system. You know your programs
requirements, right? And then you know,
ensuring that you know you're you're managing.

Correct decision
I I think uh ____ took the right path. Uh, you
know seeking FAA approval? Limited approval.
You know, I think that was appropriate, given that it
is a system that ties into the UM. You know the
aircraft avionics and it's a critical system. I think
keeping that all in the FAA site is is appropriate. I
think. I think the ____. I, I think it could have been
better if you know FAA certification was planned
from the start. But you know, I think I think we've
found a way to to do, you know, do the
airworthiness assessment you know to meet the
programs requirement. So I think in general you
know deviating from that and having to go back
and. You know, get an FAA type certification. You
know after the fact you know, sometimes maybe
he's a little bit, is more work than you know.
Planning it in front.

Contacts for Me
I, I think if this were to be, you know, picked up
again in the future, I think it would be interesting to
to know to kind of do some other case studies of.
Other systems that are that have that are, I guess
you could say more military specific. Uh, so things
like you know Air refueling. I think that would be a
really interesting study to see to do, you know to
look at? Uh, you know what is the appropriate
seeing there and is you know using? Yeah, and and
maybe even kind of backtracking and looking at it
from a. I, I think sometimes when I think I think it'd
be interesting to see how. Wow, what's practical?
You know just from the start of the Air Force. I
guess more of a a new aircraft. So are we going
to go down the CDA path or we're going to go
down the the military path and just from from
the start? 'cause I I think I think. Yeah, I think that
could be really interesting to see. Kind of the trace
it 'cause I think. I think once you are once you
have a CDA aircraft I think. I think you know. I
think it's. There's there's less trace base I think in
you know FAA or military. I think those are pretty.
Yeah, I, I think I think kind of stepping back and you
know, maybe more of a ham acquiring your new
tanker. Do we develop it? You know what is it that
aircraft role and you know mission and does that
you know what are the factors that should be
considered? In in that role you know the aircraft
intended role as to determining whether you go
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Lack of Knowledge
Well, one thing I guess. That would have been
better is if we could have. Driven, or, you know,
influence the airworthiness, planning maybe
earlier on. In that program I guess I I don't, I yeah, I
I think you know being able to have earlier
involvement through that and worthiness plan. Or
you know, maybe even initial you know, pre
airworthiness planned. You know, we probably
would have, you know, been beneficial. ("And so
I, I guess that kind of becomes a future
recommendation, but are there any other future
recommendations as far as how they get started
and come? Understanding your requirements and.
Why not?") I, I guess that really would be my main
recommendation is that. Driving airworthiness
planning early on. Because that's you know, you
know, I think. I think that's really the time to set
the. You know, set up program up for success,
right? Ensuring you know all the stakeholders
have come. You know have have bought in, you
know on their approach early on. Uhm, in in the
program and I think having a TA established
airworthiness seem. Uh, you know before you
you know, say go to RFP, right? I think I think
that's key because then that informs the
contractor did right, and. Yeah, you know they
they plan for the right search strategy. So yeah, I
think having that plan and this seemed to find early
on. Is is beneficial and then you know then that

Q20
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Appendix C: Key Code Phrases Matrix (Anonymized Data)
Platform 1: IE1 & IP1 (pg. 1/3)
AW Certification Interview Key Code Phrases
Q1
1/3/2021
Derek Dennis

Q2

What is your name, position or
How long have you worked in AC
title, and the program office
systems?
you work in?
Code Name Finding -> Position Type
Date
EN - Airworthiness Engineer
20211110 IE1

20211110 IP1

PM - IPT Lead

The Program

About the Interviewee
Q3
What modifications and platforms
have you worked on? What is the
most recent? When was it?

Q7

Q5

What is your role in the
modification?

What is the modification we
Was the original design of this
How long has the Air Force
are talking about today? (Size,
aircraft for the military, or is it a
been utilizing the aircraft?
Time functionality, ACAT level,
Commercial Derivative Aircraft?
Dollar Amount, etc)

Experience
34yrs EN AW experience

Position
Experience
7 platforms: 4 Mil (fighters), 3 MCDA; AW lead in develop AW plan
and Compliance
7+ platforms: Civil Aircraft
documentation

3yrs PM AW experience

1 platform: MCDA

PM above day to day PM,
aircraft IPT lead

C-1

Q6

Q4

AC type
Type of mod
CDA w/ mil reqt
non-complex modification;
Touches cockpit avionics;
affects Outer Mode Line (OML);
2 antennae 2 mil GPS boxes, 2
DAE; $70Mil ~ ACATIII; UON

Time of use
13 yrs flying w/ military

CDA w/ mil reqt
small fleet (x3); Mil GPS /IFF
Mode 5; Time constrained 2yr
UON; $72M ~ACATIII; Full FAA
Cert Double $$ for cert portion;
safe carriage STC w/ military
risk to operate pending
approval

13 yrs flying w/ military

24 March 2022
Platform 1: IE1 & IP1 (pg. 2/3)
AW Certification Interview Key Code Phrases
Derek Dennis 1/3/2021
Q8

Q9

What level of Airworthiness certification
did you seek to accomplish through the Why did you strive for that certification
FAA? How much did you seek to
level?
accomplish through the TAA?
Date
Code Name Finding -> Certification Path
Factors for Cert Path
20211110 IE1
Initial: Safe Carriage STC/ w mil
The TAA told us we had to change gears.
functionality approved through TAA (too
difficult for FAA to certify); TAA proposed
Indepent Review Team while Safe
Carriage with pursuit to Full FAA
certification

20211110 IP1

Q10

What were the benefits or
drivers of this path?

Benefits
Safe Carriage / TAA IRT = Faster
fielding through Risk
assessment. Path to obtain full
FAA cert. Follows AF
philosophy of: commercial
derivative aircraft, have all
modifications done under the
same authority of the basic
aircraft. Mil Cert process and
FAA
cert process
veryand
different.
No benefit:
Not easy

Initial: Safe Carriage STC (FAA) w/ mil
Time constraint due to UON. FAA full
functionality approved through TAA plan certification would take too long.
Subjective process with the
Therefore Safe Carriage STC(FAA) w/ TAA TAA. What was previously
IRT assign AW risks.
agreed upon would change.
Cycles of little progress.
Difference between FAA and
TAA certification. MCO (FAA)
more straight forward and TAA.
Driver: TAA would assess risk to

Airworthiness Certification
Q12

Q11

Q13

Q14
Did you make multiple
What were the major setbacks adjustments to the initial AW
What were the costs of this
encountered or biggest
plan or Criteria Basis through
path?
moments of tension in the
the process? Did you meet all
certification path?
standards or able to show
compliance in every area?
Costs
Success rate
Setbacks / Difficulties
# of adjustments
Military requirements (Mil GPS) NO, not achieved. Have seen all Funding for a Full FAA cert, and Multiple adjustments: 2 plan
do not align with FAA functions downsides and no benefit yet. whether FAA had ability to
adjustments, Countless
cert rules of their cert path.
TAA set too high of risk, Still
certify. Military: IRT assessed Compliance adjustments for
Would be $$$ for FAA to
need PEO approval. Funding risk level higher than PMO or TAA MACC. PMO said Medium
certify. Have not succeeded in issues for Full FAA.
Ctr assessment of risk.
risk and TAA said High mitigate
Full FAA cert. Funding
to serious.
unavailable. "It cannot be
done." Will need hybrid cert
similar to IFF Install which was
limited
w/ mil
cert for
~$78 MilSTC
- safe
carriage
STCmilw/ No, not fully achieved. Safe
All of it was difficult and
Multiple adjustments.
Did you achieve the
Airworthiness certification
from the FAA and TAA that you
wanted? Were the benefits
sought achieved?

TAA IRT risk assessment. +$20 Carriage achieved. Risk
mil for Full FAA effort (Goc
approval awaits PEO signature.
Estimate) $54 mil (contractor
proposed). Full TAA was
estimated at $40Mil. Schedule
slips due to back and forths.
Busted 2 yr time to fly
operationally. Other program
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setbacks. TAA subjectiveness.
TAA views things very different
than FAA. Everything prior is
FAA certified and so trying to
have FAA and TAA align (SEAM)
brought tension. Program
Operational Schedule Conflicts
(small fleet). Safe carriage IRT

Additional contract scope for
FAA and ctr to meet tests for
TAA to bring down risk level.
(+$10mil). Met safe carriage
STC std, but need PEO approval
for operation.

Q15

Q16
Are you flying today on a
Military Type Certificate
What risks do you currently
(MTC), Military Flight
carry?
Release (MFR), or
Supplemental Type
Certificate (STC)?
Risk types
Flying Cert
4 serious level risks, number of MilGPS flies under Safe
lower risks of due to
Carriage STC. Once risk
noncompliances.
acceptance by PEO will
have MFR. MTC obtained
once a Full STC is
accomplished.

Overall AW risk was Serious

Safe carriage STC. Once
approved we will fly on
MFR and MTC potentially
combination of all three.
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Platform 1: IE1 & IP1 (pg. 3/3)
AW Certification Interview Key Code Phrases
Derek Dennis
1/3/2021
Q17

Reflections
Q19

Q18

What documents and
communications did you find
Was the path your program took
most helpful in establishing the the right path and why?
AW certification?
Date
Code Name Finding -> Known knowledge
20211110 IE1
The AW plan. Project Specific
Certification Plan (PSCP). Mil
Hdbk 516. MACC matrix.

20211110 IP1

Correct decision
Not the right path, we still cant
fly. FAA certifying the military
reqts is not feasible. Sounds
good from philophical
perspective but not realistic
perspective. MACC is only viable
method and you would still have
noncompliance. A better
understanding of the AC is
needed
and the
actualtouse
of the
Yes because
of trying
meet

Countless meetings with MCO
and TAA to get everyone on the the UON. Upfront impressions
same page.
made Seam method more
doable.

C-3

What is something you wish you
had or knew up front when
going for the AW certification?
Any future recommendations?

Q20
Who or what other programs
would be of good value for me
to pursue in an interview for
more data collection?

Lack of Knowledge
Contacts for Me
Needed more research into the ____, IFF
FAAs ability to certify military
functions. Don’t mix! When
going for as much original cert
possible stop at military
function and let mil do the rest,
because mil will get involved
eventually anyway.
Have accurate information
HNAG. AWACS (HBS)
before going into the mod.
Better understanding of how
the TAA aw process works.
Seems like there is a
quantitative metric missing from
TAA process. Don’t mix FAA and
TAA, go one way or the other.

24 March 2022
Platform 2: IE2 & IP2 (pg. 1/3)
AW Certification Interview Key Code Phrases
Derek Dennis
1/3/2021
Q1

Q2

About the Interviewee
Q3

What is your name, position or
How long have you worked in AC
title, and the program office
systems?
you work in?
Date
Code Name Finding -> Position Type
20211118 IE2
EN - Avionics Engineer

20211130 IP2

PM - Avionics IPT Lead

The Program

What modifications and platforms
have you worked on? What is the
most recent? When was it?

Q4

Q5

Q6

Q7

What is your role in the
modification?

What is the modification we
Was the original design of this
are talking about today? (Size,
How long has the Air Force
aircraft for the military, or is it a
Time functionality, ACAT level,
been utilizing the aircraft?
Commercial Derivative Aircraft?
Dollar Amount, etc)

Experience
30 yrs avionics experience

Experience
18-20 platforms: 2 heli, 3 mil, 10+
Com, 5+ MCDA

Position
8-9 yrs with program. Lead
Flight Deck EN, heavy hand in
aircraft mod design and aw
path. Negotiating with
Contractor, FAA and TAA.

Type of mod
AC type
small fleet: 2 aircraft; this
CDA w/ mil reqt
portion would be ACAT III
~$50M includes Mil GPS, box
level ~$8M, Integration/testing
efforts the remaining $42 Mil
connecting to FMS, IFF
transponders and auto pilot.
Start 2015/16; Mil GPS FAA Cert
so TSO 196 instead of MSO 145

Time of use
purchased in 2016. maintained
on ground. 0 flight hours.

20 mos about 2yrs

1 platform: 1 MCDA // 2 simulator
programs 1 mil, 1 MCDA

Make sure a solid design is
executed from the contractor.
And all occurs relatively on
time. 2 certifications hopefully
mostly FAA

small fleet: 2 aircraft VIP
CDA w/ mil reqt
transport;platform - ACAT I
~$3.9 Billion; Deliver 2025,
about 9 yrs total; FFP contract;
Mil GPS breakout maybe
~$10M; Mil GPS system in
addition to civil GPS system
(redudant systems). Lithium
battery in EGI cause wrinkle for
FAA cert

This particular model 0 hrs. but
others like it have been utilized
for ~30yrs
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Platform 2: IE2 & IP2 (pg. 2/3)
AW Certification Interview Key Code Phrases
Derek Dennis
1/3/2021
Q8

Q9

What level of Airworthiness certification
did you seek to accomplish through the Why did you strive for that certification
FAA? How much did you seek to
level?
accomplish through the TAA?
Date
Code Name Finding -> Certification Path
20211118 IE2
limited FAA certification: Full FAA cert
with statement of functionality on
military side.

20211130 IP2

Factors for Cert Path
Passenger commercial derivative aircraft is
pushed for FAA cert. Early talks FAA said
they could certify all major integration
aspects. Have good relationships with Ctrs.
FAA well established. Mil Airworthiness
would mimic alot of same tests. Military
mission but is still a civil aircraft. Learned
from other program horror stories.
Potential cost, time, schedule reasons.
Not military path because of lack of
organic manpower, access to data, would
need more control over ctrs.

Maximum FAA certification possible. Full AF Policy dictates it. Especially for
FAA certification minus Lithium batteries. commercial passenger air vehicle.
No mention of TAA involvement.
Additional testing for those to see if
certification is possible

Q10

Airworthiness Certification
Q12

Q11

Did you achieve the
Airworthiness certification
from the FAA and TAA that you
wanted? Were the benefits
sought achieved?

Q13
What were the major setbacks
encountered or biggest
moments of tension in the
certification path?

What were the benefits or
drivers of this path?

What were the costs of this
path?

Benefits
Not right personnel to do
organically. Cost schedule
savings. Right now everything is
OK.

Costs
Since military mod more
expensive than commercial
mods. Military equipment
creators don’t build to FAA
specs DO178 (SW) DO 254
(HW), DALs meaning extra
analyses, and compliances
needed. Ctr often try to push
tasks to mil cert for risk
acceptance. Extra push on ctrs
needed. EN stance if FAA wont
certify why should I? Hard to
get good data from ctr. Either
FAA or Military dont have much
experience can be harder to
convince something has met
compliance. Tough to make
sure everything that should be
on contract is on contract. FAA
TAA pick your poison.

Success rate
In progress. Approved and
accepted AW plans with FAA
and AF. Big aircraft platform
schedule has 18 mo slip from
2024 to late 2025 2026. Cost:
FAA gives 5 yr and can pull rug
from under you. 18-20 flight
deck STCs.

Not having to do a brand new
certification. Certification
focused only on mil gps system
and its integration. Policy
pushes us to not need to certify
things already FAA certified. To
recertify flght deck for military
would be much more involved.
Cant really imagine it. Ctr
created a SIL of MCS and Flight
Deck.

No WBS for effort-lack insight.
Lithium batteries driving
additionl work for certification.
Contract struggles for
additionals work.

Work in Progress. Ctr needs to battery issue of no certification
submit cert paperwork still for path. Been addressed as extra
FAA. Lithium battery issues. 16 effort. Not influenced timeline.
cert plans held up.
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Setbacks / Difficulties
Nothing with this exact mod.
EFBs had issues - FAA wants
DAL level D when all industry
builds at DAL level E of device.
Disagreement on essential nonessential. Interpretation of
policy. Q14: "Boeing decided to
do was was basically dust their
hands off and say and we can't
mess with this stuff. It's too. It's
too much of a pain. It's it's
impossible. They're never going
to pass the test blah blah blah"

Q14
Did you make multiple
adjustments to the initial AW
plan or Criteria Basis through
the process? Did you meet all
standards or able to show
compliance in every area?
# of adjustments
Always adjustments. Not much
insight, without pushing for it.
Had direct comms with FAA,
MCO, and Ctr. lithium battery had separate effort for
certification. Looked into
alternate battery HW.

Q15

Q16
Are you flying today on a
Military Type Certificate
What risks do you currently
(MTC), Military Flight
carry?
Release (MFR), or
Supplemental Type
Certificate (STC)?
Risk types
Flying Cert
If FAA cert is not accomplished Eventually Full MTC, STC
then unable to get mil cert.
for mod rolls up into
everyone on board with FAA
MTC. Military has
cert and no real other plan.
ownership.

"Not from our perspective."
potential for adjustments of
how much testing with FAA vs
Mil.

No significant risks. FAA hold
the risks. Integration process
locked down.

Eventually STC
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AW Certification Interview Key Code Phrases
Derek Dennis
1/3/2021
Q17

Q18

Reflections
Q19

What documents and
communications did you find
Was the path your program took
most helpful in establishing the the right path and why?
AW certification?
Date
Code Name Finding -> Known knowledge
20211118 IE2
Up front discussions with all
stakeholders directly. FAA, TAA
PMO, Users, Hanscom Mil GPS,
all technical folks. Look down
both paths extensively.

20211130 IP2

only tangentially involved.

Q20

What is something you wish you
had or knew up front when
going for the AW certification?
Any future recommendations?

Who or what other programs
would be of good value for me
to pursue in an interview for
more data collection?

Correct decision
Yes. Would not continue if not.
Could not staff necessary team
for military certification. AF as
whole Short staffed. Only wrong
is being FFP. A lot of information
we don’t receive.

Lack of Knowledge
Need tp know as much up front
as possible. Certain design
changes cause to go back to
drawing board. Know what type
of information is needed to
show compliance. Understand
how FAA works and how TAA
works. Try to learn from other
program offices and their
mistakes. Know with FAA cert,
not much insight for PMO as far
as data except in ways of
manuals and diagrams. know
what is a critical safety function
and any levels of thread anlaysis
needed. Thread analysis are
expensive and time intensive. 1.
Can this be done through FAA?
2. Is that the path we want to
take? Easier as a passenger
aircraft.

Contacts for Me
___________,___________.
KC-46, MH-139 Helicopter CDAJoseph Salom. C32 E4B blue
and white aircraft. Matt
Smearcheck TAA_____. Brian
Welch TAA.

Yes. Guidance requires it. If
going military a lot of redundant
work would be done on systems
already FAA certified, versus just
looking at new system.

Wish I knew the FAA process
KC 10, C32, C37. The CDA
more. Really understand the
office at Tinker.
FAA process, and make sure the
contractor understands and bids
a contract representative of
what needs to be done. Have
strong communication with FAA
and MCO
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AW Certification Interview Key Code Phrases
Derek Dennis
1/3/2021
Q1

Q2

About the Interviewee
Q3

What is your name, position or
How long have you worked in AC
title, and the program office
systems?
you work in?
Date
Code Name Finding -> Position Type
20211213 IE3
EN - Avionics Section Chief

20211124 IP3

PM - Acq avionics section

The Program

What modifications and platforms
have you worked on? What is the
most recent? When was it?

Q4

Q5

Q6

Q7

What is your role in the
modification?

What is the modification we
Was the original design of this
are talking about today? (Size,
How long has the Air Force
aircraft for the military, or is it a
Time functionality, ACAT level,
been utilizing the aircraft?
Commercial Derivative Aircraft?
Dollar Amount, etc)

Experience
21 yrs ac systems

Experience
5 platforms: Mil attack/fighter

Position
Section Chief to help determine
if a mod should be reportable
or not to the TAA and help build
airworthiness package and
design criteria to present up to
DOE and OP

Type of mod
AC type
$20 M Guard & Reserve Funds; military aircraft
Funding issuers fears of
platform shutdown. Same GPS
box new GPS card, add DAE
and new antennae.
Downselect 2014, Real program
start 2019 to present. At least
139 Guard fleet.

Time of use
1976

2 yrs experience

1 platform: mil, Worked in test
centers, and ICBM

Program manager over digital
beam stearing and upgraded
the Nav to combat attack.
From 10: Make sure we meet
timeline.

Development ~$20M Guard & military aircraft
Reserve Funds. Full fleet 281
Addtl $35-40M for full
production. Deemed formfit
function replacement, but DAE
really made it a development
program. Never serviced in ac.

early 70s, ~50yrs old
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Platform 3: IE3 & IP3 (pg. 2/3)
AW Certification Interview Key Code Phrases
Derek Dennis
1/3/2021
Q8

Q9

What level of Airworthiness certification
did you seek to accomplish through the Why did you strive for that certification
FAA? How much did you seek to
level?
accomplish through the TAA?
Date
Code Name Finding -> Certification Path
20211213 IE3
No FAA for mil aircraft. EN process
military certification thru DOE and TAA if
reportable. Follow 62601 and Mil Hdbk
516C.

20211124 IP3

Risk level low and certification fairly
easy. Not certifying whole aircraft. Most
done through TAA. No basis for FAA,
although FAA like requirements. Sign offs
from AF Mil GPS office. Large matrix for
certifying.

Factors for Cert Path
Mandated military certification. Report up
to DOE to determine if reportable or not.
Knew we would not be reportable. No TAA
involvement. AW decision delegated from
DOE to CE. Most mods are nonreportable.

Q10

Airworthiness Certification
Q12

Q14
Did you make multiple
What were the major setbacks adjustments to the initial AW
What were the benefits or
What were the costs of this
encountered or biggest
plan or Criteria Basis through
drivers of this path?
path?
moments of tension in the
the process? Did you meet all
certification path?
standards or able to show
compliance in every area?
Benefits
Costs
Success rate
Setbacks / Difficulties
# of adjustments
MACC process ensures safe to A lot of the work comes on the Yes. Successful GPS in jammed 2 major setbacks: PM/ACC
Didn’t have to change anything.
fly. Multiple checks ensure no PMO to prove things out.
enviroments in the field.
pushing for Mcode w/o EN
Just some minor talking
critical safety of flight issues. In Personnel doing calculations
support. Tech unavailable.
between EGI and DAE
accordance w/ SE processes. themselves. 1/4 cost of
Cause program delays. //
adjustments. AW stayed the
program directly related to AW
Distinguishing between critical same. If issue contract
work, but 100% of effort prove
safety item and requirements. adjustments or risk anlysis
that it is airworthy. Good SE
Being "last aircraft in the
would be used
process but a lot of work and
inventory" targeted for Mcan be more focused on
code. "Always get the scraps"
process and whether or not is
best design.

Engineering team decided. Submission up Drivers: Engineering Community
to CE boss at AFSC (DOE). Authorizing a
couple aircraft for install and flight test.
Any changes would be addressed and then
signed as permanent mod.

Q11

Q13

Did you achieve the
Airworthiness certification
from the FAA and TAA that you
wanted? Were the benefits
sought achieved?

Time, multiple layers of
At least finished flight testing,
briefings up to chain to get go on track for fielding.
ahead. Lacked a prime
contractor, more coordination
fell on PM in PMO of mulitple
silo contracts integrating on
same system. A-10 lab testing
lacked so more push for flight
testing. Small program in fighter
attack world, lacked support.
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Test scheduling time. AntiJam
opportunities slim. Still need
coordination with FAA.
Technical difficulty between
EGI and DAE.

Q15

What risks do you currently
carry?

Risk types
No risks.

No adjustments. Small scope Reason for reqt, combat
fairly easy. Some unneccessary jamming environment, was
tests.
successful. No real risks. Plenty
of test flights. Flight risk
mitigation flip breaker on
aircraft revert to LOS.

Q16
Are you flying today on a
Military Type Certificate
(MTC), Military Flight
Release (MFR), or
Supplemental Type
Certificate (STC)?
Flying Cert
MFR as ammendment to
MTC. Flying cert is
dependent on DOE. Old
DOE said MFR, except for
large mods then issue
new MTC. New DOE
wants new MTC for every
mod.

Can't remember. Doesn’t
really know the
certificate
names/meanings.

24 March 2022
Platform 3: IE3 & IP3 (pg. 3/3)
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AW Certification Interview Key Code Phrases
Derek Dennis
1/3/2021
Q17

Q18

Reflections
Q19

What documents and
communications did you find
Was the path your program took
most helpful in establishing the the right path and why?
AW certification?
Date
Code Name Finding -> Known knowledge
20211213 IE3
MIL handbook 15C MIL
Handbook 461, 464 and 882
from system safety perspective
are the big the best guidance.
Mil hdbk 516 MACC to build AW
checklists. Experience and
guidance from CE.

20211124 IP3

Correct decision
Not right. The only path.
Required by AF as the best
process.

Engineering question. (PM lack Yes. Low risk effort and properly
of knowledge). Had a matrix to manned to do the work.
track AW that had to be
Certification is hard work.
approved up EN chain of
command.

Q20

What is something you wish you
had or knew up front when
going for the AW certification?
Any future recommendations?

Who or what other programs
would be of good value for me
to pursue in an interview for
more data collection?

Lack of Knowledge
"better clear definition of what
is reportable and not reportable
as well as what is a critical
safety item in what is not a
critical safety item."
misunderstandings lead to extra
work that may be unneccesary.
The process is long and cannot
be rushed. Rushing would have
less documentation and could
impact safety. Digital
Engineering could be future path
of going fast and still doing due
diligence for the AW cert.
Q11:"What you don't know is
what's gonna kill you." "And
make sure you know what the
heck you're talking about when
you're doing these
modifications." Q20: PMs know
the technology but dont try and
be an engineer. Trust the EN
team and understand the
process takes time.

Contacts for Me
F-16, our sister platform. Do
most the same mods (except
Mil GPS) after them but receive
extra scrutiny when going for
reviews. They also have a
Prime Contractor.

not aircraft background so no
knowledge of AW processes, led
to trial by fire. Make sure there
is a prime contractor on effort.
Too much for PMO to track.

A-10 additional contacts: Le
Shi Sueng (Albert); Christian;
Michael Hackett (CE); ____
(EN); Pamela Lee (Division
Chief, PM); Jaclyn Melton; John
DiCaprio
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TAA Representative for Platform 1 & 2: IT1 (pg. 1/3)
AW Certification Interview Key Code Phrases
Derek Dennis
1/3/2021
Q1

Q2

About the Interviewee
Q3

What is your name, position or
How long have you worked in AC
title, and the program office
systems?
you work in?
Date
Code Name Finding -> Position Type
Experience
20211215 IT1
TAA - Technical Expert CDA, EN 12 yrs ac systems / 3 yrs TAA

The Program

What modifications and platforms
have you worked on? What is the
most recent? When was it?
Experience
As DTA: Multiple MCDA aircraft
including FMS // As EN: 1 MCDA, 2
mil UAS

C-13

Q4

Q5

What is your role in the
modification?

What is the modification we
Was the original design of this
are talking about today? (Size,
How long has the Air Force
aircraft for the military, or is it a
Time functionality, ACAT level,
been utilizing the aircraft?
Commercial Derivative Aircraft?
Dollar Amount, etc)

Position
Type of mod
delegated technical
Mil GPS - defer further detail to
aiworthiness authority/ Advise the PMOs
PMO of airworthiness strategy.
Guide to following AF policy
and criteria basis and
compliance reports

Q6

Q7

AC type
Time of use
2 of 3 aircraft were MCDA.
Defer to PMO
Those 2 I worked with. These 2
selected with the basis that
they were FAA certified

24 March 2022
TAA Representative for Platform 1 & 2: IT1 (pg. 2/3)
AW Certification Interview Key Code Phrases
Derek Dennis
1/3/2021
Q8

Q9

What level of Airworthiness certification
did you seek to accomplish through the Why did you strive for that certification
FAA? How much did you seek to
level?
accomplish through the TAA?
Date
Code Name Finding -> Certification Path
Factors for Cert Path
20211215 IT1
Both Progs should have pursued
AF policy to use FAA max extent possible.
Full/limited FAA cert to the maximum
The base ac certified by FAA, so maintain
ability of all milGPS aspects. AB 360, 8110- the standards approvals and safety
101. FAA wont cover all military pieces assessments for modifications since there
and so compliances for antijam etc would are interdependencies. Mixing the
come through mil statement of
certification paths cause gaps
functionality. // Prog 2: Limited FAA
certification w/ statement of
functionality. Complies with AF policy.
Prog 1: military certification milhdbk 516.
TAA told to pursue FAA and so interim risk
based assessment while future plan for
full FAA certification.

Q10

Airworthiness Certification
Q12

Q11

What were the benefits or
drivers of this path?

What were the costs of this
path?

Benefits
Ensuring all apsects are under
FAA certification. Safe carriage
and Provisions only doesn’t
have FAA certify any system
integration aspects. We don’t
have access to all data so more
the FAA does is better.
Integration will have tentacles
touching many pieces, limited
confines most of that under
FAA and TAA looks at very
specific feature of mil GPS
system. Dont need green
aircraft data. More TAA
involvement opens to more
uncertainty.

Costs
FAA route traditionally labeled
as more expensive. Lose risk
relief valve from military if not
meeting compliance. But in
reality work needing to get
done is similar so no real
difference. "You know Mil Cert
doesn't mean no cert right?"

C-14

Did you achieve the
Airworthiness certification
from the FAA and TAA that you
wanted? Were the benefits
sought achieved?
Success rate
____ still at serious risk, need
full FAA cert. ____ cert basis
approved, still no flight test.

Q13
What were the major setbacks
encountered or biggest
moments of tension in the
certification path?
Setbacks / Difficulties
lithium battery. ____ faced
more challenges assessing
military AW for system since
intended for FAA. Lack of data
to show compliances. Having to
do safety critical function
assesment and threat anlysis,
TAA requirments different than
FAA reqts.

Q14
Did you make multiple
adjustments to the initial AW
plan or Criteria Basis through
the process? Did you meet all
standards or able to show
compliance in every area?
# of adjustments
P2: multiple revisions. But
necessary to be successful.
Early AW plan that gets multiple
iterations. P1: from TAA
perspective has no certification
basis. Would have met some
compliances in mil cert but not
all because of data availability.

Q15

Q16

What risks do you currently
carry?

Are you flying today on a
Military Type Certificate (MTC),
Military Flight Release (MFR), or
Supplemental Type Certificate
(STC)?

Risk types
P2: No AW risks. Any risks
should be rolled into the FAA
structured reqts. Once flight
test is reached should only be
proving that everything is
correct. P1: Safety critical
function risks associated w/
lithium battery. Risks are
assessed during a compliance/
AW assessment. TAA process
doesn’t need risks to be
accepted until you go to fly.

Flying Cert
An MTC or MFR in the end.
CDA will obtain STCs that will
roll into AF approval for MTC.
Use of aircraft has to be
consistent with the STC if new
configuration or capability
occurs.

24 March 2022
TAA Representative for Platform 1 & 2: IT1 (pg. 3/3)
AW Certification Interview Key Code Phrases
Derek Dennis
1/3/2021
Q17

Reflections
Q19

Q18

What documents and
communications did you find
Was the path your program took
most helpful in establishing the the right path and why?
AW certification?
Date
Code Name Finding -> Known knowledge
20211215 IT1
AW plan before Contract
Award. Knowing the military
side of requiremtents for AW
cert basis and approval from
TAA early on. Know the AW
seam - understanding all
aspects from FAA and TAA and
any interdependencies that
could lead to gaps between the
two different compliance
assessments.

Correct decision
P2: Right path. Critical Safety
Function touching avionics stays
within FAA cert. P1: Not right
path. Would have been more
beneficial for FAA cert from the
start. Program reqts are still
being met.

C-15

Q20

What is something you wish you
had or knew up front when
going for the AW certification?
Any future recommendations?

Who or what other programs
would be of good value for me
to pursue in an interview for
more data collection?

Lack of Knowledge
AW plan established before the
RFP to contractor. So they
properly propose. All
stakeholders involved and in
agreement before press, with a
TAA established Seam.
Understand your reqt and
modification. Certain things line
up better for which level of FAA
certification. Air refueling - safe
carriage, Mil GPS - limited, ARC
210 - provisions only or safe
carriage. Safe carriage dont
affect avionics.

Contacts for Me
For future research diversify
what type of modifications
maybe more miliaristic mods
and or platforms. Also tracing
a new platform and what
decisions are best to go FAA or
Military on a new platform
based on requirements.

24 March 2022
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Appendix D: PM Guidance Sheet
What to Think About for MCDA Airworthiness Certification,
A PM’s Guide to Better Airworthiness Decisions
Know Your Platform:
• Military Commercial Derivative Aircraft (MCDA) or Military Specific Aircraft (MSA)
• Mod/Platform Mission Type: Communication or Passenger seek FAA approval,
Weapon-Based Mil Reqt seek Military Airworthiness (read Order 8110.101A)
• Prime Ktr as Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM): clear communication with FAA
• Reach out to other platforms that have similar requirements
Understand Airworthiness Processes:
• Read AFPD 62-6: USAF Airworthiness – “the Air Force shall obtain and maintain Federal
Aviation Administration type certification to the maximum extent practical.”
• Read and Keep Copy of FAA Order 8110.101A – know your stakeholders and certification
levels
• Read AWB-360 for MCDA AW “Seam” // AWB-100 for AW terms & definitions
• Familiarize with any applicable AWBs - https://daytonaero.com/usaf-mil-hdbk-516airworthiness-certification-library-2/
• Take AIR-116: Introduction to AF Airworthiness Certification (ACQNow)
• See Back for Levels of FAA approval and the AW seam (Fig 1, AWB 360)
• Talk to FAA and TAA as early and as often as possible (once you here of a potential
reqt)
Decision Factors: (in order of importance)
1. Level of Integration – Where does the new system touch and how does it affect the
existing system
2. Disconnects – Know the platform and AW processes and communicate with
stakeholders well before Contract Award or Acquisition Strategy occurs.
3. Performance – The capability of the system, the mission of the aircraft
4. Policy – What is the furthest FAA can certify on the system
5. Personnel – Is your office structured for a certain certification level (most MCDAs
would not be able to handle the workload of a military certification)
6. Cost – Similar work would have to be executed for military cert or Full FAA. Refrain
from work that would overlap causing double payment.
7. Schedule – No path is significantly faster than the other. Shortcuts such as risk
approvals lead to more disconnects ending in negligible time savings.
Airworthiness is ultimately about knowing you are safe to fly and so the technical and system
related aspects come before programmatic constraints like Cost and Schedule.
Assumption Fallacy:
• Military certification is cheaper and faster due to the ability to accept risk
o Do not go into a project with this assumption; it can lead to a lot of disconnects
across your decision factors and make you lose sight of the best path
D-1
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“AW seam” - The junction between the FAA and USAF compliance assessments.
Full Definition - Some aspects of the design and/or operations may be ineligible for
FAA type certification due to a violation or lack of FAA AW regulations.2 The USAF
assesses, to the applicable criteria in MIL-HDBK-516, the aspects (i.e., CUE) not
planned to be included in the FAA’s finding of compliance.

Reference: AWB-360: Commercial Derivative Aircraft Airworthiness
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